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Source of Control. Value of timely action. Proposals to avoid
or meet crises. Requirements of democratic government. Direct
and representative democracy. Congress and improved representation. Powers of congress and the states. Power and term of the
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worked out in another. Personality and the office of president.
Congress and the bureaucracy. Fads in thinking. Scandals and
abuses. Need for internal and external control of bureaucracy.
Reapplication of· the principles of the founding fathers. ·Need
for a revitalized Constitution and increased democracy. Democratic input in policy ·formation. Renewal of personnel. More
timely decisions. Restudy of the British system of government
for concepts applicable to the United States.
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.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Diagnosis. Weakening condition. Entrenched power. Special
privilege. Seniority system. Filibuster. Inaction and undue
delay. lobbying and special interest. Senate no longer representative of the states.
Prescription. A single house congress. Election of the a.ttorney general by the house. Election of supreme c.ourt justices by the house subject to confirmation by the senate.
Transfer of the senate to the executive branch. Increased
representation. Voting in the house by concurrent majority,
including a majority from a majority of the states as well
as a majority of the members. Having three committees of the
whole and a rules committee to govern the agenda of each.
Sel,_ection of committee members, half by party leade.rship to
represent special interest and half by lot to represent the
general public. Selection of chairman of each committee by
majority party members voting by secret ballot. Requirement
that bills be reported out of committee within thirty days
with provision for extension of time at option of house.
Redistribution of work load through new committees parallel
to major agencies. Establish committee on repeal and,recodification.
vii

27

DISTRICT COUNCILORS
Diagnosis. Insufficient opportunity to keep track of Congress
and Congressmen by the voters. Newspapers, TV, radio and other
mass media insuffici~nt. Scandals and special legislation too
common.
Prescription.· Five district councilors to be elected by district within and from each congressional district. Increase
points of view represented. Relieve congressman of much casework and permit him or her to concentrate on legislation.
District councilors tE serve as members of a mixed caucus for
proposing party nominees for president. Function as presidential electors. Observe and check on congressmen. As trained
and seasoned candidates· compete for office.of congressman.
Limiting maximum time to be served to twenty years. Developing legislative federalism.
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Present senate weakens Congress. Delays action.
Increases appropriations. Does not represent states. Inadequate oversight of the executive branch. C.Oncentrates too
much power in conference committees and in senators who filibuster. Frustrates majority control and action.
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Prescription. Place senate in the executive branch. Retain
power of senate to confirm appointments and ratify treaties.
Add power to senate· to reconfirm appointments periodically and
have instant fiscal, personnel, program and policy audit of
the executive branch with full access to pertinent official
records. Senato.rs to become ex officio members of all departments, boards and commissions. Senate to have power to disallow rules and regulations having the force and effect of
law. Senate to have no power to pass legislation. Election
of senatorial appointments secretary by the senate to have
sole power to make all appointments with the president one day
a week. Committee size and membership to be flexible to per~
mit all members so desiring to be on any and all committees.
Senate to submit periodic reports to the president and to congress. Senate to function in advisory capacity to the president. Provide double accountability of government officials.
Senators to initiate impeachment proceedings. Prosecution to
be in hands of attorney general and conducted in the house.
Senators to be ombudsmen. Membership, three from each state
with overlapping terms of nine years and a maximum. of twenty
years.
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Diagnosis. Historical precedent and need for council. Too
much advice and policy formation from appointed sources and
not enough from electe·d sources. Failure to make sufficient
use of the cabinet in advisory capacity.
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Prescription. Election by the senate of a bipartisan continuing presidential council of fifteen members from within its own
membership. Selection to be made of five members by the fifty
members or·political parties thereof by secret ballot. Provision for advice from also rans and past government officials.
Constitutional requirement for meeting with the president and
refusal thereof to be an -impeachable offense. Presidential
councilors and senators grooming themselves for the presidency.
VICE PRESIDENT AND SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY

42

Diagnosis. Vice president no longer the second best man. Chosen to balance the ticket. Having little power in the senate.
Not well informed or used in the executive branch. Inadequate
choice or preparation for presidential successor.
Prescription. Choosing a person capable of being president as
the running mate. Electing the vice president elect as senator
at large to have full rights and privileges of that body. Possibility of selecting two vice presidents elect. Improving the
selection process. Requiring that all in the line of succession to the presidency have the same prerequisites as those required of the president.
PRESIDENT ELECT
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Diagnosis. Lack,of adequate prepar~tion of president.
quate time for ~roper transition to the office.

Inade-

Prescription. Lengthening the transition period. Having the
president serve two years as president elect to gain on the
job training. Delaying taking office as president providing
two years to ·investigate election irregularities prior to the
president',s taking office as president. Providing additional
time for formation of budget, planning programs, observing
congress, and gaining information on foreign policy. Stabilizing influence of a longer transitibn period on the economy
and foreign policy.
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PRESIDENT
Diagnosis. Lack of either legislative or executive experience
or both at the national level. Inadequate control of the president in the light of increased power. Use of executive agreements to avoid need for ratification by the senate. Failure of
the president to remove individuals considered persona non
grata. Lack of opportunity to give president unwanted advice.
Abuse in use of power of office by incumbent to gain reelection.
Prescription. Selecting president elect nominee from the ·senate whic~ has been placed in the executive branch. Using two
years as president elect to learn more about the office of the
president. Requiring a two thirds majority vote of the Congress
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to grant war· powers and a simple majority not subject to veto
to remove them. Requiring ratification of executive agreements
by the senate. Permitting removal of presidential appointees,
subject to confirmation by the senate, by action of either the
president or the senate. Having the president serve two years
as president elect and six years as president. Providing for
vote of confidence each two years and removal if that vote were
not favorable by a majority. Having him serve only one elected
term.
ELECTIONS
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Diagnosis. Elections costly, traumatic, dishonest and divisive, creating false impressions of mandates and popularity.
Elec~oral college no longer important in nominating process
and an inaccurate recorder of the popular vote. Direct primary not sufficiently influencing the choice of party nomiees
for president. Increased voter apathy. Electoral advantage
of incumbency. Insufficient competition from trained'candidates. Lack of ethics among politicians and insufficient
strength of laws and committees controlling elections. Process of government affected too much by election campaigns.
Prescription; Decreasing cost of elections by cutting size of
districts, shortening time for campaigning. Decreasing•size
of electoral college district to make recount feasible. Not
having-electoral college vote cast as·a block for candidate
winning a plurality of popular votes in the state. Increasing
size of electoral college to three thousand. Having the electoral college function as a mixed caucus for party nomination
for president elect and vice president elect, choosing three
candidates on basis of ability. Having the party convention·
choose from these the two candidates with· the best opportunity
of winning. Having nationwide direct closed primaries of each
party to let the party members choose the final nominee. Convoking the 3,000 district councilors to decide contested elections for president elect and vice president elect. Providing
for overlapping terms and smoother transition. Decreasing or
eliminating the opportunity for an incumbent to succeed himself in office. Increasing the competition for office by increasing the number of trained candidates. Providing for continuity of government during campaigns by decreasing the number of offices to be filled at any one time~

APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL
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Diagnosis. Lack of provision for senate alone to remove officials. No provision for periodic reconfirmation. Impeachment
and conviction too traumatic.
Prescription, Permitting· senate acting alone to remove official by a two thirds vote. Continuing president 1 s power to
remove. Providing for senate confirmation of more individuals
in high government positions now subject only to appointment
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by president. Providing for periodic reconfirmation of policy
forming officials and federal court judges at all levels.

BUREAUCRACY
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Diagnosis. Bureaucrats overspecialized and overinfluenced by
special interest groups. Government hampered by excessive
rules, regulations, directives and procedures. Rewards for
failure instead of for success. waste from false economy.
Antidemocratic tendency of the bureaucracy, superannuated and
overspecialized personnel. Overprotection of the agencies.
Insufficient opportunity for confirmation and reconfirmation
of appointees. Bureaucracy unrepresentative in character and
open to problems of conflict of interest. Having too many
new programs and· agencies added to the Executive Office of
the President. Failure to place agency properly when established aausing need for later reorganization.
Prescription. Seeking broader trained generalists. Using
experts for advice but not decision making. ·cutting down excessive rules and regulations. Having policy determine the
.use of money. Increasing control over.-welfare spending. Extending the senate's power of confirmation and providing for
decennial reconfirmation of bureau chiefs and other high government officials. Providing for.broader representation on
advisory committees, boards and commissions to avoid overrepresentation of special interests. Having the senate rather
than the president select the members of boards and connnissions. Providing for lateral entry and lateral transfer of
personnel to add a variety of experience 'and ·avoid provincialism, networks of special privilege and even dishonesty. Phasing out some of the federal bureaucracy and making its talent
available to the states.
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COURTS
Diagnosis. Protection of court to promote impartial judgment
resulting in overprotection. Political implications of high
percentage of judges being ·appointed belonging to same party
of the president appointing them. Implications of selection
of judges by the president. Policy making by interpretation.
Differing standards of courts compared to the majority of
citizens. Renewal of the court dependent upon death and resignation, possible but not probable impeachment and conviction.
Prescription. Requirement that judges contribute to their own
retirement. Election of judges by the Congress.subject to
· confirmation by the .senate to avoid having a chief justice appointed by the president preside over his trial. Having judges
reconfirmed decennially. Requiring judges to place their inve~troents in.a blind trust upon confirmation and not permitting
them to receive other income from outside sources while on the
bench. Not permitting judges to be advocates of public causes
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while on the bench. Giving Congress the power to reverse decisions on constitutional questions by a three fourths concurrent majority vote.
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FEDERALISM AND COMMUNITY
Diagnosis. Decreasing representation, overconsolidation, loss
of community,· and loss of individualism. Increasing differences between,. core city and suburbs of.largest metropolitan
areas. Increasing fragmentation of metropolitan government.
Changing from federalism toward the unitary form of government.
Increasing centralization and consolidation.
Prescription. Deliberate decentralization •. cutting problems
down to size. Decreasing the size of school and classes. Emphasizing high moral standards for the protection of both individuals and society. Establishing tax incentives to encourage growth of metropolitan areas of 500,000 or less population.
Freeing the national arena for national issues· by deferring .to
state and local judgments. Providing income tax revenue adequate for state and local needs, Eliminating the at large districts as unrepresentative of the citizens within the geographical areas of the city. Giving cities of over three million
population full power and representation as states. Granting
statehood to regions within states having over three million
population.

DEMOCRACY AND THE ECONOMY
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Diagnosis. The losing of political and economic liberty
through the growth of monopolies, conglomerates and multinational corporations. Continuing foreign aid without sufficient determination that it will be used wisely. Failing to
provide loan funds for building at a reasonable rate of interest. Using grants-in-aid to distort state spending and increase federal control over state activities. Spending of
revenue sharing funds for capital goods and things, but not
for services. Failing to stockpile food and strategic materials. Increasing trade with the USSR. Getting caught by
the over ordering of wheat by the USSR. Failing to recognize
the danger of communist totalitarianism. Weaknesses in thinking about ideologies and their followers.
Prescription. Using low interest loans to encourage home
building and home ownership. Limiting foreign aid, Returning
nearly all of the income from the federal income tax that is
not needed for national defense or pilot ·projects to the states
on a per capita and need basis. Having the federal government
raise tIDCes during wartime, especially excess profits taxes.
Stockpiling food and strategic material.. Refraining from trading with the USSR. Establishing .a government corporation to
trade with the USSR when-such trading does take place. Controlling size of corporation and government. Recognizing that
communist totalitarianism is as bad as Nazi totalitarianism •.
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Recognizing weaknesses in present day American thinking.
Avoiding foreign negotiations during periods of internal weakness. Developing a systematic method of gradual renewal of
leadership.

DEMOCRACY AND THE MIDDLE CLASS
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Diagnosis. Middle and lower classes endangered by overconcen~
tration of wealth. Competition being destroyed and.corporations
continuing to grow. Dangers in bigness per se.
Prescription. Scaling down of subsidies to be available only to
the smaller economic units. Increasing enforcement of antit.rust
laws. Disposing of excess property of corporations. Congres.s
setting a limit on the. size of corporations, making exceptions
for natural monopolies such as public utilities. Prohibiting
interlocking directorates. Increasing taxes as the corporation
grows. Doing away with tax breaks for the wealthy. Tying tax
rates for those of moderate and lower incomes to the buying
power of the dollar. Increasing tax rates fo~ those in the
higher income brackets during inflation. Levying a graduated
property tax on the bigger corporations and on corporate farms.
Creation of a new Bank of the United States. Granting tax offsets to college ·students for money spent for college tuition.
Starting With a lower minimum wage for those eighteen years old
and increasing it yearly to full amount at twenty-one. Creating more sheltered workshops. Providing for more gradual retirement.
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Diagnosis. Democracy being taken for granted. Homes where
special privilege is taught preparing a destructive element
to society. Granting of welfare funds without expecting something in return. Not requiring a suitable home for thos~ receiving assistance. Failing to adequately protect neglected
or abused children. Improper payments to clients, fraud and
waste.
Prescription. Placing more emphasis on teaching democracy in
the home. Having families get together at least once a week.
Teaching responsibility. Adequate diet. Granting welfare as
a paycheck and expecting services rendered for it. Expecting·
welfare mother to render a minimum standard of family care.
Not condoning poor living condit~ons. Providing positive incentives to improve conditions in.the home.
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CONCLUSION
Returning· to colonial and early constitutional principles
would establish the. framework for the middle class to present
problems in a democratic fashion. Channels would be avail~
able for gradual change in leaders and policy. The framework
for feedback and democratic control wciuld be available. Since
xiii

the present party and governmental system seem to cater to the
rich, the elitists and those on welfare, the proposed changes
are needed to protect the middle class. Evidence of discontent
with the two major parties might indicate the development of a
party for the middle class. With the decline of the middle
class the extremes would be left to fight it out. Gradual
change needs to be made while there is still time. Acceptance
and use of some of these proposals would push us in the direction of more democratic control and a more democratic society.
we would have a revitalized constitution. Increased democracy
would be possible.
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PROLOGUE
Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay!
Princes and Lords may flourish, or may fade;
A breath can make them, as a breath has made;
But a bold Peasantry, their country's pride,
When once destroyed, can never be supplied!
A time there was, ere England's griefs began,
When every rood of ground maintained its man-.
For him light labour spread her wholesome store,
Just gave what life required; but gave no morel
His best companions, Innocence and Health;
And his best riches, Ignorance of Wealth!

But Times are altered. Trade's unfeeling Train
Usurp the land, and dispossess the swain.
Along the lawn, where scattered hamlets rose,
Unwieldy Wealth and cumbrous Pomp repose,
And every want to Opulence allied,
And every pang that Folly pays to pride.
Oliver Goldsmith
Goldsmith, in his Deserted Village, repeats the feelings of the
dispossessed. He shows well the human losses that are far greater than
that of land alone. The movement of population to the cities in his
time, parallels somewhat a like migration in Roman history of the First
Century B.C. These are similar t~ recent migrations. In some ways all
three are fully as tragic. In the declining period of Rome, the poor
were flocking to the cities to be fed and entertained by circuses, including the throwing of Christians to the lions. In modern times, the
poor have flocked to the cities to be fed, entertained and be drawn
into riots. Modern spectacles result from the throwing of Christian
principles to the wolves. Are we to repeat Rome's stagnation, loss of
inner strength and.morality? Shall it be our standard, also to bow to
opulence and consider ourselves above the law and guilty only when
caught?
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INTRODUCTION
Many of these proposals are old and generally accepted as essential
to the development and maintenance of democracy. Others are new or used
in new places. The problem is one of implementation in the face of opposition from those in favored positions. How can power be taken
through the democratic process from those who have it? The answer is
found in the nature of mankind, that once they get too much power they
are inclined to abuse it and thereby lose their influence. Watergate
and related instances typify this situation. Once sufficiently alerted,
the electorate reasserts control.
The difficulty lies in the fact that excess breeds excess, and the
pendulum swings from one extreme to another. The challenge in a democracy is how to atop movements before they go too far, so that they are
corrective without becoming destructive or nondemocratic. Change should
occur in the lull following a crisis before the next crisis sets in.
Those needing control should accept it gracefully.
Source of Control
Much control needs to be. self-control exerted from within. That
which the executive branch corrects by itself, Congress will not have
to control. Whatever the·executive branch refuses to correct may well
lead to stronger control of the President. If Congress does not enact
laws and if the executive branch does not enforce laws that will ~on
trol overconsolidation of wealth, the electorate, after long suffering,
will change both.
Direct election of senators came because the Senate was practically a millionaire's club catering to big business. The Sherman AntiTrust Act was brought on by the abuses of business. The oil companies
lacking self-control will have control forced upon them. Working to
stop regulation by a group sympathetic to them in the hopes that they
can avoid control will fail. Control will come at the hands of a Congress changed by election to be unsympathetic. In Michigan conservative
Republican legislators refused to support moderate fiscal reform proposed by Governor Romney. They stopped fiscal reform for the time being. Following the defeat of Goldwater and the effect of his losing
coattails, and following further losses from reapportionment and gerrymandering, a Democrat majority was elected to push through changes even
more distasteful to the conservative Republicans.
Value of Timely Action
When will those in power ever learn that timely compromise is better than waiting until the tables of power have turned! Southern slave
owners might have had compensation for the loss of their slaves if Dred
Scott had become free, if South Carolina had not seceded, if other
things had not happened, but not after the toll exacted by the Civil
War.
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These proposals are made while we still have a big middle class
and while democracy is still being taught in schools and.homes. They
are made before the extremes of a depression. But how long can these
essentials for democracy be maintained without sufficient redistribution of wealth or adequate control of bigness, whether business, labor
or government? Watergate, oil shortages, the truckers' strike, and an
earlier strike against General Motors are examples of dangers of bigness. Need more take place to make evident the necessity for pursuing
old and new approaches to democracy? The hope is that sufficient timely
action may be taken for the spirit and practice of democracy to live on.
Proposals to Avoid or Meet Crises
These proposals are being made to meet the problem of running government during a crisis of leadership of the Presidency and Executive
Branch. They are also being made to avoid such a crisis. They include
internal controls within the executive and legislative branches, preparation of and gradual change in legislative, executive, and judicial
personnel, decreased cost of elections, opportunity for increased democracy in choice of party nominees, and in removal of officials of
government.
Requirements of Democratic Government
Wilson felt that secret treaties were the cause of wars and coined
the slogan "Open covenants openly arrived at. 11 Paraphrasing this for a
demo~racy where the concept is even more appropriate, the rallying cry
would be, 11 0pen governments, openly arrived at. 11
Democratic government requires a strong, free people, economically
independent and in a position to control their own political affairs.
By controlling their political affairs, they can prote~t their lives,
liberty and property. Democracy becomes more difficult to operate as
government increases in size. What could have been done directly at an
earlier time must now be accomplished indirectly through repr~senta
tion.
Deliberate diffusion of power, economic and political, must offset
or avoid possible overcentralization. Checks and balances are more
necessary than ever in a growing society. A strong leadership chosen
by the people in free competitive elections rather than by sel~
selection or manipulation is required. Democratic policy formation,
the important product of democrattc government, ideally includes a variety of input from those elected or appointed to positions of authority by Constitutional means. A people, their government and its leaders, all accountable for their actions, this is the essence of
democracy.
Direct and Representative Democracy
Today, more than ever, the basic philosophy of the Founding
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Fathers as expressed in ~he Constitutional Convention and in the final
·document should be followed. The preamble starts 11We the People 11 signifying in Lincoln 1 s words "government .of the people, by the people and
for the people." Continuing the British tradition of representative
government and developing elements of direct self-government in the Mayflower Compact and New England town meetings, the Constitutional Convention established a Congress of the United States. It is very significant that this Congress was established in Section 1 of Article 1. By
the time of the Convention and following unhappy colonial experiences
with royal governors and His Majesty's government, the colonists' trust
was in their representatives in the colonial legislatures.
Congress and Improved Representation
The Founding Fathers were right that the number of representatives
in Congress should not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but it
should come far closer to this number than the present four .hundred and
seventy-five thousand. Representation should.be increased. The great
increase in national governmental activity makes this everi more necessary.
The Founding Fathers compromised well in agreeing that Congress
should have representation, both by population and by equal representation of the states; but now the states are not being represented as they
were intended to be. Geographical representation, proposed by the
Founding Fathers, helps to overcome some of the pressures of factionalism. Further changes in representation are needed to control factions
or political interest groups and provide better state representation.
Powers of Congress ·and the States
Following the British tradition of taking power from the monarch in
the Magna Charta and providing for control of taxes by the House of Commons, Congress was placed first in the Constitution, and in Article I,
Se-ction 7, it provides that "All bills for raising revenue shall origi•
nate in the House of Representatives." Congress, placed first in the
Constitution, needs to be strengthened to remain first. In union there
is strength. A Congress combining the legislative power of the House
and Senate in one chamber would be stronger.
£ongress, representing the United States, should have delegated
power and there should be additional necessary and proper power implied
from those delegated powers, as stated in Article 1, Section 8, but the
power to tax and spend should not be used in areas where power has not
been delegated or could not be implied from delegated powers. Reserved
power, by the Tenth Amendment, is to be left to the states or to the
people thereof.
Power and Term of the President
The executive power should be vested in· a president.

5

The term of

four years has been found too short for some Presidents who have been
re-elected. Continued re-election or a life term as proposed by
Hamilton has been precluded by the Twenty-Second Amendment. The maximum
term is now ten years. With the great amount of power the President has
gained to meet depressions and wars, the length of term and the extent
of accountability need to be reassessed.
Selection and Qualifications
The President as provided in the Constitution should be chosen by
electors, that no Senator or Representative or person holding an office
of trust or profit under the United States shall be appointed an elector. The electors as chosen are to be agents of the state, but nothing
is said about the electors of a state voting as a unit. The electoral
college concept of selecting individuals, most knowledgeable of the
qualities of potential presidents, to elect the President and Vice
President has great merit. With the development of political parties
electors should participate in party nominations. Greater emphasis
should be placed on the personal qualifications, training, and experience of the President and Vice President that more may be required than
just the legal qualifications.

As stated in the Constitution the President and Vice President
should be natural born citizens. That requirement may have some value
for others in high governmental positions. A parallel to civilian
control of the military might be drawn.
Advice and Council to the President
The President, as provided in the Constitution, should be able to
require the opinion of the principal officer in each of the executive
departments, but does he ask for enough advice from his cabinet? The
failure to consult the cabinet is well known. Are those appointed by
the President free to give unpleasant or unwanted advice? An alternate
advisory system appears to be needed.
The advice and consent of the Senate, required for treaties and
appointments to high offices, should be extended. Executive agreements
are being used to circumvent the action of the Senate and many in high
offices close to the President are not required to have Senate confirmation. The importance of executive agreements and of the high positions held justify more control. Should the role of the Senate in
advice and oversight of the executive branch be expanded? Could these
functions be performed more effectively if the Senate were· in the
executive branch?
The Courts
The functional distribution of power in the Constitution includes
a judicial branch, but if Congress as it says in the Constitution is to
have the sole power to make laws, that precludes the judicial branch·

6

from lawmaking. The courts presently go beyond judicial self restraint
and in their interpretations make law. Congress, which makes law, is
subject to the public will through elections. The President, who has
much influence in proposing, passing, or vetoing legislation, is subject
to periodic election. Since the judicial branch in effect goes beyond
interpretation it should be subject to periodic review, also. Some
action needs to be taken so that Congress can remain the ultimate
authority in law making as intended by the Constitution.
Checks and Balances
The Constitution includes additional restraints through checks and
balances by giving one branch part of the power of another. The President 1s veto power over bills passed by Congress is but one example.
There are many others. But are the present checks enough? What will it
take to control a burgeoning bureaucracy? Increased democratization,
decentralization, and decreasing concentration of political and economic
power will be necessary to develop a responsive and effective government
as a means of adequately protec~ing the life, liberty and property of
all individuals, weak as well as strong.
Political Parties
Would a responsible party system be sufficient to meet the challenge of democratic government in the present day? As stated in the
report of the Conmiittee on Political Parties of the American Political
Science Association in 1950, political parties are 11 indispensible instruments of government." Granted, they are. But responsible parties
alone are not enough to meet today's needs for responsible government.
Or, perhaps, the problem is that the- proposal for a responsible party
government has not been realized.
Political parties even with direct primaries are still not democratically controlled. Shades of smoke-filled rooms and continued
manipulation by the political and economic elite continue to haunt and
even dominate the parties. How are parties to be responsible and yet
avoid the problem of a tyranny of the majority? What is the way to
develop the organization and system of parties, government, and economy
to avoid either the tyranny of a majority or the tyranny of a minority?
How are the citizens to control directly or indirectly? How are they
to have the opportunity far a workable variety of simple majority,
extraordinary majority and consensus techniques of decision making
available?
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OLD AND NEW APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY

Basic concepts considered necessary for self-government and generally accepted by Americans include: separation of powers, checks and
balances, popular sovereignty, representative democracy, rights of individuals, all of these determined, guaranteed and protected by written
constitutions, judicial review and free and periodic elections.
In the establishment of the Constitution embodying these concepts,
events, conditions, principles and personalities played their part. The
experiences of colonial government and self-government, conflicts between colonists and the Crown, m.ercantilism, the Declaration of Independence, the Revolution, Shays' Rebellion, depression, rights of Englishmen, Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Franklin, Hamilton, and others,
each contributed in its own way to the new Constitution.
At the time of the forming of the Constitution, legislatures were
trusted because they were chosen by and representative of the colonists.
But because in republican government the legislative authority necessarily predOifinates, according to Madison, that must be lessened by
dividing it.
So although Congress was in first place in the Constitution, it was weakened by the establishment of two houses having different types of representation. The House represented population, the
Senate represented the states. The Connecticut Compromise, providing
this difference in representation, created division betweell the two
houses, weakening each and weakening Congress as a whole. The Senate,
the less representative body, was expected to be the more conservative.
Over the years it has become the more liberal of the two branches.
Planned in one way, the Constitution has worked out in another. Planned
to make laws, set policy, and supervise the executive branch, Congress
has become more and more subject to the influence and control of the
President and the bureaucracy. What had started as a legislative body
representing the people and the states, has become almost something like
one self-perpetuating board of trustees, the Congress, elected by the
people but controlled by seniority and.the few, catering to another, the
bureaucracy.
Personalities ·played their part not only in .the Consti~ution making
process, but also in the determination of its content. The executive
branch was designed with Washington as the man expected to be President.
There was a provision for impeachment, conviction, and removal, but this
was made sufficiently difficult to make it less probable ~nd uncommon.
In seeking a strong executive and seeing Washington as President-to-be,
did the Founding Fathers protect this country sufficiently from the actions of a different type of President? From a President who refused a
third term, we have gone to one who has sought and gained a fourth.
From a President who had the trust of the people, we have gone to one
who has had their mistrust. From Presidents who have considered themselves as executors of the laws of Congress, we have come to Presidents
who have exceeded their authority, to be checked by the Supreme Court.
At a time when the main thrust of the newly elected members of
Congress may be on cutting expenditures, that of the members with
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greatest seniorityJ whose ties are closest to the bureaucracy, may be on
increasing expenditures. Large increases in government employees during
.wars or depressions bring ·in many with .similar points of view. Close
association with these contemporaries and continued reinforcement of
their ideas within government year after year because of this association, do little to prepare them for different ways of thinking or long
range planning. Long reinforcement of a depression or war psychosis may
hinder proper planning under different conditions. Not that depressions
or wars should be quickly forgotten. They should not. But they should
be taken in their proper context. There are ways of thinking and .fads
of thinking within bureaucracy. Group think described by Janis in his
book, Victims of Group Think, is far more prevalent than the few examples he gives.2 What are other causes of this burgeoningJ selfaggrandizing, self-indulgent, and.self-protecting bureaucracy with its
tendency toward group think and tunnel vision? Are personnel hampered
by manuals that are too detailed and specific? Are ·there too many levels of supervision and too many -steps in the line of communication? Is
the input from the top or bottom occurring too late? Are there adequate
provisions for preventing or controlling illegal activities throughout
government and all its branches? Is political participation becoming
too costly~ Are the costs of elections or political appointments too
high? Is the growth of bureaucracy and the national government· a serious threat to the states and ·the federal system? Are- special interests
and government becoming too big to control? Scandals and abuses involving officials of all branches of government and special interests continue to occur. Teapot Dome, Harry Vaughn, Billy Sol EstesJ Bobby
Baker, Nat Voloshin and the more recent Watergate scandal are periodic
examples. Following the Watergate affair and revelations of large
political donations and other abuses, this question arises, 11 Should
there be continuous investigation of the executive branch of government,
including the President, his advisors, all departments, bureaus· and
agencies, in fact, all national govern.ment? 11 The answer is ••yes. 11 The
next question is, 11 How can this investigation continue without disrupting the conduct of government?" · How can it be done in such a way that
Congress can get about its other business? How can the question of
executive privilege be met to gain access to information from the executive branch? How can the problem of separation of powers be overcome?
How can Congress be strengthened? How can it be made responsible also?
What can be.done to make the judicial branch equally responsible?
How can we answer these questions? Reorganization of the executive branch continues. That doesn't seem to be enough. Control of
policy seems to be slipping in the executive branch·from the appointed
heads to the bureaucrats. Those being regulated tend to regulate themselves. How can the general public be protected from the special in~
terests? These and other questions may be answered in part by taking
another look at old approaches to democracy ·and applying them in new
places..
A return to the principles of the Founding Fathers would do much to
increase democratic control. These principles among others are separation of power, division of power, checks and balances, periodic elections, advice and consent, Presidential electors, delegated, reserved
and denied power, and representation and administration more related to
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the total population. In the space age quicker feedback and more sensitive control-is necessary. In the earlier period strengthening the executive, the judicial and the national government was required. The
Constitution had to he broadly construed to cover the purchase of the
Louisiana territory, the establishment of judicial review and the protection of the instrumentalities of the national government from crippling taxation by the states. Present day excess use and abuse of power
requires further distribution of power,.checks on officials and their
use of it. The answer is a revitalized Constitution and increased
democracy.
In government--legislative, executive, or judicial--there is a
greater need to practice John Stuart Mill's concept for·tieeking truth,
competition of ideas in the market place, by gaining information through
parallel or divergent sources. Equally important is the need for renewal of personnel through periodic election, elected representation.in
policy formation, lateral entry, lateral transfer, competition for position, training for advancement, limit on length of service, and retirement. This combination is necessary to avoid both the overfresh and the
overpreserved. By combining fresh points of view with seasoned experience, not bound by dead hands or dead wood, more timely decisions .might
be made available. The promptness of an action may be fully as important as the action itself. Too much delay gives too much hope for
avoiding enactment altogether. Delay in either lawmaking or execution
protects the offenders at the expense of the victims.
The concepts listed above are now new, but there may be different
ways and more ways for them to be used in search of increased democratic
control of government. How may they be applied more effectively in both
the bureaucracy and Congress?
Much of the emphasis in political science for the half century of
Wilsonian and post Wilsonian politics was on American adoption of the
British mode of government. The President was to become like the Prime
Minister and lead the legislative as well as the executive branch. Secretaries of departments were to become members of Congress just as political secretaries of departments in Britain were members of the House
of Lords and House of Commons. Oversight of administration was to be
like that of the House of Commons through the ques~ion hour. As practiced in Britain this oversight would be by the whole House, not by
committees, The department head would be a member and present for
questions from any other member. Control of the party would be centralized at the top.
Removal of the Prime Minister when there is a failure to win a vote
of confidence constitutes a check on the executive. Resulting dissolution- of Parliament was a very strong motive for party members to support
him and avoid losing office. Collective responsibility would be the
basis of putting party policy into operation. Proposals to add these
features of British government to that of the United States were commonly offered and supported by political' scientists. Rarely, if ever,
was there a proposal to reduce the American court's role to that of
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the British, where without a single written constitution, laws enacted
by Parliament are not subject to judicial review.
But can you superimpose one system on another without serious side
effects and unforeseen ramifications. Perhaps not, but some features
might be adoptable without substituting our concept of separation of
power for their concept of legislative supremacy. Some changes might
help avoid the growing executive and judicial supremacy over the legislative branch. Let us borrow from the British and elsewhere whatever
may improve our government and make it more democratically controlled.
What may we adopt to make the Congress, if not first as anticipated
by the Founding Fathers, at least coequal to the other branches? What
cah be done to make the parties, not only more effective but also more
democratic? What can be done to make the whole party system more representative? Yb.at can be done to make the governmental system more representative? How can we improve the qualifications of elected as well as
appointed officials? How can we make elective offices available on a
fair competitive basis in the same way that government employment is
through the merit system? How can we make the judicial branch answerable to the people for its decisions just as the legislative and executive branches are?
A restudy of the British system of government as it might be
applied to American g9vernment may be profitable for several reasons:
(1) The concept of the major role of the legislative and executive part
of government in policy formation, (2) The vote of confidence as a means
of controlling the executive, (3) The questioning of the executive departments by Parliament in full session and not by subject matter committees, (4) Greater per capita representation of constituencies, (5)
Use of broad representation committees to consider general aspects of
legislative proposals, (6) Selection of party leaders by those most
knowledgeable of them, (7) Shorter time for campaigning, and (8) Much
smaller election expenses to individual candidates.
Combining these features of British government with American use of
separation of powers, checks and balances and federalism could do much
to insure the responsiveness of those in power to voters and others who
placed them there. Further development of functional distribution of
power within the branches could add both efficiency and constraint.
The vote of confidence together with American periodic elections could
increase timely control.
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
There is a widespread recognition of the need for strengthening
Congress. It has been criticized for lack of initiative, lack of leadership, for its seniority system, its centers of entrenched power and
special privilege. Congress as a whole may be representative, but its
committees are not. Time and time again bills passed in one house fail
to pass in the other, causing inaction or undue delay. Many bills, of
course, should be killed, but failure to act or acting too late can
callse great hardship.
Congress, expected by the Founding Fathers to be the branch to form
legislation and policy, has abdicated this position to the President or
those of his choice. An example of this trend was the selection of
Sargent Shriver by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to develop legislation
establishing the Office of Economic Opportunity. The content of the
bill was determined completely without any help from or knowledge by
Congressmen prior to introduction.
Another area taken over by the President is budgeting. Starting
with the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the President began to gain
overall control of the National Budget. Struggle over impoundment of
funds by the President is the natural outcome of this development. The
Budget Bureau first located in the Treasury Department was placed in the
Executive Office of the President in 1939. By executive order in 1970,
President Nixon renamed it the Office of Management and Budget. Until
1974, there was nothing comparable in Congress to the President 1 s budget
staff for financial overview. Congress needs to be reorganized to develop stronger, more responsive leadership for effective overall policy
formation. The days of Czar Reed and Boss Cannon are over; Senator
Norris, with help, broke some of the speaker 1 s powers, but the Reorganization Act of 1946 has not corrected the overconcentration of power in
the committee chairmen or the fragmentation of leadership.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 reduced the number of
standing committees in the Senate from 33 to 15 and in the House from
48 to 19.3 But the number of subcommittees has increased so that there
are now approximately three hundred committees and subcommittees. The
standing committees were provided with professionally trained staff,
but little staff assistance is available to minority members of committees to develop opposing points of view. Each standing committee was
authorized to conduct investigations and directed to exercise oversight
of departments and agencies within its jurisdiction. But presently
this oversight by Congressional committees is limited by their being
outside of the executive branch and not having full access to documents,
tapes, memos and other material necessary to conduct a full investigation. Nothing was done at the time, and little since, to limit the
unwritten rule of seniority, filibuster in the Senate, or the power of
the House Rules Committee to block legislation. The Reorganization Act
of 1946 strengthened the committees and their chairmen. The increase
in subcommittees has fragmented the work of. Congress and has made it
virtually impossible for Congress or its leaders to develop or maintain
a broad overview of policy or legislation. The development of subcom-
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mittees has further increased the strength of special interests, their
pressure groups, and their lobbyists. Once hailed as a way to improve
the representative process, these political interest groups, more accurately called pressure groups, have subverted the representative process
to gain overrepresentation and even domination in some cases.
In contrast to current emphasis on committee subject matter specialization, more should be said about functional specialization of
elective bodies. In contrast to administrative federalism, there needs
to be a new thrust in the direction of legislative federalism.

As a former legislator, lobbyist and state official, I see the need
for legislative reorganization to offset the monopoly in policy formation held by committee specialists, bureaucratic· specialists and lobbyists for special interest groups. To accomplish this purpose there
needs to be greater input in policy formation by those not representing
the special interests, especially in the formative stages.
Lobbyists and reapportionment, extolled for years as the answer to
the need for more balanced representation, have created overrepresentation for the powerful interests and less representation for the weak
and unorganized. Functional specialization can.provide increased representation, a streamlined legislative body, greater oversight of the
executive branch, and increased advisory input relative ta.policy-making
and execution.
The basic functions of a legislative body are representation, legislation, and oversight. A separate body for each of these functions
would increase effectiveness in each of these areas.
How much of a chanie would it take to make Congress effective and
responsive?· How can Congress renew itself?. How can Congress provide
for more competition of ideas long stifled by committee chairmen or the
Rules Committee? How can investigation of the executive branch be conducted without interfering with the legislative process? Since form,
organization, and procedure can help or hinder the strength and representative quality and process of Congress, these factors as well as the
members, their qualifications, apportionment, constituency, selection,
terms and tenure, all bear consideration.
Starting first with form, shall there be two houses or one? By
eliminating undue rivalry, duplication, friction and delay, Congress
could speak more promptly and with the undiluted strength of a majority.
The most important step to accomplish this would be to have but one
chamber, the House of Representatives, and let it speak with one voice.
The unicameral body eliminates the rivalry of the two houses and does
away with delays caused by the second house. Specifically, it does
away with the duplication of committees and their hearings, the need
for conference cormnittees, and the opportunity for filibusters. This
would strike significantly at entrenched power and minority con4rol.
De Tocqueville speaks of the danger of tyranny of the majority.
There
is also danger of tyranny of a minorit·y. Both conference committees
and filibusters cater to special interests and minorities. Striking
at entrenched power-, special interests and minority control would
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increase

majo~ity

rule, an essential aspect of democracy.

The new House would·have all the power of the present Senate except
confirmation of appointments and ratification of treaties. It would
have all the power of the.present House except the power of .impeachment.
Instead of having the power to impeach by a majority vote, it would have
the power to try impeachment cases and convict by a two-thirds vote. It
would elect an Attorney General, not subject to confirmation, for a term
of six years; and elect Supreme Court justices subject to confirmation
by the Senate. This would mean that there would be no possibility that
a President being tried following impeachment would have his appointee
as the presiding officer at his trial. If President Nixon had been impeached, his appointee, Chief Justice Burger, would have presided over
his trial in the Senate.
The Senate, originally planned to represent and protect the states,
no longer performs that function. Senators under the Constitution were
elected by -their respective state legislatures. They were chosen as
'Senators who would represent the state. ·OVer the years corruption entered in and they were not chosen for that purpose. Manipulated by
railroads and big business, the legislators chose millionaires who
sought protection for themselves and the interests they represented.
The Seventeenth.Amendment, designed to correct the situation 1 provided
for direct election of Senators. Although still intended under the new
system to represent the states, they do not. Instead the longer they
are in office, the more they represent national interests, not state
interests and not necessarily the national interest. The Senate provides more tax loopholes for special interests than does the House. 5
Senators increase House recommendations for appropriationg at the behest
of special interests, both outside and inside government.
Continued
reelection and extremely long tenure makes them less state oriented.
As potential Presidents, they seek a national constituency. The representation of states as such, the basic funCtion for which they were
created, is no longer performed. The Connecticut Compromise has become
an empty gesture. The Senate, no longer useful to represent the states
in Congress, is needed as a check in the executive branch.
But if the Senate were transferred to the executive branch, what
would compensate for thf loss of the Senate in Congress? What vote
would protect the Federal system and the states? How would the vote of
each state be determined? How could it be done with a membership of
435? Madison said, 11 The representatives must be raised to a certain
number to guard against the cabals of a few • • • and however large •
limited to a certain number in order to guard against the confusion of
a multitude. 11 7 With the great increase in population and no increase
in members since 1920, are the variety of interests throughout the
United States adequately represented today? See Table I.
There has been a large increase in the staff of Congress and its
cormnittees since that time, but there has been no comparable increase in
members. Since 1920 the population of the United States has increased
from 105,710,620 to 215,000,000 persons and has doubled in the past half
century. A comparable increase in House members would bring the number
from 435 to 833. The·United Kingdom, with a popul~tion of 55,710,700,
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TABLE I.

HISTORICAL COMPARISON OF CONGRESSMEN AND FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN RELATION TO POPULATION

~

....

"'

Po2ulation

Cong;ressmen

Pop. Per
Cong. District

Federal
Emelo::z:ees

Fed. Employees
Per 1000 Po2.

1820

9,638,453

186

51,820

6,914

1.4

1970

203,184,772

435

467,091

2,843,000

71.5

Per Cent

Increase

2,108'7o

2337.

901%

41, 119%

5,090%

Number of Federal employees in 1970 if increased since 1820 at same rate as Congressmen - 16,110
Number of Congressmen in 1970 if increased since 1820 at same rate as Federal employees - 76,470

has 635 members in its. House of Co1I11I10ns. With only a little more than
a quarter of the United States population, the United Kingdom's House
of Commons has nearly half again as many members or about six times the
representation. Each member represents an electorate of about 62,000.8
As long as twenty-five years ago, Herman Finer was proposing a Hause of
800 members. 9 Going less than halfway toward this number, the membership of the House could be increased to 600 with the provision that
each state have at least three members.
See Table II.
This would be
the equivalent of combining the present House and Senate and increasing
the representation of the larger states by 65 members. The determination of each state's position on issues would be more accurate than the
present method of having two senators who may be on opposite sides and
simply cancel out each other's vote, leaving their state unrepresented
on that question to all intents and purposes.
See Tables III and IV.
By having at least three representatives from each state, the determination of the state's position would be made by more than just one Congressman. Cancellation of a state 1 s vote would be possible because of
absenteeism, but complete unrepresentation would be less likely under
this proposed system.
But how could the state 1 s vote be counted under such a system?
John C. Calhoun proposed the concept of a concurrent majority to protect the individual state's interests. He proposed "to give to each
division or interest, through its appropriate organ, either a concurrent v~bce in making and executing the laws, or a veto on their execution.11
A modified form of Calhoun's concurrent majority would let
the state speak in Congress as a unit in favor or in opposition to a
bill. Passage of a bill could require the winning vote to include not
only a majority of the members, but also a majority of the states as
determined by the majority vote of each state's delegation. Voting
machines and computers could determine very quickly whether or not a
bill had the combined support of a majority of the members and a majority of th~ states.
A bill receiving one of these majorities but not both, would be
recommitted to the standing committee from which it had been reported
for further study and revision. Action on such a bill could be much
faster than the present method of sending it to the Senate, where it
would be referred to a new committee. Under the present system, following action of the committee and the Senate, it would be sent back
to the House, where there might be a need for a conference committee
and further delay before passage. All of these transactions would take
much more time than simply sending it back to the same connnittee which
had already had it under sufficient consideration to make the original
recommendation for passage. That committee could build on previous
knowledge to make further modification to seek final passage.
The elimination of the Senate would end the filibuster, stop riders, decrease some of the effects of seniority, do away with conference
committees, fifteen standing committees, and all of their related subcormnittees. The establishment of a unicameral legislature with six
year overlapping terms for members would make possible the division of
membership into three classes, one for each year of election of onethird of the members. Membership of 600 would leave 200 in each class.
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TABLE II
Apportionment: 95th Congress, House 435 Members
Apportionment: Proposed House 600 Members

600
Members

435
Members

57
52
35
33
33

43
:l9
25
24
24
23
19
15
15
12
11
11
10
10
10
9
'8
8
8
8
7
7
7
6
6

32

~

<»

26
21
20
16
15
15
14
14
13
13
11
11

11
10
10
10
9
9
8

~

Po2ulation*

California

19,953,134

New York

18,241,266
11,793,909
11,196,730
11,113,976
10,652,017
8,875,083
7,168,164

Pennsylvania
Texas
Illinois
Ohio
Michigan
New Jersey

Florida
Massachusetts
Indiana
North Carolina

6,789,443

Missouri

5,689,170
5, 193,669
5,082,059
4,677,399

Virginia

4,64~,494

Georgia
Wisconsin
Tennessee
Maryland
Minnesota
Louisiana
Alabama
Washington
Kentucky
Connecticut
Iowa

4,589,575
4,417,933
3,9?4,164
'3,922,399
3,805,069
3,643,180

*Population as of 1970 census

3,444,1~5

3,409,169
3,219,311
3,q32,217
2,825,041

600
Members

435
Members

7
7
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

6
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
l

1
l

1
1
1

~

Poeulation*

South Carolina

2,590,516

Oklahoma

2,559,253

Kansas
Mississippi
Colorado

2,249,071
2,216,912
2,207,259
2,091,385
1,923,295
1,772,482
1,744,237
1,483, 791
1,059,273
1,016,000
993,663
949, 723
769,913
737,q81
713,008
694,409
666,257
617,761
548, 104
488,738
444,732
332,416
302,173

Oregon
Arkansa~

Arizona
West Virginia
Nebraska
Utah
New Mexico
Maine

Rhode Island
Hawaii
¥few Hampshire
Idaho
Montana
South Dakota
North Dakota
Delaware
Nevada
Vermont
Wyoming
Alaska

TABLE III.

PARTY AFFILIATION OF THE 9Sth CONGRESS

~

~

Alabama

Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas

California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia

....

"'

Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

Iowa
Kansas
K~ntucky

Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan

Minnesota
Mississippi
Mj.ssouri

*Independent

2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
l
l
1
2

Rep.
1
1
1
1
1

~

Rep.

4

3
1
2
1
14
2
2
1
5

2
3
29
3
4
10
10
2

l
l
1

2
2
2
2

12
B
4
2
5

6

i

l

l

1
1

1
2
2
1

Senate

House

Senate

1

5
10
11
4
3
B

2
12
3
2
3
2
2

2

3
2
B

4
2
2

~

Montana
Nebraska

Dem.

i

New Hampshire

2
1

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina

North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

Wyoming

Rep.

2
1

Nevada

House

1
1
1
2
1
1
1

1
1
1
2

2
2
2
1
l

l
1
2
l
1
l

i*

1
l
2
l
l

2
2
2
2

~

1
1
1
1
11
1
28
9
10
5

i7
2
5

5
22
1

Rep.
1
2
1
4
1
11
2
1
13
1
4
B
l
2
3
2
1
1

4

6

5
4

2

7

2

1

TABLE IV

Summary of Party Affiliation of Congressmen by State
Number of States
, Senators Democrat

House Majority Democrat

13

Senators Democrat

House Membership Evenly Split

3

Senators Democrat

House Majority Republican

3

Senators Split

House Majority Democrat

Senators Split

House Membership Evenly Split

2

Senators Split

House Majority Republican

7

Senators Republican

House Majority Democrat

3

Senators Republican

House Membership Evenly Split

2

Senators Republican

House Majority Republican

3

Senators Split
House Membership Evenly Split

14

23 States
7 States

Note that there are only s~teen states in which the political party is
the same for both the two senators and the majority of House members of
the same state.
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Under the present membership of 435 in the House, a quorum of 100
is required for a Conmlittee of the whole. With 600 members it would be
possible to have 200 on each of three Committees of the whole and require 100 present for a quorum. These committees would be similar to
the ABCD and Scottish Conmlittees of Parliament, except that they would
determine the final form of the bill. The second weakness in the House
is the refusal of the Rules Committee to permit a bill to be taken up
until its substance is acceptable to it. If there were separate rules
committees for scheduling bills for each committee of the whole, the
legislative process would be speeded up. Bills could be considered
three times as fast. Final vote would be by the whole House with opportunity for roll call and debate to protect members not taking part
in other committees of the whole. Jurisdiction of these three rules
committees and the three committees of the whole would be concurrent
so that if the sponsor of a bill could not get his bill through one
rules committee or one committee of the whole, he might get it through
another. John.Stuart Mill 1 s concept of competition in the market place
to get the truth, mentioned above, is applicable for getting proposed
laws. A Vice Speaker elected by each of the three committees of the
whole would preside, or decide who would preside over his respective
committee.
The greatest weakness in Congress is the domination of committees
by special interests. This includes lawyers on the Judiciary Committe'e. Barbara Hinckley states, 11 Committee assignments, as shaped by the
leadership and members' self selection • • • norms of specialization
and seniority • • • support constituency representation by the same interests on the same collDDittee over a long period of time. 11 11 This provides for al.most complete and continuous representation of special interests. In addition, "Committees are reluctant to change because
their members fear both organizational and personal loss of power." 12
What can be done to balance out special with general interest,
producer with consumer interest? What can be done to provide for gradual change within the committees? What can be done to provide for differing points of view within the committees in'policy making, bill
drafting and markup and consideration of bills? To provide for gradual
change, membership of standing committees would be apportioned so that
an equal number would be chosen from each of the three classes. Just
under one-half of the membership on each committee would be chosen by
party leaders taking requests of members into consideration. This part
would represent special interests. A majority of the committee would
be chosen by lot and would come closer to representing the general public. This same ratio should be maintained within subcommittees. As a
result of the varied points of view on the subcommittees and committees, compromise and adjustment satisfact6ry to both the special interest group and the general public might be developed at an earlier stage
in the legislative process. This in turn could speed up later stages
and assist in moving the legislation on to its ultimate passage or defeat. There would be reason for more optimism for the proposal's passage once it had cleared these first hurdles. John Gardner of Common
Cause proposes "rotation of members among committees so-that members
would receive wider exposure to governmental policy and would thus be
better prepared to make broad and deep judgments on the issues before
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them. 1113 He gives a second advantage of rotation as 11 the breaking up
or hampering development of the underground alliance of a committee
member, a middle level bureaucrat and ~ special interest lobbyist concerned with the same subject matter. 1114 A third advantage of rotation
according to Gardner would be to 11 strike the death knell for legislative fiefdoms presided over by again satraps. 11 15 Such rotation would
greatly increase representation of the general public. Committee chairmen would be chosen by the majority party members of the committee using
a secret ballot, the method proposed by Senator Joseph S. Clark of
Pennsylvania in 1965. 1 b This would permit majority party control of
committee chairmen. If it is important to have a secret ballot to protect union members as they choose their leaders, it should also be important to have a secret ballot when committee members choose their
chairman. In both cases it is needed for protection against retaliation. Committees should be required to report bills out within thirty
days or request an extension of time if not ready to report.17 This
extension of time could be granted by a.majority vote of the House. If
the extension were not.granted, the bill would be discharged from the
committee and refer~ed .to a general committee for its consideration.
This would be done to stop the killing of bills by the inaction of committees. Bills should be reported out to be amended,·passed, or killed
by a majority vote of .the House and not controlled by a few committee
members or even just the chairman.· This, plus the use of three rules
connnittees and three committees of ·the whole, would move bills along.
Consensus is general in government, and many bills are passed by
overwhelming .majorities;"but the exigencies of government cannot wait
for complete agreement and the satisfaction of every last member. For
while delay may protect the rights of one individual, it can stop the
protection of many, just as the overprotection of criminals can leave
their victims underprotected. It is better many times to pass a law,
test it, and amend it, if necessary, than to have no law at all.
Better use of Mondays and Fridays would also speed up the legislative process. Why cater to a few congressmen who live nearby to the
detriment of the country as a whole? Chronic absenteeism should be
noted and reported to constituents so that all members would be either
present or accounted for. Congress, as well as the President, can set
the tone for the country through ethics, accountability and work. District councilors mentioned below can assist those wishing to consult
with constituents so that there would be less reason for the Tuesday
Thursday Club members to be gone over weekends. The presence of district councilors and their observation would probably do much toward
insuring the attendance of congressmen. It could also help improve
their moral and ethical standards,
More emphasis should be placed on a continued re-evaluation of
laws, rules, and regulations having the force and effect of law and on
seeking amendment, elimination or repeal wherever indicated by the reevaluation. Attempts should be made to eliminate special legislation
or special rules as much as possible. For example, changes in the Internal Revenue Code and Internal Revenue Service Regulations to achieve
uniformity of application of the law are necessary to do away with the
special privilege of those having greater wealth. A standing committee
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on repeal·and recodification would have much to do. An Office of Law
Revision·Counsel, such as the one proposed by House Resolution 98818 in
the 93rd Congress, could assist the standing committee on repeal and
recodification. Intensive study of executive orders and sublegislation
established by departmental rules and regulati_ons would give ample evi-

dence of delegation "run riot." This is where Congress has let its
power be eroded away to be added by accretion to the executive branch.
Much work needs to be done to reverse this trend. The boundary line
between legislative and executive power has been shifted so gradually
that it would take a flood to put it back in its old channel. Instead
of coming from Congress, much of legislative input is from the President and the executive branch. There is little opportunity for broad
overview by the legislative branch with its many committees and subcommittees. To rectify this situation the committee structure of the
House should include not only the newly proposed House Budget Committee
and committees paralleling the work of the departments, but also committees paralleling any high executive group such as the National Security Council, Council of Economic Advisers, Office of Domestic Affairs,
and the like, so that Congress could develop overall policy and not
·just policy in a narrower sense. The budget committee should be drawn
from Ways and Means, Appropriations and members at large, sufficient to
overcome entrenched power centers. Jurisdiction of committees should
be realigned to apportion the work more evenly as proposed by House
Resolution 988.19
With these broader-based policy committees, Congress would be in
a better position to.help control government budgeting, initiate legislation and develop governmental policy. Its present role in establishing departments, passing laws, indicating powers and functions, and in
continuing investigation and appropriation should be further implemented and intensified. Senator Brock of Tennessee said in Congress
"that perhaps a third 11 of General Accounting Office effort "goes to a
comprehensive review and analysis, and even that tends to be in terms
of dollars and cents but not terms of human life • • • and it is long
past time that we had a human audit to gauge the positive or negative
impact of our efforts. 1120 Congress's role in developing policy could
be greatly enhanced,
Thomas Cronin, seeking ways 11 to keep the Presidency in line and to
insist on more honest and candid Presidential reporting, 11 proposes
"that Congress establish standi"ng committees on the Executive Office
and Presidential operations, 112
Such committees would be similar to
those above, but put more emphasis on reporting and control than on
policy formation, Doubtless such committees could also participate in
that function as well, through the additional information gained from
the President and those around him.
Jurisdiction of the Budget Committee and the other standing committees should be redefined to provide for a more equitable distribution of work. The Judiciary Con:onittee of the Senate had over 29 percent of the work in 1973.22 No committee should have more than ten
percent of the work load. More than that develops too great a concentration of power. Reestablishment of a few more committees and doing
away with some of the subcommittees could improve coordination and the
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balancing out of interests. Since subcommittee reports are generally
accepted by the whole cozmnittee, special interests are apt to be overrepresented. The time to achieve balance between interests is in the
early stages of legislation. It is almost impossible to do it later.
Failure of the unicameral body to assist significantly in policy
formation could not be blamed on another branch of the legislature,
for that other branch would not be there to blame. The unicameral
body would either produce or be judged accordingly. These proposed
changes are not intended to favor any one philosophy over another in
the end product of law. The sole intent is to have Congress as a
whole make these decisions rather than having them made by a few members in key positions of entrenched power.
Congress has long been noted for specialization on a subject matter basis. Standing committees have been set up for that purpose.
Members gain status and stature as subject matter experts. Experts
are called in to committees to testify. Committee staff is chosen on
an expertise basis. Administrative assistants develop expertise. But
Congress has failed to specialize on a functional basis. The three
functions which Congress serve are representation, legislation and
oversight. In all three functions Congress is becoming less effective
than it could be, because it has not specialized by function to meet
problems caused by increased population, industrialization, and a burgeoning bureaucracy created to cope with domestic and foreign economic,
social and military situations.

On a population basis Congress is about half as representative as
it was fifty years ago.
See Table V.
It is one-ninth as representative as it was in 1800 when each Congressional district contained
50,080 people. Today th·e number of people in each district is over
467,000. Membership in the House has increased from 65 to 435. That
number was fixed in 1920 and was changed temporarily in 1959 to 437 to
provide representation for the two new states, Alaska and Hawaii. During the time that representation of the people has decreased nine
times, the bureaucracy has increased 411 times.
Today there is great need for increased representation, more time
for legislating and far greater need for legislative oversight of the
huge bureaucracy. More emphasis should be placed on the creative rather
than the corrective role of Congress. It needs to reassert itself as
a positive force in developing new legislation rather than wait for executive initiative. This Congress could do, if it could spend more
time on legislation and less time on.representation and oversight. But
how can this be done and still provide adequate representation and sufficient oversight? How can representation be increased, legislation
speeded up, and oversight improved?
Congress should keep its oversight functions relative to general
policy and appropriations. It needs not only the help of the comptroller general for financial matters, but also that of the attorney general for legal matters, such as interpretation of laws passed by Congress and investigation of questionable departmental activity. If the
attorney general is elected by Congress as proposed, he would function
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TABLE OF REPRESENTATION

TABLE V.
Year

1790
1800
1810
1820
1830
1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970

PoE:ulation

Consressmen

3,929,214
5,308,483
7 ,239,881
9,638,453
12,866,020
17,069,453
23,191,876
31,443,321
38,558,371
50,155,783

62,947,714
75,994,575
91,972,266
105,710,520
122,775,046
131,669,275
150,697,361
179,323,175
203,184,772
203,184,772

203,184,772
8 Temporarily

65
106
142
186
213
242
232
237
243
293
332
357
391
435
435
435
437 8
435
435 Present
600 Proposed
3000b Proposed

for 1959

bnistrict Councilors
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PoE:ulation Per District

60,449
50,080

50,985
51,820

60,404
70,535
99,965

132,672
158,676
171,180

189,602
212,870

235,223
243,013
282,241

302,688
346,431
412,237
467 ,091
338,641
67. 728

under the direction of Congress and not the President. If Congress
passes the laws their agent should help enforce them and· not be controllable by the President to protect and cover up poor administration.
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DISTRICT COUNCILORS
What provisions could be made for increased representation and
closer observation of government by citizens, whether directly or indirectly? Direct democracy was most effective when the governmental
unit was small and the voters more aware of the problems and personnel of government. As the population grew in Massachusetts, there
was change from direct democracy to representative democracy in the
town meeting,
At this stage in government, the voters could still watch those
they chose to represent them as they decided the business of the' town.
Distance was short and tradition long in watching government operate.
As population increases, as government becomes more complicated, as
distances become greater, how can the voter maintain adequate control?
Is the increase in the number of representatives sufficient? Can the
elected representative .be observed carefully enough by the voters? Is
reporting by newspapers and other mass media enough? Are the average
voters as much in touch with their representatives as are the lobbyists?
Just as the executive branch needs to be observed by the Senate
and House, so too, does Congress need to be observed. Just as the
most effective observation can come from elected senators within the
executive branch, so too, the most effective observation can come
from elected councilors from within the legislative branch. If in
the process of representation, congressmen are elected by constituents to pass laws when those constituents cannot do it directly, why
is it not equally important to elect people to observe the lawmakers
when constituents are not in a position to observe the lawmakers personally? At present most ~f the information that comes to voters
comes from news reporters, congressmen, or lobbyists who have their
own points of view to represent. They have their own axe to grind.
This information does not come from persons elected for that purpose
by the general public. Who has the time, money and interest to observe the action or lack of action of Congress? Who could observe Congress closely? Who could observe. Congress partly from the inside? Few,
if any, other than paid lobbyists, can do this at the present time.
Congress and congressmen have grown away from their constituencies as
the work of the congressmen and size of the constituencies have ~rown.
Both the work of the congressmen and the constituencies need to
be cut down in size. Transferring the Senate to the executive branch
would eliminate the statewide district. Having at least three members
from each state would eliminate the at-large district from the House.
Having five district councilors from within each congressional district would decrease the size of each constituency even further. The
size of such districts would about equal the size of congressional
districts in 1790 and the following fifty years. This would bring
representation and observation of Congress closer to home.
Five district councilors elected from separate districts within
the c9ngressional district would provide opportunity for a greater
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variety of representation within the congressional district and throughout the country. The number of points of view Q)uld be increased fivefold. Variety of representation within the congressional district now
comes through lobbyists representing state and national pressure group·
organizations. The elected district councilors would represent different points of view; and since they were paid by the general public and
not by the pressure group, the loyalty of each would be to his own constituency rather than to a narrow part of it.
The claim has been that the bigger the district, the more the political interest groups would balance each other out. In fact, in the
large districts, particularly when the whole state is the district, as
in the present United States Senate, only the large, well-organized
pressure groups will be adequately or overrepresented. The smaller,
less powerful organizations and the unorganized public lose out.
Election at large would mean representation at large and rerepresentation of the same winning majority over and over again. This is
seen repeatedly in city elections where the ward system is not used.
But the constituents and interests within states and congressional districts are not necessarily or even generally homogenous. Instead they
are varied, and this variety of constituency and interest should be reflected in the representative system and Congiess. The smaller district council districts would make this possible.
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The district councilors could do much of the case work and entertaining of visitors. This would free the congressman for the work of
legislation. The district councilor could observe not only his Congressman, but also Congress. He could attend open hearings, do research, help prepare bills, offer testimony and represent the congressman at his request. Together with the other district councilors they
might provide a quick survey of public opinion that might be more accurate in a political sense than a regular public opinion poll.
The franked letter of the congressman apparently seeking constituent opinion is often designed to influence opinion rather than find it.
District councilors would be more accessible to their constituents and
could help.those constituents have a greater impact on their congressman.
As an official.of government, the councilor might have access to
information not generally available to the public, so that he could report back to his constituents as well as get information from them.
District councilors could also function as explained below as a connecting link between state legislatures and Congress, thus extending
federalism in practice. They could also be available for substate,
state, interstate and regional conferences as deemed feasible and desirable.

District councilors, as state employees and members of the legislative branch of Congress, would have the· unique position of being
parts of both levels of government at the same time. The precedent for
this could be the selection of U.S. Senators bY their respective state
legislatures under the provision of the original Constitution. District
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councilors would have not only representation and observation functions,
but also elective duties as well. They would serve as members of a
mixed caucus of their respective parties for proposing a slate of nominees for President. After the November election for which they would
be candidates, they as presidential electors would cast the ballot for
their district as determined by the popular vote for president-elect.
District councilors should be paid the same amount as House members
with the same perquisites. All funds should come from the state treasury and be fully reimbursed from the U.S. Treasury. This provision
would make them state employees not Federal employees and eligible to be
presidential electors. The funds should be administered by each state
for its own district councilors so that there would not be the concentration of power found in the hands of a Wayne Hayes.
The need for district councilors in observing the action of Congress can be seen not only in the formal and behind the scenes negotiations and manipulations. It can also be seen in relation to the activity of congressional members and their staffs. Ynlen things are so
tightly controlled 'by those in power that it takes a personal scandal
to bring them under control, there is something wrong with the power
structure.
Ethics is personal and individual. It is also collective. Values
in personal lives and relations are carried over into public authorities. It is not too much to ask that those who make the law should
abide by it. If Presidents are not to be above the law then congress-·
men or their employees should not be either. Bobby Baker, Nat Voloshin,
Senator Tom Dodd, Adam Clayton Powell, Wilbur Mills and Wayne Hayes are
examples of abuses. Their arrogance in the use and abuse of power in
many cases is almost as immoral as their personal lives, in some cases
more so.
Nationally syndicated columnist David Broder wrote in the Louisville Courier Journal of June 16, 1976, that Wayne Hayes had been a
chronic violator of the standards of political behavior for years before any allegations were raised about his private conduct. During debates on a controversial pay raise for members of Congress, Hayes
threatened to cut off the staff allowances of Republicans who objected
to the pay raise.23 In colonial times the Virginia House of Burgesses
exerted influence on the Royal Governor by having the power to observe
his conduct and determine his salary. We could well copy colonial experience and have the district councilors determine the salary and
other emoluments of congressmen. Constitutional authority to do so
would make it clear to congressmen that these councilors had the right
to observe. They would also realize that, even though the councilors
came from smaller districts than they, the councilors had power over
them. This would be another way to emphasize constituent power over
elected officials.
District councilors could learn much to prepare them for the office
of congressman if and when it were available. Experience in the state
legislature would be helpful for a district councilor and for a congressman. Howevev, the experience gained as a district councilor would
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be even . .more valuable to a congressman.
In case of congressional vacancy for whatever reason, five district councilors from each .congressional district would be available
to compete for the office of congressman. Their background and experience in government, gained as district councilors, would be especially helpful in preparation for representation of the district and
membership in Congress.

The potential increase in trained and seasoned candidates might
help in decreasing the excessive length of time some congressmen serve.
Specifically limiting the number of terms or years eligible to serve
would·do even more. House members to be elected to six year terms as
proposed, would be limited to three elected terms or twenty years.
This would permit serving up to two years of an unexpired term. District councilors would be limited to ten terms of two years or twenty
years.
Much has been done to develop administrative federalism but little to develop its counterpart in the separation of powers, legislative federalism. Administrative fede~alism-has grown through regional
commissions, interstate compacts, governor's conferences, grant-in-aid
programs, and federal funding of state and local projects. Much of
this has been done through the creation of categorical, block and
project grants. These and others have been created by Congress through
its power to tax and.spend for the general welfare. These funds have
been used in areas traditionally under state and local control. Once
started, the control has shifted to the National level.
Created by Congress but administered by the executive branch, the
control of these programs has shifted from the legislative to the executive branch. Financed in part by Federal and in part by state
funds, these grants have been administered at the state level pursuant
to the requirements of the National department's rules and regulations
and within the provisions of National law. There was little or no opportunity for state legislatures to have much input into the original
law. State laws were passed largely to comply with the provisions of
the National law in order to maintain eligibility for Federal funds.
Whatever differences there were between states and the Federal government over the objectives and application of the programs were determined by negotiation between state officials, the governor, or Congressmen from that state, with the Federal officials. There was no
practical provision for the states to be represented in this negotiating process except through the governor or the department head most
directly concerned. The U.S. Senators and Congressmen represent the
national point of view. The governor and department heads feel and
express the administrator 1 s point of view. The state legislature operates in the state capitol and usually in short sessions and has little opportunity to represent the legislative point of view. There is
little that the legislature can do other than memorialize about or
against congressional proposals or pass laws in compliance with the
Federal law as passed. This 11 is largely unsatisfactory as a form of
communication on policy questions and in no sense is it a¥ adequate
substitute for direct dialogue with members of Congresa. 11 4 In the
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early statehood period, the legislature controlled administration at
the state level through committees. The legislature could balance out
one program or need against another. As state government increased,
the legislature, not being in continuous session, lost its control over
the departments and programs. Supervision within the states was by the
state departments, each supervising its own functional area. Earmarked
funds, both national and state, revolving funds, backdoor financing,
and open end matching have decreased legislative control even further.
A lack of codification of national-state correspondence has made it
easier for the national agency to treat different states on other than
a uniform basis relative to meeting national standards. Significant
decisions have been made at the bureau level. Professionalism of the
government ~ployees attending the same schools, belonging to the same
professional organizations,. and talking to each other tends to develop
the specialist 1 s point of view.
Lacking is the overall point of view which could be made available
in the legislature if something.Jolere done about the present committee
system. The British use of A, B, C, D and Scottish Committees with
general jurisdiction is one possibility. But even without this lessening ·of committee specialization, there is ~till a broader point of view
available in a legislative body than within any one executive department. The Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations 11 suggests
having the presiding officers of the legislature, the majority and minority leaders and chairmen.of committees involving Federal-State relations authorized • • • to present testimony to congressional committees considering new or modified Federal programs significantly effecting the state. 11 Z5 The difficulty with the ACIR suggestion is the problem of being in two places at the same time. State legislatures are
either actively involved in legislating and legislators are not free to
go to Washington to testify, or have adjourned and are not organized to
have members speak for the legislatures or be paid to represent it.
District councilors would be free to be in either the state capitol
or in Washington as the situation demanded. The District Council could
function as a legislative link between Congress and the state legislature. The district councilors of a state could meet as a body in Washington while observing Congress to discuss state policy. At times by
mutual agreement, they could meet jointly with that state's Congressional delegation to share cotmn0n concern and ideas relative to pending
legislation. The district councilors of a state would also be available to meet at the state capitol on call of the state legislature while
it was in session. More lengthy meetings in preparation for congressional sessions could be held between the regular sessions of the state
legislature. Being in Washington as a body, they could continue to consult as a state unit. In Washington they could influence Congress more
effectively than a legislative body from a distant state capitol. As
individual councilors, they could continue to represent the state point
of view. Collectively, they would represent all of the states. They
could also help interpret Congressional points of view to the states.
Together with Congressmen and the state legislatures, they could develop
legislative federalism and do much to protect the states• freedom to
legislate. In so doing, it could strengthen the states in the Federal
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SENATE

The three functions of the present congress, as noted before, are
legislation, representation and oversight. The unicameral congress,
relieved of much of the representation and oversight functions could
concentrate more on legislation. The district councilors, as previously explained, would be primarily responsible for developing proper
representation. The senate, no longer representing the states nor·
needed in Congress for that purpose, would be free to concentrate on
overseeing the executive branch. Placed there it could be far more
effective in oversight and control. It could be considered or called
an executive senate. Not all of the power or prestige has to remain
with the President to maintain a strong executive branch. Even now
not all executive power is in the hands of the President. The President shares the selection of high government officials with the Senate.
He appoints and they consent or refuse. It is within their power to
choose. The executive branch would be strengthened if the Senate having the power to consent and the power to ratify were in that branch
rather than in the legislative branch. Although the executive branch
would be strengthened, both the President and administrative agencies
within it would be subject to increased democratic scrutiny and influence through the elected Senate.
In addition to the power of confirmation and ratification, the
Senate would have power of reconfirmation and instant fiscal, personnel, program and policy audit of the executive branch with full access
to pertinent official records. This instant investigation in coming
without warning would be similar to postal inspection and bank examination, The Senate would also have investigatory power equal to the legislative and judicial branches. Senators would be ex officio members
of all departments, boards, and commissions and have authority to attend any and all sessions they wished, to participate but have no vote,
The Senate would have power to disallow any rule or regulation having
the force of effect of law if considered to be beyond power granted
by Congress.

By being in the executive branch, it could investigate and advise
without having the burden of legislating, As an elected official of
government and ex officio member of all departments and agencies, the
Senator would have access to in-depth information, not available to the
newsman except through leaks, skuttle butt, wire tapping, informants,
off-the-cuff or not-to-be-quoted sources. De Tocqueville spoke of the
Senate as being a grand council to which the President would have to go
for ratification of treaties and consent to appointments, 26
The Senate as proposed would have these powers and more, It would
be free to advise on domestic and foreign affairs, to add to its role
stated in the Constitution of consenting to nominations and ratifying
treaties. It could investigate, not only for the purpose of confirming
nominations, but also for continued performance; not only for the purpose of determining what laws should be passed, but also for determining how well the laws were being executed.
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Would the placing of the Senate in the executive branch be contrary to the concept of separation of powers? No, because it would be
a check within the executive branch itself. It would be an internal
check similar to the bicameral system of legislatures and the dissent
of courts. The Senate would choose its presiding officer from among
its own members. The vice president would not be its presiding officer. The Senate would have power by a two-thirds majority to determine qualifications of and limitations upon its own members, to refuse
to seat, to censure, to curb activities, to limit access to official
records, or to remove.
A Senatorial appointment secretary, elected by the Senate from
outside its own.membership, would have sole power to make all appointments one day every week for all persons having access to the President on that day. More specifically, no other official, not even someone selected by the President himself, would have_any authority to make
appointments .for seeing the President on such a day. Failure to meet
such appointments could be an impeachable offense. This would insure
access of the Senate and its members to the President.
The Senate would elect its own prosecuting officer to start legal
proceedings based upon its findings. Senators could act individually
or through committees paralleling departments or areas of concern.
These committees, just as those of the House, should parallel any
high executive group such as the National Security Council, Council
of Economic Advisers) Office of Domestic Affairs, and the like so
that the Senate could develop overall policy.
Committee size and membership would be flexible, permitting all
members so desiring to be on a committee. This would avoid having a
committee stacked for or against the individual agency or group being
investigated. The chairman.of the committee would be chosen by secret
ballot. Further organization within the committee·would be determined
by the committee itself. Jurisdiction of each committee would not be
exclusive. Other Senators or committees could investigate the same
area. Choice of subject for investigation would be made by Senators
or committees.
The Senate would submit periodic reports of its findings and recomm.endations to the President and to Congress. It could serve in an
advisory capacity.relative to Presidential action on bills, whether to
sign or veto. Chosen from among its own members, the presiding officer of the Senate would have recognition and prestige,·comparable·to
that of the Speaker of the House.
-Selected members of the Senate could function as a board ~f directors of a National research council. Part of the research facilities
could include a bill drafting service to provide assistance in the
preparation of bills being drafted to carry out proposals resulting
from the research. The Senate could function in a quasi-legislative
manner, clearing requests of departments and determining the final
form of administrative bills, subject, of course, to further decision
by the President.

34

One purpose of·having a Senate as council to the President would
be to have competition of ideas through two sources, one, from those
chosen and appointed by the President and two, from those elected by
the people. Another purpose would be to have double accountability
of government officials, one, to the President and two, to the Senate.
A third purpose would be to have internal control within the executive
branch from an agency answerable not to the President, but to the people.
This would provide a second means of control outside the bureaucracy, for its personnel, not being administrative employees, would be
less apt to try to cover up governmental inefficiencies. In fact, its
main reason for existence would.be to discover and report such improper
activity. Since the Senators and President would answer to different
constituencies, the Senate would be independent of the President. Collectively, the Senate would represent the people of the United States,
just as the President does. Since ·the members would not stand for
election at the same ·time as the President, there would be no coattail
effect to influence the Senate to support the President.
Although the main purpose of the Senate would be to provide advice, information, performance audit, assistance in policy formation,
and control, it· would also be best informed to initiate impeachment
proceedings. Impeachment would be by a majority vote of the Senate.
The present method of having an investigation by a Senate committee,
followed by another investigation by a House committee to determine
if there should be impeachment, causes both duplication of effort and
undue delay. Conviction and removal from office should be by the more
representative body, the Congress, ~nd by a two-thirds concurrent majority.
This Ct>ngress referred to above would have one house with 600-members. The two-thirds concurrent majority would include two-thirds of
the members voting, assuming a quorum, plus the majority vote of members of two-thirds of the states. The trial would be conducted by a
panel of members made up of one member from each state as chosen by
each state delegation. The prosecution would be in the hands of the
Attorney General and a committee chosen by the Senate, The other members of the Congress would be free to continue with other functions of
Congress until it came time for presenting the findings of the hearing
with the recommendation of the trial panel for final consideration and
vote.
In addition to the general investigatory function, the Senate would
have the more specific role of ombudsman. Since the Senate would be in
the executive branch, it would not be limited in its right of access to
all government files, including secret ones, by the doctrine of the separation of powers. Individual members having the support of the Senate
plus the ·proposed Constitutional authorization for access to information, would be in a strong position to protect citizens from neglect or
abuse by government officials or employees. More important, this support and authority would do much to prevent its occurrence in the first
place.
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Recognizing the need for protection of persons, corporations, officials, or agencies from abuse or investigation run riot, it would be
necessary to punish severely improper use of information. Laws providing strong penalties should be enacted to be applied against those using
such information for personal gain, to disrupt our regulatory systems,
to· infringe upon rights protected under patents and copyrights, to interfere with law enforcement and judicial processes or to endanger the
national security.
The Senate could follow precedents, procedures, and rules of Congress in granting subpoena power and contempt citations. It would have
as its staff the Office of Management and Budget. The Director of this
office would be elected by the Senate since this office would be under
its control-and he would be its agent and chief administrative officer.
The General Accounting Office would still remain under the control of
Congress to continue its role of post audit. The Senate would have one
hundred fifty members, three from each state, having nine-year overlapping terms. This would be comparable to an expanded Senate with three
instead of two members from each state. Each Senator would be chosen
from a separate district, thus decreasing his election expenses and
lessening the need for large donations. One member from each state
would be up for election every third year. The terms would be overlapping and lengthened from six to nine years to provide greater continuity of supervision. Senators, as proposed, would be eligible for
two elected terms of nine years each or a maximum of twenty years.
This would permit serving up to two years of an unexpired term. District councilors elected for two year terms would be eligible for ten
terms.
Limiting the length of service would help insure that congressmen
would serve in key positions while still in their prime rather than
in their dotage. It would replace congressmen longer in service, who
have gradually lost touch with their constituents, with younger, more
constituent-oriented congressmen. Age is not the sole or even most
important criterion, because some congressmen, gaining prominence
through other lines of endeavor, may be elected when somewhat older
than the average freshman. Limiting the length of service of others
elected at a younger age would give them an opportunity to become productive at an earlier stage in their legislative career.
The denial of the opportunity to remain in office after three
terms or twenty years as House members, or two terms or twenty years
as senators, or ten terms or twenty years as district councilors,
would automatically increase the number competing for each of the
higher offices. Theoretically, at least, this would guarantee an
increase in the competence of the official chosen. If it seemed
desirable to give voters opportunity to check upon the congressmen
or senators between their elections at the six or nine year intervals,
provision could be made for recall at three year intervals. Following
recall, a special election could be called to fill the unexpired term.
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PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL

There is a strong historical precedent for an executive or Presidential Council. Nine of the thirteen states had them. They were
Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, Vermont and Virginia.27 Colonial councils were established to protect the colonists from the governor because there was
a need for systematic provision for advice from elected sources.
The Council elected by the representatives of the colonists, provided
the opportunity for more democratic input in policy formation and in
its execution. Elected councils, needed in the trying times of the
colonial period to avoid abuses of policy and its execution, are
needed now to avoid the repetition of some of the excesses of modern
administrations.
Such a council might have been beneficial to the two Adams, two
Johnsons, two Roosevelts, Jefferson, Monroe, Jackson, Van Buren, Buchanan, Lincoln, Grant, McKinley, Wilson, Harding, Coolidge, Hoover,
Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy. Others might have been included in
the list for various reasons, but the ones selected were chosen because of the trying domestic or foreign conditions of their time.
They were also chosen because of pending disaster to the country,
corruption of officials or dictat6rial tendencies of their close
associates. Any one of these is a sufficient reason for a presidential council. The fact that there was a combination of them in
most of these administrations provides a much greater reason for the
reestablishment of councils as a means of providing increased democratic control of the President, his palace guard, brain trust and
the evergrowing, self-protecting, self-perpetuating bureaucracy.
The councils were discontinued in most states, not because they
were unneeded but because the governors did not want to be controlled.
They were discontinued in the unicameral states because the councils
wanted to have full legislative power in addition to their role as
adviser to the executive. Washington, seeking to use the U.S. Senate
as a council on a treaty with the Indians, was rebuffed when the Senate referred the proposed treaty to a committee • • •, 11 the Senate
made it clear that in its own estimation it was not a Council of
State but a legislative body, in no way subordinate to the President.1128
Now the Senate is needed less as a legislative body and more as
a check on the President and his programs. There were those in the
Constitutional ~onvention who warned about having too strong an executive. Both Madison and Franklin 11 thought a Council would not only
be a check on a bad president but (also) be a relief to a good one. 1129
There is too much advice and policy formation from appointed
sources, special interests, the press, TV and cormnentators, and government employees who have never been subject to an election, There
has not been enough from elected sources, from those chosen by the
people to be their representatives, and from those representing the
general public.
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Jackson had his kitchen cabinet, Roosevelt-and Kennedy, their brain
trusts. Nixon has had his close advisors, both in and out of government, appointed or selected, but not elected. There is nothing sacrosanct about those appointed. If special interests have great interest
and influence in the appointment, the appointee and his policy will
probably be less representative.
How can the Senate function in a closer advisory capacity? How can
it be chosen democratically? How can the bipartisanship of its members
be ensured to provide a variety of points of view? How can its membership be renewed gradually to achieve both change and continuity?
Answering the first question, the Senate could choose a presidential council to act on its behalf. In the Constitutional Convention,
Colonel Mason proposed:
• an Executive council, as a Council of State for
the President of the United States, to consist of six members, two of which were from the Eastern, two from the middle, and two from the Southern states with a rotation and
duration of office similar to those of the Senate; such
Council to be appointed by the Legislature or by the Senate. 30
A Presidential council would develop in the following way. It
would be an elected·body chosen by the Senate· by secret ballot. To
ensure democracy it would be elected, not appointed. To be sure that
those voting would not be subject to undue pressure, the balloting
would be secret. To ensure bipartisanship, positions on the Presidential council would be apportioned by party according to the
strength of the party in the newly elected class.
This bipartisanship for the executive branch would carry on the
bipartisanship of committees of Congress and bipartisanship on independent regulatory commissions. Once the election is over, much should
be and is accomplished on a consensual basis. More should be done by
general agreement between the parties and for the benefit of the nation. Less should be forced on the country and the people by strong
partisan support and for narrow partisan reasons.
The minor party and its members should be considered one of the
minority groups to be protected and its members to be guaranteed equal
rights. Ours is not a one party system that outlaws al~ opposition·
parties. Nor should it be a system where the major party takes unfair
advantage of the opposition or considers it an enemy. The attitude
and actions of members of the Committee for the Reelection of the
President should be proof enough of the resultant dangers.
The composition and activities of the Committee for the Reelection
of the President are further evidence of the opportunity of abuses from
entrenched power. Periodic election of officials by those knowledgeable of their qualities by secret ballot could do much to break up such
overconcentration of power.
Since the members of the senate as proposed would be chosen for
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nine year overlapping terms, one third would be elected every three
years. Each third would constitute a separate class. To provide
change, each class would elect one third of the presidential council
for terms of nine years from among its own members. Vacancies on the
Council would be filled by each group elected every third year.
A presidential council of fifteen members would be small enough
to function as a close consulting body. Five members chosen every
three years would make possible both continuity and change. Apportioning the vacancies between parties on the basis of the party membership of the class elected would develop bipartisanship. Designation of those vacancies by party and having each fill its own vacancies
would ensure bipartisanship. A secret ballot would make voting without
fear of favor possible. Each member could vote as his own conscience
directed.
A presidential council chosen for its wisdom and virtue from members of the senate should provide advice and aid.in policy formation
that would be both democratic in origin and beneficial in content to
the President and the country. If we have a democracy, why not pick
the President's advisors at least indirectly through a democratic
process.
To be more truly representative, there needs to be a place in the
executive branch for the also rans. Where better than in the proposed
senate would you find a place for them. In Great Britain His Majesty 1 s
Loyal Opposition is paid by the government.
In close elections the losing candidate has nearly as much support as the winner. Could his supporters and backers be that much
wrong, that a candidate at one time can be presidential timber, then
suddenly to be such a loser and be apparently of little value. How
can there be such a difference between Humphrey, the man who wins as
vice president, and Humphrey, the man who loses the race for president?
Because of the increase in population, except for the year 1948,
every losing candidate for president from either of the two major parties has received more popular votes than Franklin D. Roosevelt did in
1944. That year he received 25,602,505 votes. Losers received the
following numbers of popular votes in the succeeding elections:

1952
1956
1960
1964
1966
1972

Adlai Stevenson
Adlai Stevenson
Richard Nixon
Barry Goldwater
Hubert Humphrey
George McGovern

27,314,987
26,035,504
34,107,646
27,174,989
31,275,165
29,168,110

While talking to Senator McGovern in April of 1976, I recalled
that these losing candidates had each received more votes than President Roosevelt as winner in 1944. I then asked if the major losing
candidate. should have some role in government similar to His Majesty's
Loyal Opposition in Britain. He agreed and made the following statement:
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A losing candidate goes into oblivion. Yes, he should
be used in some way, because he learns so much in the.campaign. President Roosevelt sent Wendell Willkie on a world
tour and he wrote the book One ~rld. He died soon after,
but he did make a contribution.
A losing candidate with that kind of following and that kind of experience can 1 t be all wrong. He should be listened to periodically, together with the presidential council. Perhaps he should become a member of it and assist in developing the minority point of view. Proper
combination of the majority and minority approaches to problems could
lead to a consensus and broader support for policies and programs.
Since the President has become chief legislator the bipartisan approach
is needed in the executive as well as the legislative branch.
Might there not be a place for a senior advisory council. Are
past government officials of value only to non-profit corporations or
in some other full time government position, to be of value only when
in one office or another? Why not seek ideas within the government
from those who seek office? l-Jhy not continue to seek advice from those
who have left office for honorable reasons? The less information received from those who have disgraced the office the better, but from
those who have served honorably in office there should be a wealth of
information and advice especially following contemplation. Admission
by the person him.self of fault, miscalculation, or wrong decision on
the basis of later developments would do more to develop wise future
policy than outside investigation could ever do. Former President
Hoover served with honor on the Hoover Commission. He contributed
much to the study of the reorganization of the executive branch of
the government.
Is there anything magic in the appointing process in finding brains
that can be trusted? Instead of developing a brain trust that may be a
monopoly for special interests and a combination in restraint of democracy and ideas, why not break up the selection process? Why not break
it up to provide for more competition in ideas, to seek the truth as
Mill would, to find the truth in a wealth of ideas in the market place?
That which might be lost in expertise could be made up in breadth of
viewpoint. Expertise can be employed to be on tap, but not on top.
Election by the people, whether directly or indirectly, of district
councilors, representatives and senators can provide the variety of
points of view necessary for the development of a balanced policy reflecting the needs of the constituencies, and through indirect represen~ation in the presidential council, the needs of the country as a
whole. Senators and those on the presidential council can seek their
own advisers to offset and balance those chosen by the President.
Eisenhower and Nixon have relied more on business and financial elites.
Kennedy tended to rely more on educational elites.3 2 Senators could
seek others to complement the President's choices.
To be sure that the presidential council would have adequate opportunity to consult with the President, it would be necessary to have Constitutional requirements for meetings and agenda. The meetings should
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occur at least once a month on call of either the President or the
presidential council, The agenda should be made up on a joint basis
except that the President would have priority for his items in six
of the monthly meetings, and the presidential council would have priority for its items in the other six monthly meetings, ProYision for
these meetings should in no way preclude others that-might be called.
The role of the presidential council would be purely advisory.
The President's decisions would be his own, but at least he would be
able to get advice from recOgnized officers of the government selected
in a representative manner. He would be the recipient of opposing
views fronrwhich he could pick and choose whatever he wished, or simply use his own. -~·Policy could be formed in a more deliberate fashion
and, by including opposition in the process, avoid some otherwise unanticipated problems and side effects.
Institutionalized opposition in the policy forming process might
widen options, lessen the over optimism of anticipated success with
its probable lack of alternate action and back up plans. It could
also lessen the pessimism caused by unanimity of anticipated failure.
The President would still be free for decisive action regardless of
the source of advice,
According to Louis Koenig in his book The Chief Executive, President Johnson's favorite tactic with those whose advice he sought was,
"I want to do this. You tell me Wy I shouldn't. 1133 But what about
the advice he didn't seek and other alternatives he didn't consider?
Presidential assistants, Adams and Haldeman, limited both alternatives
and questions to be considered by Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon,
respectively.
George Reedy, former White House Press Secretary, stated:
Presidents are usually political creatures whose
senses have been dulled by an environment that permits
apocalyptic decisions to be carried out before they ha34
encountered the opposition of other str~ng minded men,
He

p~oposed:

The creation of an over-all congressional committee,
with members drawn from all the standing committees of the
Congress, and with full power to require regular reports
on the international situation and on the executive branch's
plan to cope with it. Such a group would not--and should
not--be granted legislative authority. But its access to
information should be limited only by practical considerations of time and manageability • , • there sho~5d be no
limitations based upon security considerations.
The presidential council or senate could perform these functions.
As proposed, they would be free from legislative functions and would
have full access to information.
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Elected as advisers with -overlapping ~erms to proVide experience
and continuity, having full access to information .and based upon broad
.representation with a variety of input, the presidential council could
provide great knowledge, guidance and stability to the executive branch.
This presidential council could be in a special way what Benjamin Franklin envisioned, 11 a check on a bad President • • • a relief to a good
one. 11 3 6 The executive branch would be stronger, but more democratically
directed through increased sensitivity, feedback, and control.
Significantly, the President and Vice President would no longer be
the only ones elected in the executive branch.
The fact that the senate and the presidential council chosen from
Fit were both elected to give advice would indicate that the President
needed to receive advice. The fact that the presidential council was
elected and not of the President's own choosing would indicate that
unwanted or unpleasant advice could be given. No longer would the President be completely surrounded by his own appointees to be given their
opinion by the President when he wanted them to have it. As an elected
council answerable to the senate and to the people, it would be free to
offer advice as it saw fit and make its reports to both the public and
the President. The presidential council could take the place of the
cabinet, whose advice is seldom sought and rarely used.
Doubtless, some of these councilors would be potential Presidents.
Several present-day senators already think of themselves as prime candidates for the office of President. They would be happy to be in an
official position to give the President advice, especially to be able
to do so as a part of the executive branch. As they groomed themselves
for the Presidency from within the executive branch, they would take
away some of the prestige of the President by providing a range of, or
limits on, acceptable policy formation. In their investigating and
planning role, they would be gaining invaluable experience for the office of President if they should get it.
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VICE PRESIDENT AND SUCCESSION' TO THE PRESIDENCY
The office of Vice President was intended to have great stature
under the Constitution. The Vice President, by terms of that document,
was made President of the Senate, a body of prestige and strength representing the states. That position was ~xpected to be one of action
and second only to the President in power. He was authorized to cast
the deciding vote in case of a tie, further evidence of the power he
was expected to have. The method of selection of Vice President was
still further indication of the intended importance of the office.
As originally planned in the Constitution each elector voted for two
peraons, one from another state than his own. That person receiving
the largest number of votes would be President providing he had a majority A and the one with the second largest number would be Vice President.~7 There was no designation of candidates for Vice President.
The Vice President was to be the second best man for the office of
President.
This system, changed first 38 ~ecause of a tie vote between Jefferson and Burr, was changed still further by the development of the
party system. Party consideration in balancing the ticket meant choice
of Vice Presidential nominees on the basis of strength toward winning
an election, rather than strength of the individual in office. Party
development in the Senate further detracted from the status and power
of the Vice President, The Senate majority leader, chosen from among
Senators themselves and by the majority party, was far more powerful.
Ignored by the President, overshadowed by the Senate majority leader
and the Speaker of the House, the office of Vice President lost much
of its intended power and prestige. Vice Presidents as late as Coolidge were not even called to attend cabinet meetings. The office
meant so little that enemies of strong men like Theodore Roosevelt
had him chosen Vice President as a means of ending his political career. If McKinley had not died in office, and Roosevelt succeeded
as President, little more would probably have been heard of him.
Even as late as the time of Vice President Trlµllan, the President was
not keeping the .Vice President .adequately informed. Alger Hiss knew
more about what was going on at Yalta than did Vice President Truman.
In Eisenhower's administration, at the time of his heart attack,
it was Sherman Adams and not Vice President Nixon who took control of
the business of the Presidency. Facetiously, taking over is probably
not the proper term. Under Sherman Adams it was more like retaining
than taking over. Presidential assistants became more powerful than
Vice Presidents. Haldeman followed this tradition. Through an act
of Congress creating the National Security Council, the Vice President was to have a more important role in foreign policy. But how
could an Agnew compete with a Kissinger in either knowledge or control?
Following the serious illness of Eisenhower while in office, the
death of Kennedy, and Johnson 1 s history of heart trouble, the TwentyFifth Amendment was added to the .Constitution. This provided for succession of the Vice President in case of disability as well as death.
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The tragic events leading to this amendment made it even more evident
that the Vice President should be of Presidential stature. The choice
of Hubert Humphrey as President Johnson 1 s running mate in 1964 gave
some evidence that the political parties were taking this need seriously.
What needs to be done to restore the office of the Vice President
to the status and power to which it was intended? The proposed senate
in the executive branch, and the corresponding change in functions
would make possible not only restoring, but also enhancing the Vice
President 1 s status and power. It could enhance his power because he
would no longei be a hybrid, part legislative and part executive,
but would be completely in the executive branch.
Whatever role he played relative to the senate, would add to his
present executive duties. To give him a more prominent position in
the senate, he should be elected senator at large at the same time that
he is elected Vice President elect, He would be elected to both offices
on the same ballot to continue as senator as long as he was Vice President elect or Vice President.
As a full member of that body he would have all the rights and
privileges of it. Elected at large, he would have the advantage of
prestige that went with that constituency. Being a senator and having the rights and privileges of one, he would be in a constitutional
position to offer advice to the President. He would also have full
access to any and all departments, boards, commissions and agencies,
to investigate at will, consult or advise. He would be far more knowledgeable if and when he took over as President. This would include
awareness not only of domestic, but also of foreign affairs.
With the great increase in government and resulting responsibility
on the President there may be a need for not just one but two working
Vice Presidents. One could be involved primarily with foreign policy,
the other with domestic policy. The problem of selection would be doubled because of the need to select two, but with past problems of Vice
Presidential candidates and Vice Presidents such as Eagleton and Agnew
there might be an advantage in selecting two by the normal selection
process to be sure that one of those selected would be suitable for
office or eligible to succeed to the Presidency.
Following the Eagleton and Agnew affairs there have been many
questions raised about the method of selecting the Vice President.
The Institute of Politics at Harvard made several suggestions for
improving the Vice Presidential selection process. Amo~g those were:
(1) having the Presidential candidate start the selectibn process
earlier, (2) discussing the criteria for the running mate and urging
emphasis on competence to be President as the primary factor, and
(3) considering the platform at the convention after tQe nomination
of the Presidential candidat§ to give him more time in the final selection of his running mate. 9
Training and experience in the legislative and executive branches
at both state and national levels as well as related experience in
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metropolitan, academic, corporate or international fields should be
included as possible items for consideration in the criteria for Vice
President. Considering the broad nature of the office, experience in
a variety of these would seem most beneficial, especially experience
in both legislative and executive branches. Because of the nature of
our federal system, experience at both the state and national levels
would be rewarding.
Not·only should the Vice President have the qualifications for
President, but also all others in line of succession to the Presidency.
High ranking Presidential advisers should also have the same prerequisites. This is particularly important relative to those dealing in
foreign policy, especially since foreign policy has become such an important part of the President 1 s responsibility.
In time of crisis the question of bypassing someone in line of
succession because that person was not a natural born citizen could
raise additional areas of conflict during a crucial period. The requirement of natural born citizen was included in the prerequisites
for President to prevent the brilliant, attractive Alexander Hamilton
from becoming President. This same requirement would lay to rest the
possibility of Henry Kissinger becoming President. Could not their
services have been rendered under more control by natural born citizens, just as there is provision for civilian control of the military.
With the cabinet officer a natural born citizen, the defense for the
policy of a Hamilton or Kissinger could have been that it had ·the support of natural born citizens in positions of authority. The President should not be the Sole natural born citizen to be answerable to
such charges or be subject to such great responsibility, particularly
in the area of foreign policy. A highly talented Hamilton or Kissinger warmed by the glow of high public acclaim and international praise
may be blinded by the reflection of their own brilliance. As an actor
they may place more importance in day by day portrayal in the play of
events than in ultimate reality or long run national interest, to give
the appearance of accomplishment regardless of what might be happening
backstage.

45

PRESIDENT ELECT

Not only do present-day senators need experience in preparation
for the Presidency, so also do prospective Presidents. For the first
140 years under the new Constitution, the President took office about
four months after he was elected. In the early 1800s that length of
time for final preparation for office was sufficient. At present the
transition period should be even longer. But following the adoption
of the ~entieth Amendment, the President had less time instead of
more.
President Roosevelt who proposed the Twentieth Amendment was already in office when it took effect and didn't feel the need for the
extra time for preparation. Those following have been thrust into
office with insufficient opportunity to be informed. Leading candidates are briefed on foreign policy during the campaign but not as
thoroughly as an incoming President should be.
Some information is held back since·it may be used for political
purposes, that is, for the purpose of gaining office. Information for
a prospective President would not be as full as it would be for a President planning a course of government action. It would be une thing
to ·be using .information to gain office and .another to be using it while
having the responsibility of being a government official •. It is one
thing to talk about negotiating on your knees as .a candidate and another in being conunitted to negotiate on your knees as the head of the
government.
A longer transition period is needed for preparation of the budget, development of legislative proposals, and the State of the Union
Message. Lengthening the transition period would make more gradual
change possible. It is customary in many organizations to have people
in training for higher positions and to have a President-elect, even
for social clubs. If this is common practice in private orgallizations
and in business, both large and small,.why would it not be even more
important for the highest office in government and for the incoming
President of the United States?
A two-year term as President-elect would give him a session of
Congress to observe from the viewpoint of the President. It would
further his understanding of government operations. There would be
opportunity for him to become better informed on foreign affairs.
At no other time in his life could he have done more than he could
as President-elect to prepare himself for the Presidency. As situations arose, he could think about what he would do if he were President and have an opportunity to compare his judgment with that of the
actual President. If on-the-job training is important elsewhere, why
not here in the toughest of all jobs?
Some might suggest that the term of two years for the Presidentelect might be too long. A shorter time might be better, but the
present length of time is far too short. Candidates seeking the
Presidency learn much in campaigning as McGovern said, but they are
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bound to learn more in office. They learn much as Vice Presidents and
in other offices, but would never learn as much as they would if sure
of becoming President and everyone knew it.
The delay in taking office as President would provide two years
more time to investigate political donations and election irregularities. This additional wait of two years would discourage illegal donations that were made to get quick protection or early payoff.
The President-elect could do much to prepare himself for President
after the heat of the campaign was over and when he was closer to the
reality and responsibility of office. He could pursue the ramifications of his election promises from inside the government and might
even change his mind in the light of additional information, Time
would be available to prepare his own budget, rather than be bound
in great part to the one formed by his predecessor.
There would be time available to consult with those who might
become part of his administration. They, in turn, could be consulted
on the development of new programs, changing others, and budget alterations to fit proposed needs. Pilot programs might be established.
Of utmost importance would be the gradual learning necessary to
be prepared on foreign policy. The opportunity for the President-elect
to learn would seem to be far greater than that of the Vice President.
One reason for this would be the certainty that the President-elect
would succeed the President. Many Vice Presidents have not. Franklin
Roosevelt had three Vice Presidents. Second, the President-elect would
not be a campaign rival for office. The desire of the President to
run for a second term and thereby keep a potential rival uninformed
has stopped Presidents from preparing Vice Presidents to succeed them.
A third reason is the incumbent's feeling that no one else is really
capable of being elected President or being President. The actual
election of a President-elect would remove that reticence, The President would be dealing with a future equal and would know it. The tendency would be to treat him differently because of the office he held.
Of even greater importance would be the time and opportunity for
the President-elect to be informed on foreign policy. He would have
access to information because he already held office. With more information, the Bay of Pig fiasco might have been avoided in 1961. By
knowing well in advance when and who will be involved in a change in
authority, an orderly transfer of power can be worked out.
Separating the time of elections from the time of transfer of
power can maintain stability in foreign affairs. It is common for
leaders of foreign countries to test the American government during
Presidential elections and to test American Presidents when new in
office. The Cuban missile crisis occurred in October, 1962, less than
two years from the time President Kennedy took office. A foreign government would gain no special advantage in doing this during a President-elect election for the following reasons. The President already
in off ice would remain in power the next two years while the President
elect was becoming more thoroughly prepared for office. The incumbent
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President would probably have little or nothing personal at stake since
he was not running for office, nor could he be reelected President. In
addition he would be in a position to continue his policies for the
next two years while still in office. The incumbent President could
share much of his experience, concepts and beliefs with the Presidentelect while preparing him for the Presidency. This sharing of ideas
could well insure a more stable foreign policy. Gradual transition
and implementation would help also.
The economy might well be more stable during the election period
because the incumbent President would remain in office for the next two
years. The independent regulatory commissions are planned with overlapping terms of office to provide for more gradu~l change in policy.
The interchange of ideas between the President-elect and the President
could provide a similar gradual change.
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PRESIDENT
In getting the best person into office, more emphasis should be
placed on pertinent training and experience in the executive branch
for those aspiring to be President and more experience or observation
of the Congress for those aspiring to be congressmen and eventually
President.
Some Presidents have had experience as governors, executive experience yes, but not at the national level. In recent years, more of
the candidates have been former Senators, who have had.little or no experience in the executive branch. The establishment of the Senate in
the executive branch with power of· advice, confirmation, reconfirmation, audit, and control would provide an opportunity for potential
Presidents to be better.prepared to assume the duties of that office.
Formerly, governors of large states, notably New York and Ohio,
men having much experience as executives, became Presidents. More
recently former governors of California and Georgia have sought the
office. Because of the emphasis on foreign affairs and the inability
of governors to develop nationwide constituencies, Senators now have
a great advantage in the race to become President. Senators or congressmen, unless they have been former governors, have not had executive experience. Governors of large states, at present, seldom become Senators. They would, thereby, lose an opportunity to· become
more knowledgeable in foreign policy. The natural line of advancement to President under the proposed system would be up and through
the House, the Senate, Presidential Council, Vice President elect,
Vice President, and President-elect to President. This would provide potential officeholders and candidates with experience in both
the legislative and executive branches. They would have the opportunity to grow into the Presidency.
The modern President has acquired power not envisioned at the
time of President Washington. Much of this has come from Congress
itself through the enactment of war and emergency power. Inadequate
control of such additional power and sufficient, practical power to
remove it can lead to its misuse and abuse. In Germany, after Kaiser
Welhelm and World War I, a democracy was established under the Weimar
Constitution. One section of this permitted the Chancellor to take
emergency power by decree. The Reichstag could not stop him. Under
the United States Constitution, as interpreted, Congress can pass
laws granting emergency use of power by the President. Once enacted
for a specific war or emergency, these laws stay on the books to be
used as a continued base of power. This power·given by a majority
of Congress cannot be taken away by a majority, if the President objects, because of his veto. The original granting or allocation of
power in the Constitution required an extraordinary majority. Why
should not the reallocation of such emergency or.war power require
an extraordinary majority of Congress? A two-thirds vote of Congress
should be required for passing emergency or war powers and repeal of
such laws require a simple majority not subject to veto bY the President. This method of repeal was provided for in the Lend-Lease Act
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and other war time laws.
In foreign policy the President has avoided the control of the
senate by using executive agreements instead of treaties. Nonselfexecuting agreements require a majority vote of both houses. ·Selfexecuting treaties do not require even that much. In the Missouri
v. Holland case it was ruled that treaties could take power away from
the states and give it to the Federal Government. There is no limit
to the extent to which executive agreements can be used in place of
treaties. Extensively used as a means of avoiding control by the
senate, such action thwarts the intent of the Constitution and should
be stopped. Therefore, executive agreements should be subject to
ratification in the same way as treaties. Ratification would require
a two-thirds majority of .the senate.
The President's power to appoint and remove as well as his power
over foreign policy would be changed, His appointing power as stated
above should be shared with the senate for all major policy forming
positions. This would also include nearly a thousand positions placed
in Schedule C during the Eisenhower administration. The President
would be limited further, relative to interim appointments which would
be subject to disallowance by the senate. Since not only appointment
and confirmation, but also removal is important in having good personnel, Presidents have removed their appointees for various reasons,
whether policy differences, inefficiency or whatever. The President's
power to remove has been-successfully challenged only with officials
having quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions. The President
has sole power to remove even when appointees are confirmed by the
senate. To increase democratic control of the bureaucracy and to insure better working relations between Presidential appointees.and the
senate, appointees should be removable by either the President or
the senate. Under the method suggested above, it would be easier to
remove undesirable appointees, even those close to the President.
In the international field, diplomatic personnel considered by the
host country to be persona non grata are removed to improve relations between nations. The arrogance of a Sherman Adams or a Bob
Haldeman are well known. The removal of such an individual might
improve relations between the President, the senate, and congress.
If it were improper for Congress to insist that Secretary of War
Stanton be retained by President Andrew Johnson, why should it not
be improper to insist that a Haldeman equally repugnant to Congress
be retained by Nixon. Further details are given below in the section on appointment and removal.
Changes in the President's role relative to emergency power,
foreign policy, appointment and removal have been designed to increase control over his actions. Another change which might improve
the direction of his actions would be the use of the senate and the
presidential council for advice as suggested above. The President
would be given council and reports by the senate and the presidential council, but would be as free to accept or reject that advice as
he is that of the cabinet under the present system. Although remaining Cormnander-in-Chief, Chief Executive, and Chief Legislator, he
would receive advice from the presidential council and the senate,
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whose members are elected by their own constituency and are not appointed by him. Not being beholden to him for their position, they
would feel less reticent to give the President advice that he might'
need, but not want to hear. A modern President, powerful in his own
right and subject to great pressure, needs the opportunity for additional advice and guidance from independently elected officials having their own base of power. They, equally answerable to their constituents, could serve as an internal check in the executive branch
and provide increased democratic control.
The term of office would be two years as President-elect and
six years a~ President for a total of eight years. The single term
of six years proposed by President Eisenhower has considerable merit.
This was also supported by Senators Aiken and Mansfield who jointly
introduced Senate Joint Resolution 77, proposing it in the 92nd Congress. The six years is long enough for accomplishment. It is short
enough for others to strive for the office while in their prime. The
strain of the office is sufficient to affect the health and competence
of the office holder so much that a longer term seems undesirable.
Fully as important as the six year length of term is the provision· that a President cannot be elected more than once. There would
then be no way that a President or those officials close to him
could use their office and the power thereof to further his reelection. 40 The pressure of office as used by the Committee for the Reelection of the President to garner large donations from corporations
and interest groups has caused much law breaking and abuse. This
precedent and the possibility of its continuance is very dangerous to
a democracy, the economy, and the middle and lower classes. Since a
President may not come up to the expectations of the electorate,
there should be some method of rectifying the mistake and shortening
the term. To provide for a popular vote on the President and determine if he should remain ih office for the full six years, a plebiscite would be held at the end of each biennium of his service.
The term of House members was made two years when the intent or
desire was to have policy determined by laws of Congress subject to
biennial review. It is true that senators served for six years with
a third of the senate being elected each two years; but, since it
was impossible to pass laws without the assent of the House, the twoyear term for the House was sufficient to protect the voters from
change or new legislation. The President, as Chief Legislator, has
taken over the role of Congress in policy formation. Therefore, he,
not the congressmen, should be subject to biennial review. If he is the.
one whose policies or actions are not popular, why not have him defend or praise his own policies to the nationwide constituency which
is his. In the past, American voters have given evidence time and
again that they knew what they did not want. The elections of 1964
and 1972 cited above are examples. There was a protest vot~ against
Goldwater in 1964; there was a protest vote against McGovern in 1972.
Another example was the protest vote against Hoover in 1932.
Fully as much of a problem may be the apparent mandate resulting
from overwhelming majorities.
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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., speaks of:
Nixon carrying the imperial.Presidency toward its
ultimate form in the plebiscitary Presidency--with the
President accountable only once every four years, shielded
in the years between elections from Congressional and public harassment, empowered by his mandate to make war or
to make peace, to spend or to impound, to give out information or hold it back, superseding congressional legislation by executive order, all in the name of a majority
whose choice must prevail till it made another choice
four years later--unless it wished to embark on the drastic and improbable course of impeachment.41

All: alternative, less traumatic and time consuming than impeachment
and conviction, is needed to make the President more responsible to
the people. If a vote can make a plebiscitary President, then let
a vote unmake him if his support changes. Let this vote come every
two years to strengthen a good President or replace a poor one.
In time of crisis a President is much stronger with evidence of
public support behind him. A·vote of ·confidence at such a time could
strengthen his position and do much to lessen the manufactured carping criticism of a militant minority. It would also lay to rest the
concept of the support of a silent majority. The votes would be there
to prove where the actual support was. The President would .be subject
to the vote of confidence or· lack of it by the people as counted and
registered in the electoral vote.

If the vote were favorable, the.President would continue in power
fully aware of the strength of his support. If the vote were in the
negative, he would be replaced by his Vice President. The term "vote
of confidence" should definitely be used rather than 11 recall." The
purpose is not to "get 11 a President. It is to determine the extent
of support he has, and then if such.support is insufficient, to remove him. The shift from President to Vice President in mid term
rather than at the end should change the course of policy in line
with the election results, Perhaps such change would be less abrupt
and less drastic if done at the early stage of disagreement.
If the President had approval to complete his full term of office,
a President-elect would be chosen at the end of his fourth year as
President to be ready to take over at the end of his term. The President would stay in office the next two years while the President-elect
was gaining experience, This gradual transition would have eased the
pressure upon a new President, as was Kennedy, by giving him time to
learn the office and be briefed on conditions and situations that might
need decisions.
There would be fewer times of apparent weakness because the transition from President to President-elect would be smoother than the
present method. The President-elect would gradually gain in influence;
and the retiring President would have a longer time in which to help
his successor gain an understanding of the office. He could, thereby,
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be of much assistance to the incoming President.
There would be no question about where the authority rested relative to the President-elect, just as there is no question about the
authority of the President in relation to the Vice President. In case
of succession to the office of President during.the two years of the
President-elect, the Vice President would succeed to the Presidency as
presently provided for. Other constitutional or legal provisions such
as the Twenty-Fifth .Amendment on Presidential succession and disability
would remain unchanged.
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ELECTIONS

Elections, under the present system, have been costly, traumatic,
dishonest and divisive, and ·have created false impressions of mandates
and popularity. Crucial decisions have been made in the primaries of
a few states, and nominations and elections have been manipulated by
the overzealous or dishonest.
The Constitution provided for the choice of President and Vice
President by a majority in an electoral college. In case there was
no majority, the choice of President would be made by the House with
each state casting· one vote to give advantage to small states, The
Vice President would be chosen by the Senate if there were no majority.
Senators were chosen by their respective state legislatures. No mention was made of political.parties. Changes have been ma"de in the
election system since the adoption of the Constitution which were designed to extend the suffrage and to gain more popular control over
elected officials. This was the intention, but ·have the results been
those intended? Just as amendments to the United States Constitution
and Federal laws have affected the electoral system, so too has the
development of factions, parties, state constitutions, state laws, and
political,practices, both legal and illegal.
The Twelfth Amendment changed the electoral college voting to distinguish between voting for President and voting for Vice President.
Under the system in the original Constitution, the person receiving the
second largest number of votes for President became Vice President.
The intent was that the second best man would become Vice President.
But with the development of parties, those who voted for Jefferson also
voted for Burr. Their intention was that Jefferson be President and
Burr., Vice President. Under the terms of the Constitution, the House
made the choice and selected Jefferson as President. The~senate chose
Burr to be Vice President. If no parties or a multiparty system had
developed, the electoral college might have remained a nominating body
as intended. If that were the case, it would have become the practice
for the House to choose the President and the Senate the Vice President.
Even with the development of parties, the electoral college has not made
the final decision in three elections, that of Jefferson's tie vote, and
those of John Quincy Adams and Rutherford ID. Hayes. Adams, the eventual
winner in 1824, had less electoral and less popular votes than one-third
of the electoral and pOpular votes. In 1876, Rutherford B. Hayes had
less popular votes than his opponent, Samuel J. Tilden and only one more
electoral vote as established by the Electoral Commission created by
Congress to determine the outcome of the election. The electoral college did make the decision in 1888, but President-elect Harrison had
less popular votes than his opponent, Grover Cleveland. Until 1881 some
states selected Presidential electors by districts. Since that time,
all states have chosen their electors at large. This has added to the
unrepresentative character of the electoral college. The suffrage has
been extended to Blacks, women and eighteen-year olds by passage of the
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments and by civil right
acts; but no change has been made to expand the electoral college or
make it more representative of the people.
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Prior to the final election comes the choice of the party nominee.
This was first done by caucus, by getting a few of the party leaders
together to make decisions. Later came the legislative caucus which
was more representative of the elected members of the party. This was
followed by the convention. The first national convention to choose a
President was held by the Anti-Masonic Party in 1831. Apparently more
democratic than caucuses, the convention was still so unrepresentative
in practice that the direct primary was adopted eventually in all the
states.
Convention delegates are not representative of party members. Democrat delegates are apt to be more liberal and Republican delegates more
conservative than party identifiers.42 The struggle for delegates and
the convention activity of the Democrats in 1972 continues to raise ·
questions about the representative quality of Democrat conventions. The
taking over of the Republican convention by the So called grass roots
movement of the Goldwater supporters in 1964 raises questions of representation in Republican conventions. The activities of the Committee
for the Reelection of the President in 1972 raises still further questions about the electoral process. Direct primaries adopted to democratize the nominating process are used in about two-thirds of the states
for selecting convention delegates. Presidential preferential primaries
are meaningful in less than a third of the states. Since candidates
pick and choose the primaries most favorable to them, the majority of
the party members have little to do in the choice of their party's nominee. Final election results indicate voter dissatisfaction with party
nominees. Neither Johnson nor Nixon had the great support and mandate
that the election results indicated, for many of the votes cast for
Johnson were actually votes against Goldwater, and many of the votes
for Nixon were votes against McGovern. Party primaries and conventions
do not necessfrily choose the best candidates and the electoral college
does not reflect the choice of the voters. At present, Presidential
primaries do increase the role of party members in the selection of the
Presidential nominee, but party members do not exert their influence at
the crucial time of the actual choice of the nominee. They exert it
earlier and in a piecemeal fashion in the state primaries. The electoral college is now far less representative than it was at its inception. It has no part in the nominating process, and with but few exceptions, is an automatic inaccurate recorder of the outcome of the popular
election.
Under the present method of having Presidential electors chosen at
large, the state electoral vote is cast as a block, giving a tremendous
advantage to big states and even small minorities within them. As the
plurality of the popular vote goes, so goes all the electoral votes.
This has the effect of casting the electoral votes of the losers for
the candid~te they voted against. Senator Mundt called this legalized
thievery. 4 3
Are Presidents to be chosen in an accidental or manipulative,
self-aggrandizing basis or are they to be chosen in a democratic or
representative manner? Ia there some way of returning the electoral
college or its equivalent to its intended role of nominating rather
than electing? Is there a way of incorporating part of the legislative
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caucus concept in the nominating process? Can the convention and the
direct primary method be included also? Can the electoral college district and popular election be incorporated in the final selection of
President? Judson James in his book on parties, suggests 11 greater use
of preprimary conventions • • • , and generally th~modification of
nomination procedures to emphasize party members."
Starting first with the nominating process and the electoral college, its representative and judgment making character needs to be returned. By having district. councilors as the electoral college for nominating purposes, the number of electors would be increased over fivefold, from 538 to3,000. The development of parties makes this proposal
by itself unrepresentative in practice and undemocratic. If the features of the mixed caucus were added, then a representative body would
be cre8ted. The district councilors of each party from each of the districts carried by that party would be supplemented in their deliberations by voting delegates chosen by the party leaders within each of
the nonparty represented districts. The vote of such delegates would
be reduced by the percent vote less than 50 percent cast for President
in the preceding Presidential election to keep voting strength parallel
to party strength. The district councilors and delegates from each
party in mixed caucus would select three nominees who would be certified as· Presidential candidates to the national convention of their respective party. A variation of this method might include the possibility of nominating from the floor. That national convention· would narrow
the field to two nominees whose names would be placed on the ballot of
a national closed party primary. This would rest the final choice of·
party nominee on the party members themselves. Instead of being faced
with the complete and final decision of a convention with all of its
recognized faults, t~e party members themselves would choose their
Presidential nominee. They would be responsible for and bound by their
own decision, to be subject to all its advantages and disadvantages.
Possibly the candidate second high in number of popular votes would be
that party's choice for Vice President. To keep electioneering expenses down, this national primary should occur as soon after the convention as possible, still providing time for printing ballots and preparing machines for voting. By selecting the candidate most preferred
by the party members of each party, the eligible voters in the general
election would be more apt to be voting for their own preference rather
than voting against someone they did not want or refusing to vote because they were not satisfied with either candidate. The electoral
system should be designed to make actual voter choice possible. There
may be greater significance in the choice of the nominee for each party
than the final choice of the President-elect. If the best candidate is
chosen from each party, then the final choice will be between the best.
This would be much preferred to the choice of the lesser of two mediocre candidates foisted upon the parties and electorate by factional
manipulations in conventions.
Choice of the nominee for President-elect, by electors in mixed
caucus, delegates in convention, and party members in direct primary,
is improved by the special function performed by each group. The mixed
caucus, made up of district councilors serving in an observing capacity
in Washington and a listening capacity at the state and district level,
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would consist of persons in position to evaluate members of the Presidential Council, the most likely candidates for President under the proposed system. District councilors would be in a position to study potential candidates at close proximity on a day-to-day basis. This would
add greater knowledge of the qualities of potential candidates to the
selection process. The voting delegates in the mix~d caucus would add
a request for qualities acceptable to voters in weaker party areas.
The second phase in selection by the convention delegates would
entail the choice of the two of the thr~e candidates with the greater
opportunity for winning the election. This type of decision is most
appropriately made by convention delegates because they represent the
party organization whose primary function is the winning of elections.
The third phase., the actual choice of .the party nominee is best
made by the party members in closed primary for their personal choice
will influence their willingness to give final support in the general
election. The three phases together should result in the selection
of the best qualified, the strongest and the most popular candidate
of the party.
Increasing the democracy of the nominating process needs to be
followed by a more accurate method of recording voter choice for President in the general election. The present method, as previously explained, is highly inaccurate and has already resulted in selection of
Presidents who are not the popular choice. The most common complaint
is against the practice of having the total electoral vote cast as a
block for the candidate winning the plurality of that state's popular
vote. By using the proposed council districts as Presidential election
districts, the state electoral vote would not be cast as a block but
would be a summation of the choices of each electoral district. The
number of electoral votes would be increased nearly sixfold from 538 to
3,000. The districts not voting with the plurality winning the state
would have their votes counted as they were cast and not for the opposition candidate. By decreasing the size of the electoral college
district, the task of recount in contested elections would be simplified.
The substitution of the votes of the Presidential election districts for the votes of the electoral college would do much to increase
representation over that of the electoral college system. The expectatioµ that electio~ of the Presi~ent would be regularly determined by
the House with each state having one vat~ was intended to protect small
s~ates.
The use of the 3,000 district councilors as Presidential electors would not overbalance the selection process in their favor. A
convocation of the.°district councilors to decide contested elections
for President-elect and Vice President elect would be compara~le in
size ·to the present party nominating conventions.
Just as the advantage of the small states should be eliminated in
such contested elections, so too the advantage of the large states
should be eliminated in the nominating and election process. For with
the development of parties and practice, governors and senators from
large states have been chosen party nominees. This has been particu-
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larly true since the state electoral vote has been cast at large. Two
changes could decrease the overwhelming advantage of the large states.
The first would be the use of the district council districts as electoral college districts and casting the electoral vote in conformity
with the ballot decision in the district. The second would be the forming of new states so that there would be less variation in population
among the states. Potential candidates from all states could be judged
more on their personal merit and less on the size of the state from
which they came. Exigencies of today demand the best in leadership regardless of the state of origin. If the larger the area and population
is to give the best choice, then let that area be thewholeof the United
States and the population be all of the people therein.
Under the present system the development of a strong third party
could put the major parties at its mercy by holding votes enough to
barter in the electoral college. Minority rule or coalition might be
established which would weaken the government. The need is not for a
weak government, but for a strong government democratically chosen and
democratically controlled. The proposed method of nomination and election would be a significant step toward making this possible.
The common complaint today is that only the rich or those who have
access to wealth can run for the Presidency. Hubert Humphrey 1 s experience in the West Virginia campaign against John Kenned¥ is a prime example of what can happen. The plight of the various candidates in their
seeking funds from the Federal Elections Commission in the 1976 Presidential primaries is further evidence of inequality of opportunity
caused by lack of funds. The incumbents or those already well known
have a tremendous advantage. The increase in primaries increase the
advantage of wealth and/or organized special interest groups.
This complaint about financial and incumbent advantage in the
race for President is valid also in ta~ races for senator or governor.
Twenty-two senators are millionaires.
As population increases it
would be far more true for new candidates for Congress than for candidates for district councilor. The cost of a senatorial election is far
greater than that of a congressman. Elimination of the state at large
district and having three senatorial districts in each state would cut
the cost of nomination and election to one third. Granting statehood to
areas having three million and over population could cut election costs
in the California area seven times. The combination of the two methods
could cut the cost of election to the senate from the California area by
twenty-one times. Primary and election costs of congressmen would be
even less and those of district councilors approximately one-fifth that
of the congressmen. See Table VI.
Again, cutting down the size of the district would cut down the
cost of election, thus increasing the number of potential candidates.
The goal of increasing democracy is part of the American tradition and
action as seen in the expansion of suffrage. Why is it not just as important to democratic government to increase the number of potential
candidates as it is to increase the number of potential voters?
In the past, proposals have been made that election for Congress
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TABLE VI
Approximate Cost of Election of Senators Under Proposed Plan Compared to Present Cost of Election
of Senators From Sixteen Largest States Assuming New States of Three Million Population

Entitled

~

Cal.

N.Y.
Pa.

Tex.
Ill.
Ohio
~
~

Mich.

N.J.
Fla.
MasS.
Ind.

N.C.
Mo.

va.

ea.
Wis.
Total

Rank

States

Po2ulation

l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

7
6
4
4
4
4
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
50

19,953,134

13
14
15
16

I6

Old States
Unchanged
Total

34
84

18,241,~66

11,793,909
11,196,730
11,113,976
10,652,017
8,875,083

7,168,164
6,789,443
S,689,170
5, 193, 669
5,082,059

4,677,399
4,648,494
4,589,575
4,417,933

Cons;ressmen
43
39
25
24
24
23
19
15
15
12
11
11
10
10
10
9
300

Present
Senators
2 Per
State
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
32
·68

TiiO

Proposed
Senators
Present States
3 Per State

Senators

New
States

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
48

21
18
12
12
12
12
9
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
160

102
150

262

Proposed senatorial
District Population
as Percent of Present
Senate State Population
4.87,
5.5%
8.3%
8.3%
8.3%
8.3%
11.1%
16. 77.
16.7,%
16.7%
16.7%
16.7%
16.7%
16.7%
16.7%
16. 7%
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Increase in Senators to new states 112. The last colwnn indicates how much it would cost to campaign for
proposed senate as compared to campaigning for present senate,

and President determine a mandate and provide a Congressional majority
to carry it out. This has been pushed in the name of party responsibility. But there is a serious question about doing too much too soon
rather than having programs better planned and executed on a more gradual basis. To provide for smoother transition and avoid the trauma of
too much politics at any one time, Presidents would be elected to hold
office for two years as President-elect, and six years as President,
unless removed earlier. Senators would be elected for nine-year overlapping terms. The members of the new single chamber Rouse would be
elected for six-year overlapping terms with elections not taking place
in Presidential election years. In this way each candidate, Presidential-elect, senatorial, or congressional, would run on his own platform and on his own merit. All district councilors would be elected at
the same time as the President-elect and would be Presidential Electors.
Their terms would be for two years. This would give them an opportunity to run twice on their own between Presidential-elect elections.
The senators, elected for nine-year overlapping terms, would not run
at the same time as the President-elect. By scheduling these elections
in proper sequence, all senators and congressmen would not be up for reelection at the same time as the President-elect and could be free to
seek that office, without relinquishing their own, until and if they
became President-elect. Except for one-third of the House, once each
eighteen years, all members of the House would be· in office and free
to run for the Senate while incumbents.. All members of the district
councils would be free from an election for their own office and available to run for Congress whenever there was an election in their own
Congressional district. The use of such terms and sequence of elections would provide for a gradual change in personnel and for competition by experienced candidates for each of these offices with the exception of district councilors. Candidates for district councilor
could come from state legislators, other state officials, mayors or
other public minded citizens. See Table VII.
Elections have not only been costly, traumatic, dishonest and
divisive; they have also been too time consuming and disruptive of government operations. Favors have been promised and granted to gain delegates at conventions and votes in the elections.
At times it seems valid to raise the question of when is there a
bribe and who is bribing whom. There is supposed to be a distinction
between a political donation and a bribe based on whether it occurs
before or after an election. Does it also depend upon who offers it
and who takes it?
Why not use the same criterion to distinguish between a properly
or improperly promised contract or grant made by a politician. Was
it made before or after the election? Is it any more honest for a
politician to bribe a voter than it is for a voter to bribe a politician? There is a special danger when an incumbent is running for office.
Many states forbid a governor to succeed himself. As indicated
above, Presidents should have one term for six years after serving
two years as President-elect. House members should be limited to three
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TABLE VII

Periodic Table of Elections

Office

Year

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

DC
H
s

DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
DC
DC

Hl

H2

sl

PE
s2

H3
Ill

s3

PE

H2

n3
Hl

sl
s2

PE

H2
s3
H3
Hl

DC

s1

PE

District councilors elected in 1980 and biennially.
House elected in 1981 and one-third replaced biennially.
Senate elected in 1981 and one-third replaced tri-

ennially.

PE

President-elect chosen in 1982 and every sixth year
thereafter.
President to take office in 1984 and every sixth year thereafter.
Superior number indicates class to be elected.
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elected terms of six years so they could run as ·incumbents only twice
unless they filled less than two years of an unexpired term. Senators
would be limited as proposed to one opportunity to run as an incumbent
unless they too were to fill out an unexpired term of less than two
years.
As districts get bigger campaigns become not only more costly,
but also much longer. The longer the election period the more time
there is to make election promises. The closer to the election the
more promises there are to spend money and the less apt Congress is
to tax.
Another problem, fully as serio~s and perhaps more so, is the
tendency for action on domestic and foreign policy to grind to a halt
while the campaign waxes hotter. Military action may be geared to
short run political gain, for example, the bombing halt just prior
to the 1968 election in November.
Government is in limbo while problems grow. How can we go through
the trauma of an election and govern properly at the same time7 Great
Britain limits this period of stalemate by setting a six weeks' limit
on campaigns. The good of this country and the need for stability in
economic and foreign policy demands that government continues while
there is a changing of the guard.
If we are to survive there can be no sleeping at the post or desertion for a party. Security comes first and somebody has to be on
duty at all times. The sickness of society, the emergencies of the
country, the fine line between economic stability, inflation and unemployment demand it.
Under the proposed system some would not be able to run for the
office they had because of the time limit. They could aspire to and
compete for other offices. By increasing the competition, better office holders should be chosen. If an increase in the number of candidates and the widening of choices for the appointing officers is supposed to improve the quality of those appointed, then it should be
logically assumed that competition would improve the quality of those
elected.
Returning to the problem of a need of continued government action
during elections, an answer can be found for the House. Since only
one third of its members are up for reelection, two thirds are left
who could continue to transact business for only a majority of its
members are required for a quorum.
The calendars of bills under consideratio~ by the class up for
reelection could be divided between the other two classes. Members
up for election could make provision to vote on bills in absencia,
a practice already used in Congress. The House under this method
could continue in operation while those up for election were out
campaigning.
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APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL

Not only is democratic control through the election process .important, but is is also important through appointment and removal. High
appointed officials as well as elected officials have much to do with
policy formation. It is important for the Chief Executive to be able
to select individuals who will work with him and for him. The President, however, does not now have the sole power to place a person in
office. The Constitution provides that:
He shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all
other orficers of the United States, whose appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by. law; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of
departments.46
He.may also make interim appointments. The only provision in the Constitution for the removal of persons from office requires impeachment
by the House and conviction and removal by the Senate. In practice,
however, the President can and does remove those appointed by him.
If the President can remove an office holder at all, he can do so without action by the Senate.47 He is limited in his removal power of
those holding quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial positions to those
reasons stated in the law establishing that agency with which the official is connected.4 8 The attempt by Congress through the Tenure of
Office Act to stop Andrew Johnson from removing Secretary of War Stanton failed when the impeachment and trial of Johnson ended without a
conviction. The President should not be forced to keep someone he
dues not want. But if the Senate does have a significant part in confirmation, why should it not have a part in the remov.al process? If
the President alone can remove undesirable personnel, why then should
not the Senate alone remove undesirable personnel? The Senate should
have the authority to remove those considered undesirable. Let the
President be free to pick someone else, but also let the Senate be
free to remove them. However, it should be more difficult to remove
than to confirm. Confirmation is and would be by a majority, but removal should require a two-thirds vote of the Senate, This would not
be considered like impeachment and the vote for conviction, but would
be a political action showing that they did not want some official in
office plus the Constitutional power to remove.
The importance of professionalism, career and security is recognized for those competing for positions under the merit system and denied ~articipation in politics, but even many of ~hose have important
policy making duties. Those in policy making positions should be held
more directly accountable to representatives of the µeople. Those involved in policy formation or holding positions' confidential in nature,
as in Schedule C, should be subject to Presidential appointment, confirmation, reconfirmation and removal as previously indicated. Indepen67

dent regulatory cotmnission members should continue as at present to be
removable only for the causes stated in the law establishing the commission. Subjecting such other officials to reconfirmation would ma.ke
them accountable in.the same way as those elected or appointed for specific terms. Periodic reconfirmation should not be perfunctory, but
should be fully as thorough as initial confirmation hearings. The Senate, having had the various departments, bureaus and agencies under continuing study, would be in an excellent position to conduct such hearings.
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<!UREAUCRACY

Democratic government is dependent upon dispersal of power, lines
of upward cotmllunication, election, observation, control and removal
from below. The Wilsonian Prussian model of bureaucracy is based upon
concentration of power, lines of authority, appointment and close supervision from above. It is designed for control from the top by the
expert. The goal is efficiency in administration. In bureaucracy, as
developed in the United States, major control is from the expert--the
bureau chief--who is in turn controlled largely by the major pressure
groups of his specialty. Through the leadership and influence of officials borrowed from private industry, special interests are served from
within the government.49 In addition to the difficulties of regulation
caused by the presence of strong partisans of the regulated groups, are
the problems of administering the department itself.
The goal of efficiency cited earlier is hampered by the dysfunctions of bureaucracy, excessive rules, regulations, directives, procedures and overspecialized and ingrown personnel. For example, PPBS
(planning-programming-budgeting system) had to be dropped because 11it
got caught up in the hands of people more interested-in process than
in results. Those who put too much emphasis on the process tend t3
stifle, not improve, performance and to forget about objectives. 115
Efforts have been made to develop advisory committees, particularly in the Department of Agriculture. These, however, are largely
made up of clientele, still overrepresenting special interests. "In
time, government agencie~ become lobbyists for the clientele whom
they are supposedly regu.1.ating. 1151 An example of the demands of overspecialization is the 11 g'reat clamor, not only from inside the executive branch--all those people who have their own favorite programs-but also from the Hill, to spend increased revenue, even while there
is a deficit. 11 52 In fact, "our reward system is such that failure
in a ta§k environment has generally resulted in larger appropriations.11~3

The balan~ing out of special interests is supposed to occur
through the budgetary process and be determined on a dollar basis. The
phrase almost used was a dollar-and-cents basis, but with costs in the
millions and billions it was hardly appropriate to use "cents. 11 A moLe
appropriate term would be 11 a dollar-and-sense basis," because money and
policy are so closely connected. A better ordering of priorities would
put sense before dollars and policy before money. With that emphasis,
policy-wQuld determine the use of money, rather than having money the
major determinant of policy. Overcentralized purchasing and the development of a comm.on plane for the Navy and Air Force that couldn't take
off from a carrier are examples of money as determinant of policy and
its resulting false economy. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's
blunder in developing the F-111 at a cost of $14 million per plane and
a cost overrun of between $~ and $4.5 billion· found most of the test
planes crashed or grounded. 4 .
A second example of irrational economy is the refusal of the
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Defense Department to build nuclear-powered submarines and surface
ships. 11The United States is spending on its strats3ic nuclear forces
about forty per cent of what it spent at its peak."
At a time when
the Russians are expanding their nuclear-powered forces, 56 Admiral
Rickover reveals 11 a proposal of the Defense De~'rtment systems analysts
to sink ten Polaris submarines to save money."
This is in spite of
the importance of a lack of oil in Japan 1 s defeat in World War II. The
Mideast oil crisis is further evidence of the need of spending additional funds to develop an oil free nuclear-powered force with unlimited
range. "A six per cent i~grease in cost would increase military effectiveness fifty per cent. 11
A third example of the false economy of having money the major determinant of policy, is the percentage cost of administration as a criteria in a welfare program. Granted, administrative costs are significant, but a staff so overloaded with cases that it can't keep up with
the changes in financial conditions of recipients, and the emphasis on
short waiting periods which hampers adequate investigation, plus the
insistence of taking the client's word for his or her financial situation, lead to less efficiency and a poor use of money. In these cases,
both the worthy and the chiselers may not get what is coming to them.
Frank Goodnow's proposal to separate politics from administration
was designed to get politics. out of bureaucracy and develop a nonpolitical public servant who would treat clients on the basis of need rather
than party affiliation. The expansion of the merit system has added
professionalism and protection to public employees. Expertise is a
natural by-product. At times it has added narrow vision, arrogance,
favoritism, and overprotection. The role of the servant has been reversed. Singly operating as human, collectively they may be dehumanized. The language of earlier times has changed and so has the spirit.
Letters of two hundred years ago were signed, 11 Your humble servant, 11
or 11 Your obedient servant." Now they are signed 11 Yours sincerely," or
just 11 Sincerely." The question is, "How sincerely!" Bob L. Wynia concludes that "the more years a bureaucrat s5ends in the public service,
the more antidemocratic his views become." 9
Martin Landau, in the November-December, 1973, issue of Public
Administration Review, stated that "Bureaucratic systems appear to act
as ends in them.selves and their functionaries seem more protective of
status and power than concerned with the search for rules of adequate
solution. • • • Modern bureaucracy devotes inordinate amoun~6 of energy to the construction of barriers to review and account. 11
The ninety~third congress has endeavored mightily to
extend the Senate 1 s power to confirm presidential nominations to a wider range of executive branch officials • • •
The Senate and the House have passed bills (S 37, S 2045,
H.R.-11137) requiring confirmation of future appointees to
the OMB posts • • • (director and deputy director) as well
as of the executive secretary of the National Security
Council and the executive director of Domestic Council. 61
Other bills have proposed confirmation for other high officials.
70

It is just as important to require the confirmation of a Henry Kissinger as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and
on the National Security Council as it is for him to be confirmed as
Secretary of State. It was as Presidential adviser for national security affairs that he made "secret arrangements with Soviet leaders in
1972 on the number of strategic nuclear missiles on each side. 11 This
was done without informing Congress 11 which may be a violation of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961. 116 2 Kissinger later denied
this claim. In either.position, he needs to be. under the observation
and control of more than the President alone. This is because he, like
Kaiser Wilhelm, has been "fearful and distrustful of his bureaucracy 116 3
as Smith Simpson describes him. His leadership in foreign policy falters because he fails to maintain adequate contact with his followers
to give or receive ideas.
Norton Long, recognizing the fact of administrative discretion and
even administrative legislation, questions its representative character,
11 If the bureaucrats decide for the people, then • • • does the bureaucracy represent the people? The process and extent of repreg~ntation
needs to be applied to administration as well as Congress. 11
Democratic input through boards and commissions es.tablished by law or Constitution if necessary, could add different or enforcing points of view
to policy now formed in a bureaucratic fashion. At the National level
this input is available sporadically through special commissions set up
by the President or Congress. These tackle large problems on a crisis
basis. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, a committee of Congress,
is an example of a government. organization for con~inuing input in policy formation. Within the Federal government there are over 2,000 advisory grou5s, but most of them are technical and represent special
interests. 6
The use of boards and connnissions for quasi-legislative or quasijudicial purposes is a long established practice. The independent regulatory commissions at the national and state level are ample evidence
of this. Boards and councils are used for governing schools, cities
and counties. The function of the board, commission, or council is to
form policy, set up rules and regulations and hold hearings. The execution of the policy is usually left under the more immediate direction
of a single administrator, An extension of these principles of organization to the executive branch would incr.ease the opportunity for
greater variety of input in policy formation, establishment of rules
and regulations and holding hearings. Method of ·selection, terms,
qualifications, and distribution of board members are significant in
the representation process.
Questions of conflict of interest arise relative to administrators,
legislators and judges, These same questions are pertinent to board
members. They should not preclude completely the opportunity for those
most vitally concerned from serving on such boards, but some method is
required to counterbalance the possible overrepresentation of special
interests •. This is done elsewhere by providing publi.c members of
boards. Public members of boards should be used and make up over half
the members on any board or commission. The choice of members of the
board requires taking additional factors into consideration.

71

The distribution of board membership is significant in the representative process. This includes party, profession, sex, age, economic
level or interest and geography as some of the criteria. Regardless of
which party wins the Presidency or Congress, the people of this country
are not all members of that party. If party is a factor in the distribution of seats on committees in Congress where policy and laws are
determined, then party should be considered in distributing positions
on boards which form policy and review rules and regulations having
the force and effect of law.
Profession is important because those having the same profession
tend to form cliques, advocate their own cause, see things from their
specialist point of view and protect their own interest. This includes
military personnel, planners, economists and engineers. Another is the
legal profession which is greatly overrepresented in government relative to the number of lawyers in the total population.
Common sayings, which cannot be taken too literally, still have an
important element of truth that bears consideration. Some which are
applicable to the present example would be as follows. It is the business of the law to make business for the law. Lawyers overrepresented
in legislatures and Congress write laws to require the services of a
lawyer. Chief Justice Burger, addressing the American Law Institute in
Washington in May, 1974, "urged members to use their influence to simplify procedure and reduce legal costs in two areas--the probating of
wills and the purchasing of homes. 11 66 They live by what is the law and
go by the letter rather than by the spirit of it. Living on the edge
of the law they may court disaster and slip over the edge into the illegal. The large proportion of lawyers involved in Watergate is evidence of this. There are many fine lawyers and law can be an honorable
profession, but more has to be done by the AmeriCan Bar Association and
state and local bar associations to make it so. The disbarment of for. mer Vice President Agnew and the accompanying criticism of him may do
much to reestablish the status to which this profession should be entitled.
Other professions and businesses, including the medical, planning,
banking contracting, fuel and automotive, can also do much soul searching to control their own people and improve their public image. Leaders of all of these and other groups, the experts, can be hired as consultants when needed. They shouldn't be overrepresented on boards or
be on boards where their decisions involve conflict of interest. Balance, on the board, of interests including consumer interest is important. Board members should be chosen for breadth of view, not just
for a special area of interest or training.
They should be chosen for their competence, not for their sex; but
competent people of both sexes can be found. The same is true for
race. A paraphrase of the Sixteenth and Nineteenth Amendments would
read, "The right of the citizens of the United States to board membership and policy formation shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any state on account of race or sex." The right to vote
is not enough. Participation in policy formation after the election is
over is fully as important. The same holds true for those of different
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ages and economic levels or interests. If policy determining positions
are held primarily by those of wealth, the point of view of wealth will
largely prevail. If the oil interests are overrepresented by a Kerr or
a Johnson, there needs to be some counterbalance.
Geography is generally accepted as being important in representation. States have their senators, congressmen their districts. Senatorial courtesy generally helps keep patronage distributed geographically. But with the concentration of policy formation in the Executive
Office of the President and especially in the hands of the President and
his close advisers, the question of where the advice comes from geographically is especially important. During President Kennedy 1 s administration, with some notable exceptions such as Theodore Sorensen, much
advice came from around the Boston area. President Johnson gradually
found more advice from the Southwest. President Nixon seemed to get
much of his from California. Boston and Florida have gained somewhat
as sources·.
These advisers were appointed by the President, who develops a
clique or entourage as he campaigns for office. He may inherit advisers
from his predecessor. To offset this narrow selection of advisers,
election of boards or commissions by the senate would provide a broader
choice of talent as each senator would tend to propose for consideration
those within his constituency. Some would claim that this idea is provincial. But what areas do the constituencies cover1 They cover the
whole of the United States. To provide a second scree~ing if it seemed
desirable, the persons e_lected would be subject to confirmation by the
House. Through this method, variation and Balance in points of view
would be avai.lable in the policy making process. Consumer or voter complaints come too late after the_ loss is suffered or the damage is done.
Democratic input in policy formation at an earlier stage in the governmental process might prevent some of this loss or damage. Granted, it
might not; but if it didn't, the people and their elected representatives would have only themselves to blame. Through increased democracy
the power of big government would be cut down to a more manageable size.
Adding similar boards or committees up and down the line of the departments would make administrators more responsive to the public and
less in need of tighter administrative control.
The growth of bureaucracy at the national level has frustrated
those proposing new programs. It has been said that if you want to ruin
a new program, put it into an old agency. This accounts in part for the
placing of some of the new programs in the Executive Office of the President. This has added to the super bureaucracy of that office. The
Brownlow Committee recommended control agencies in the Executive Office,
such as budget and personnel. They made no recommendation that operating agencies be placed there. Personnel and operations in the Executive
Office of the President should be kept at a minimum. If operations of
regular departments are not adequate, organization and personnel changes
should be made. The answer is not to continue to create new agencies
but to make proper use of the ones already in existence. If new agencies are required, then the functions of old agencies should be reevaluated, and transfer or elimination considered. Placing of new programs
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in new agencies brings a sudden influx of aew personnel instead of a
redirection of·the old. New programs need some special consideration
.but also need to be balanced out against other demands for government
action. To avoid some of the necessity for later reorganization greater
initial consideration should be given to the proper long range location
of such an agency. Temporary independence or overprotection should be
avoided and the agency located in one of the established departments unle&s the size of the program or other viable criteria indicate otherwise. Competition for funds or personnel within a department are internal controlling factors in determining priorities and tend to keep new
programs within manageable limits. Placing new programs in old departments would rejuvenate them and avoid the continuance of a self-perpetuating bureaucracy making work for itself just to survive. Increased
opportunity for lateral entry into all of the primarily policy making
positions, even those at the bureau level and below, would aid in the
rejuvenation of the departments. Lateral transfer even at the lowest
level and including field workers might also be beneficial.
Lateral transfer of personnel within and between departments, bureaus, and agencies can be used to break up cliques, provincialism, and
-networks of special privilege and even dishonesty. This principle is
valid for all government, no matter what branch or level. Police and
foreign service personnel are regularly reassigned. State Department
employees are reassigned between countries and between home office and
overseas. Similar transfer could take place between Washington and regional offices for other departments. The transfer of personnel can
add variety of experience and broader understanding. It can break up
opportunities for favoritism. The merit system, designed to take politics out of bureaucracy to provide equality of treatment to clients,
has developed a bureaucracy of experts granting special privileges to
special interests.
A new trend in the merit system is needed to replace specialists,
within reason and as rapidly as possible, by generalists of high quality relative to competence. Special-i.sts are needed in some positions.
They are irreplaceable in certain positions, but those positions should
be kept at a minimum primarily for two reasons, cost and provincialism •
.It costs more to use personnel overtrained for positions. More to the
point, overspecialization develops its own provincialism and narrowness
of view with a resulting inability to recognize or care about many of
the ramifications or side effects of proposals. The ends may be so
intensely desired that the means and implications become secondary.
This narrowness of viewpoint may include the feeling that Washington has all the answers, that states and localities need to conform to
decisions made in the National capitol. Rules, regulations and directives increase. Guidelines beginning with a threat • • • and running
to 46 pages have been sent to agencies participating in the Medicare
program. 5 7 They feel that the states and localities don't know what
is best for them, nor could they know, because they are understaffed
and don't have their own corps of specialists. They are partly understaffed because of so much red tape. The feeling on the part of some
seems to be that Washington has a corner on the talent available for
government service. Their belief is that the states could not get
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competent personnel to handle these programs, but states are big enough
now to develop personnel to handle these problems. If some of the Federal bureaucracy were phased out, that same talent would be freed to
work in state government doing the same type of work for less money •
.Salary incentives could be used to attract the few experts otherwise
unattainable within a state. Persons now employed by the Federal government could work for the states instead of vice versa. An expanded
Council of State Governments could facilitate sharing of research so
that state talent and ideas could be made more generally available
throughout the United States.
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COURTS
Courts and justices have had a special place ·in governmental systems. In some, the court has been a political arm of the government
to do the bidding of the executive. In others it has been a law unto
itself as in the star chamber proceedings in France. Under the British and American systems it has sought to be impartial. Individuals
are considered innocent until proven guilty. To protect the court from
outside pressure and promote its function of impartial judgment, judges
have been given the security of long term in office with no decrease in.
pay. Article III, Section I in the Constitution states, "The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts shall hold their Offices during
good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their Services,
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in Office. 11 This was construed to forbid their paying Federal income
ta~, in that it would lower their salary.
However, in the case of
0 1 Malley v. Woodrough, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the court
stated that 11 to subject them (United States Judges) to a general tax
is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their
particular function in government does not generate an itmnunity from
sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are charged with administering. 1168
As citizens they should not only pay their fair share of taxes to realize what it is like to pay taxes, they should also contribute to their
own retirement. Under present law, judges can retire at full pay at
the age of 65 after 15 years service or at 70 after 10 years service.
The only justification for full pay upon retirement is to encourage retirement. This noncontributory pension plan does little to make judges
feel what it -is like to be a citizen with full responsibility for each
to pay his own way.

The intent of long term and stable nonreducible salary is to provide for independence of the judiciary and to keep the courts out of
politics. But over ninety percent of judges appointed by a Republican
President are Republicans .and the same percentage ho~~s true for Democrats being appointed judge by a Democrat President.
Between 1933
and 1963, Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy made a
total of 799 appointments to federal judgeships at all levels; of them,
61, or less that 8 percent, were to nominees of 11 the other Party. 11 It
seems strange that party seems so significant in the qualification of
an impartial judge. It looks as though the judge is taking his politics with him. Presidents pick men for judges who are basically sympathetic to their own political philosophy. There is nothing strange
about this, but there are political implications.
President Nixon appointed four justices to the Supreme Court, including a chief justice. This is especially significant, because the
Chief Justice, by terms of the Constitution, is to preside at the trial
of a President following impeachment. There are important implications
if a President's appointee presides at his trial. Should this be permitted? President Roosevelt appointed nine members. Under the circumstances of the possibility of such strong influence or control over the
judicial system and the increase of the President's role as chief leg77

islator, are we not back to the problem facing Montesquieu when he proposed the separation of powers. Madison 1 s concept of checks and balances as developed in relation to the Presidency has left the President
with more checks on the other branches than they have on him and has
created an imbalance in his favor. A method of removing the President's
check on the court would be to have the justices of the Supreme Court
elected by Congress. A large proportion of the congressmen are lawyers;
and they, particularly as lawyers, would· be qualified ~o choose someone
from their own profession to be a justice. The Senate did refuse to
confirm Haynsworth and Carswell. The Senate would have the- role of
confirming, or refusing to confirm, the candidate elected by Congress.
Since the Supreme Court has moved away from judicial self-restraint and
into what was formerly called political thickets and has made more significant changes than Congress in some areas such as civil rights, the
court should be considered' to be making policy. In
modifying, interpretation or declaring unconstitutional,
provisions of federal law restricting the rights of unpopular or even widely detested minorities--military deserters, Communists, and alleged bootleggers, the Supreme Court
tends to oppose law making majorities and the majority of
their constituents. It is said that the judges, after all,
inherit an ancient tradition and an acknowledged role in
setting higher standards of justice and right than the majority of citizens or their representatives might otherwise
demand. 70
At the same time they are 11 setting higher standards of justice and
right" they may be setting lower standards of morality and defense.
This conflict between the rights of individuals and groups is parallel
to the right of an individual to pollute, and groups of ecologists to
oppose. Pollution of the mind or the defense system is just as important a problem as the pollution of air or water. Prevention of strip
mining in one case might be similar to an attempt to prevent, in another. As the Court moves contrary to the representatives and their
constituents, each acting within their constitutional limitations, it
acts contrary to democracy, and begins to make policy. If the court
is making policy, then it should be· subject to some form of democratic
control; for it should not be an agent to itself and subject to no one.
Appointment of judges to serve during good behavior, protects the
court and its independence in deciding individual cases, but it does
not permit.removal for mental or physical disability. It does not permit adequate periodic renewal of the court. The time of renewal depends on death and resignation, not on physical and mental deterioration. Replacement is erratic, not gradual.
Recall, used by a few states, would be another possible method for
removing unwanted or unfit judges for whatever reason. However, a nationwide popular vote for recall of Supreme Court justices would be too·
costly. Another method would be to require reconfirmation of each
judge by the senate on the tenth anniversary of his original confirmation, and each tenth year thereafter as proposed by Robert Byrd of West
Virginia. By having reconfirmation at a specific time, the judge's
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qualification would not be taken into cons1deration because of any specific last moment decision but would be determined on the basis of his
overall record. If it is proper to raise questions about decisions
made by a judge prior to original confirmation as in the Haynsworth and
Carswell cases and the Stevens confirmation, why is it not proper to
raise questions about his record as a Supreme Court Justice in determining reconfirmation. Reconfirmation proceedings should be just as
thorough as those for the original confirmation. In deciding qualifications for original confirmation, to avoid the question of undue special influence, judges should agree to having their funds placed in a
blind trust before taking the oath of office, and to not accepting outside funds for personal use during service on the bench. They should
refrain from being involved in political controversy, and should not be
a close adviser to the President, as was Abe Fortas. Their role as
judge is different from a lawyer's role as advocate. They should not
be judges on the bench and advocates of specific public causes at the
same time. Their actions, statements and activities should not be such
as to detract from the traditional impartial role of judges. Just as
they determine the limits of the Presidency or Congress in relation to
the separation of powers, they also have a responsibility in recognizing their own limits.
A more politicized court, characterized by less judicial selfrestraint would logically lead to a need for increased democratic control. The method proposed above might be·used to check individual justices, as a means of bringing the Supreme Court back into tune with the
law making majority, or of recognizing that the justice and the court
were supported by the confirming body. Chief Justice Earl Warren would,
with little doubt, have been reconfirmed in 1963 following ten years of
service on the Supreme Court.
A method directed toward action relating to specific decisions
should involve more than the original confirming body of individual justices. Amending the Constitution requires action of both Congress and
the states. Ratification of amendments is considered by the states in
a rather haphazard manner. State legislatures do not all face up to
the issue at the same time. Delay may have its advantages, but timely
action is not one of them. The Court is upheld by default. Since the
Supreme Court sometimes reverses itself, can it then be considered infallible. in its decisions? Should it be the final arbiter, or should
the final arbiter be more representative of the people? A means of including Congress and representatives of the state in overruling the Supreme Court can be found in the voting method recommended foF the single chamber Congress. A three fourths concurrent majority would be required to overrule a decision of the Supreme Court. This would be the
equivalent of action by Congress and three fourths of the states through
their elected representatives as now required for amending the Constitution. If further protection of the states seemed necessary, an additional reqqirement of a three fourths vote of district councilors voting
as states, could be added.
Greater emphasis should be placed on speedy trials as guaranteed
in the Sixth Amendment. Greater effort should be made to eliminate undue delay, whether caused by overcrowded court dockets, lack of action
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FEDERALISM AND COMMUNITY

There is no substitute for community solidarity in a democracy.
A stable connnunity tends to be self-governing. Thomas Jefferson was
fully aware of its strength at the time of his embargo. The Greeks,
at the time of the city states, conscious of the importance of strength
in the city considered the question of proper size. As the cities of
the United States grew, they were divided into wards. With the rapid
growth of cities and government reform to give greater control to the
elite through election of councilmen at large, some of the representation and sectionalism of the city was taken away.
Following urban sprawl, annexation, the growth of metropolitan
areas and big government, there was a drive for efficiency, economy and
consolidation. In the drive for centralization of the large governmental units or singleness of administration, there came an overconsolidation.
One large prison would be built instead of regional centers of correction. Local educational facilities were abandoned. Schools were
consolidated. Pupils were shuttled about from one place to another.
Classes became overcrowded. Students went on ha~f-day sessions. Discipline problems increased. More emphasis was placed on counseling,
some being required because there was too little personal attention
available elsewhere.
Metropolitan areas grew and the larger they became, the sharper
was the resource gap favoring the suburbs. 11 Core cities, problems
mounting, losing tax resources, controlled in bits snd pieces by its
bureaucracy, beca~e ungovernable. Much of the policy making and control was taken from governing bodies and given to administration.
The rush was from the personal relations of the primary group to
the impersonal of the secondary groups. Individuals became numbers.
The big house, the state prison, was typical. Individuals receiving
other governmental services became lost in the crowd. Persons in society lost their identity, sense of being, and sense of belonging. Reisman aptly describes it in The Lonely Crowd.
Then primary groups began to be identified within the secondary.
The need for personal, instead of impersonal, relationships was being
partially fulfilled. The cottage system was established in some institutions to instill some group and community identification. This was
but a step in the right direction.
Instead of a premium being offered
premium should be offered to discourage
improve the communities we have, rather
munity and neighborhood should be a fit

to further consolidation, a
it. Effort should be made to
than destroy them. Each complace in which to live.

The concept of divide and conquer is as true in government as it
is in warfare. Cutting problems down in size can decrease the number
of personnel required. Decreasing the responsibility or duties of
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positions can lessen the amount of professional training needed to fill
them. Lessening the training required can provide more jobs for local
people. Simplifying the administration by decreasing the size of the
unit would require less assistance from professional outside consultants. A Bedford Stuyvesant could come closer to managing its.own
school system.
The drive for efficiency brought consolidation. Consolidation,
although expected to, did not save.money. The main purposes of a better educated citizenry and better cormnunities were lost in t_he drive
for consolidation. Bigger schools became a goal in themselves. Classes
became larger at the same time.
There is no substitute for the personal attention which a teacher
can give to students in a small class, particularly in kindergarten and
in the early grades. Here the teacher can be a second mother and in
many cases be the closest thing to a real mother. This is the time to
teach good principles, the things that really count above and beyond
counting itself.
If children achieve academically at a higher level because they
are given personal attention, self-confidence, a good self-image and
more is expected of them, they can also achieve higher moral standards
for the same reasons. Considering the social cost in misery and the
econ·omic cost in taxes, there are sufficient reasons to emphasize high
moral standards in school for the protection of both individuals and
society.
The family is the best place to teach this, but if it isn't done
there, it should be done in church or in school. In school, all of the
children of the community are together. Here they mingle together to
share what standards they have or don't have. Having them together in
small classes under close supervision, more can be done to maintain and
improve standards than is possible in crowded conditions with little
supervision.
In the long run, cutting problems down to manageable size can decrease the total cost of government. Those given proper consideration
and treatment in the education system are less apt to need it in a
penal system. The loss of freedom and identity in modern highly urbanized society can be adjusted to by learning self-respect, consideration
of others and self-control in a small group situation under the guidance of a teacher who cares. The choice of teachers requires considering. not only method and subject matter, but also personal character.
As time goes ·on, the latter becomes more and more important.
In the attempt to develop mass production in education and government to match mass production in industry, the realization of the most
important difference between them was lost. Mass production in industry is based upon uniformity and interchangeable parts. But students
are not machines made up of identical parts with interchangeable hearts
and brains, they are individuals who need more personal attention than
is available in overconsolidated schools.
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As individual schools and communities were swallowed up, overconsolidation and overcentralization with its accompanying inefficiencies
resulted. It sapped the strength of communities and destroyed many,
and the system and cities as they grew approached the unmanageable.
What started with local and state control with the Federal government having its own sphere of operation and was called dual federalism,
has been followed by cooperative federalism. This cooperative federalism in which national and state activities have been intermixed was followed by Johnson's creative federalism. This was nationally directed
and used both governmental and nongovernmental agencies to carry out its
programs. States had less and less control over programs. as they were
bypassed by direct grants of money to communities and nongovernmental
units.
In spite of attempts to regain state.control, administrative federalism and revenue sharing have continued to strengthen the national
and local governments at the expense·· of the states. Michael Reagan suggests that this trend may go through permissive federalism (his term) to
the unitary system by the eighties.7 2 That is in the next decade.
States have little time to unite and protect themselves from further
Federal encroachment.
The unitary· system would come at too high a price, one exacted in
taxes and in the liberty of its citizens to plan on a state basis. Living in any society has some cost, the loss of some liberty. But being
subservient to a larger government can be more of a burden and policies
may be harder to change under it than under a smaller one.
Describing conditions in large American cities, Fantini and Gittell
say,
The great similarity in institutionalization of urban
services under a highly centralized system is evident in
all large American cities. Innovation is rare in these
large systems. Professionalism, centralization, and intricate bureaucratic development are major detriments to
innovation.73
But if and when change comes, its wide application may mean the
adoption of a new.policy which hasn't been adequately tested, rather
than adoption for experimentation in a smaller area. The unitary system of government would simply·increase these problems, not arithmetically but geometrically.
Gottfried Dietze em4hasizes the importance of federalism as a basis
for popular government.7
De Tocqueville stated that centralization
comes naturally, democracy comes by reflection. The time has• come for
deliberate economic and political decentralization, which is necessary
not only for domestic strength, growth and development, but also for
strategic strength in national defense.
For the latter especially, it is necessary to deploy defense establishments, automotive, aircraft and space industry, and governmental
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units so that what is left after initial damage in case of attack can
operate at maximum efficiency. Overconcentration can lead to blackmail
and massive attack. The Cuban Missile Crisis is ample evidence of that
possibility.
Further evidence of the need for economic and political decentralization can be seen in the disparity between the per capita income of
central city inhabitants and persons living in surrounding suburbs.
Lineberry and Sharkansky as noted above, state that 11 the larger the
metropolitan area, the sharper the gap favoring the suburbs •11 In material they quoted from the U.S. Bureau of Census, the ideal m'~ropol
itan area would have a population between 250,000 and 500,000.
Granted, there are geographic, economic and political limit-ations,
but industry, commercial enterprises and communities can be relocated
and established through tax incentives and other encouragement, such as
those recommended by the Advisory Cormnission on Intergovernmental.Relations in 1968.76 New ones can not only be established, but they and
older ones can also be protected, both in economic base and in local
control. The tax incentives referred to above would be federal corporate tax rebates or allowances and not local property tax exemptions.
They would be designed to favor metropolitan areas of less than 500,000.
Through changes in Federal government policy, states and cormnunities could reassert more control over functions traditionally theirs.
They could act more for themselves and less as agents of the National
government. Dahl says, "Even though the most pressing questions of the
day cannot be de-nationalized, the existence of local autonomy helps to
free_the national arena for precisely these national i-ssues. 1177
James L. Sundquist states, "The conscious policy of the Federal
government as a whole--and, hopefully, the state gov,9nments as well-should be to defer increasingly to local judgments."
The same concept
should be followed by the Federal government in its relationship to
States. The conscious policy of the Federal government as a whole
should be to defer increasingly to state judgment. In both cases the
Federal government should exert leadership, but let the state and local
level decide whether and in what way to follow.
Leland Baldwin, in his book, Reframing the Constitution, talks of
combining states into regions 11 as a means of decentralizing Federal
functions and power. 11 But he cQncedes that these new region states
might become "nascent nations. 117 9 To achieve his purpose of decentralizing and yet avoid the possibility of developing nascent nations, the
answer might well be to give statehood to subregions within the present
states. Charles Merriam in the 1930s proposed that Chicago, New York,
and ·other large cities and their immediate areas become separate city
statesBO so that they could control their own politics and have greater
representation at the national level. The increases in state population and the increase in complications of government since then would
lead to a greater need for his proposal now than when he first made it.
Reapportionment of state legislatures alone has not given the
cities what they want. Subdividing the bigger states might cut their
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problems down to manageable size. The present move to city county consolidation might go another step to include the state. By making these
city states big enough to include the suburbs of the metropolitan area,
there would be one government for the whole metropolitan unit. A New
York City State could solve its own problems without the hindrance or
help of upstate New York so often condemned by the City. Metropolitan
areas, centers of wealth and poverty could solve their own problems.
Creation of single member districts within the city state could
provide_ for the variety of representation necessary to protect the varied interests of its people. By interstate compacts, the sections of a
metropolitan area could combine into a single city state. By using
three million as a quota for a state, the New York City Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area would be a combination of four states with
that amount of representation.
By using three million, the mean in population between the large
and small states, as the quota only six Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area would have over that amount, They would be New York, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit and San FranciscoOakland.
By using this quota with the concept of moiety in determining additional representation when half the quota was reached, California would
become seven states; New York, six; Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania and
Texas, four; Michigan, three; Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina and Virginia, two; and Wisconsin
would have nearly enough population to become two states. This would
make a total of thirty-three new states or thirty-four when Wisconsin
increased sufficiently in population, With the stipulation· that no
state would lose statehood, that would make a total of eighty-three or
eighty-four states. Each of these might well be a more governable unit.
A commission type of government could be established to govern
metropolitan areas of over three million. -Each area having three million population would become a separate city state. Those city states
within the metropolitan area would be further organized into a superstate. The superstate would have a commission type government to coordinate the government of the separate city states. The mayor of each
of the separate city states would be a member of the governing commission of the ·superstate. The superstate could serve as a special distric.t for all functions which needed metropolitan wide coordination.
The superstate would have power to tax and spend in functional areas
specified by the city states.
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DEMOCRACY AND THE ECONOMY
Political liberty and economic liberty are closely intertwined.
John.Locke believed in the inalienable right of man to life, liberty and
property.
Americans of two hundred years ago were complaining about the
abuses of the British mercantile system and sought political liberty
that they might have economic liberty. But freedom alone was not
enough. Innnediately after the Revolution, the new United States suffered from actions of British merchants designed to destroy the little
industry remaining in the former British colonies. Tariffs designed to
protect these infant industries were enacted following Hamilton's proposal of a Plan of Manufactures.
Passing through greater freedom from government control in the new
economic era following the Revolution, business grew with the help of
patents, tariffs and· other government aid. Inadequately controlled by
state or national government, trusts developed, monopolizing banking,
manufacturing and trade. Farmers were taken advantage of by railroads
and milling interests, paralleling recent actions by truckers,.packing
plants, oil companies .and wheat dealers.
Antitrust laws were passed correcting· some of the abuses. Others
continued. Distinction was made between good and bad combinations in
restraint of trade. The danger of bigness per se was not recognized by
Theodore Roosevelt or the courts. Frontiers were still open at the
time for those blocked by the trusts. They could still go west.
These frontiers, now gone for smaller businessmen, remain open only
for huge corporations and conglomerates within the United States and
overseas. We are now in an era of neo mercantilism with huge corporations a government unto themselves, inadequately controlled under the
antitrust laws. This modern mercantilism is fully as stifling to some
Americans as was the earlier British mercantilism. Giving political
donations to gain special concessions, placing leading company e~icu
tives in high government positions in the executive departments,
independent regulatory commissions and the World Bank, business protects
its own interests, expects and receives special privileges. Widespread
ownership of property has been hindered by concentration and control of
wealth by multinational corporations both in this country and abroad.
The overseas flight of capital went in search of cheap labor and
windfall profits, Aided and abetted by the Marshall Plan, it went in
part becaus~ of unwillingness to face competition at home. The Marshall
Plan, following World War II, was probably necessary to avoid a depression. There was great merit to it on humanitarian grounds. But it was
not an unmixed blessing. There was some waste, Other aid was later
used against us.
The more highly industrialized countries which received the greater
part of the economic aid used it to improve their productive machinery.
Germany's rebuilt steel mills were completely modernized and were ahead
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of United States mills in modernization st that time.
money to build facilities that could outcompete us.

We loaned them

The European Common Market, encouraged and aided by the United
States and its capital, is a stronger competitor now because of our
assistance. Naturally, more interested in protecting their own countries, they acted in concert against us and, for an example, excluded
the Americans from their broiler market in Germany to satisfy the
French. As could have been expected, they continue to look out for
their interests first.
From 1947 to 1974, as reported by Representative Gross of Iowa
in debate in Congress on January 23 of that year, the United States
spent over $260 billion in Foreign Aid. 82 Much of American assistance
funds, not used to develop competition against American business, has
been used for "valueless objects such as roads to airports, luxury hotels and office buildings 11 as stated by Congressman Long of Maryland
in his objection to R.R. 11354, a bill to grant an additional $1.5
.
billion in soft loans to the International Development Association. 83
Congressman Miller concluded the debate by saying,
Let us barter this aid for bauxite, lead, chrome, and
all of those metals we need or will need to run our economy
and maintain our life styles. If we do not act now to stockpile critical raw materials, we will soon face a mineral crisis and future generations of Americans will have to go begging for them.8'1Congress refused the requests for the $1.5 billion by World Bank President Robert McNamara by a vote of 248 to 155. This was in spite of
strong support by Secretaries Kissinger and Shultz.
A recurring theme and probably the strongest objection to the bill
was opposition to its soft loan feature. Designed as interest free
loans to underdeveloped countries, receiving nations charge 12 to 20
percent to their own farmers and small businessmen for these· funds.
Complaints were made against loaning money practically interest free
to foreign countries at the same time that potential homeowners and
small businessmen were paying much higher rates in this country.
Using a similar principle of low-rate loans in the United States
and lowering the rates of interest for home contruction, not even coming close to making it interest free as in the IDA proposal would increase building and get Americans less auto and more home oriented.
Selective credit controls as proposed by the National Urban Coalition
would also make additional funds available for home loans at a lower
rate of intereat.85
Seeing some of these and other unfortunate results of overseas investments, what can we do to reverse the trend~ Overseas appropriations can be decreased. A tax on the income of United States citizens
or corporations from whatever source or wherever derived might help
reverse the outflow of American capital. This would return it to, or
keep it in the United States for investment purposes.
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With this increase in domestic funds, more money might be available at lower interest for home building. Today the reverse is true.
High interest once considered usury is now the usual, and home building is down. The 11 $28 billion home credit crunch" is enriching the
banks with the help of the Federal Reserve Board.8 6 High interest
rates set by the Board to curb inflation 11 represent an added cost of
doing business and tend to be inflation~ry in and of themselves when
hikes are passed down to the customer. 11 ~7 Increases in interest rates
are deceptive. A change in rate from 7 to 8 percent looks like a one
percent increase, whereas the additional percent is 1/7 the amount of
the previous rate. This is the equivalent of a 14 and 2/7 percent increase in the cost of interest to the borrower.
The principles of the Founding Fathers have been turned around
not only in appropriations and interest but also in taxation. Under
the Constitution, .. the intent was to levy taxes, to raise revenue, to
pay the debts, provide for the cotmnon defense and general welfare.
General welfare itself was left to the states. The tariffs were to
control foreign and interstate c0tmnerce. A Bank of the United States
was created to control the currency and stop some of the speculation
of the state banks. The state of Maryland enacted a law taxing the
federal bank notes to try to drive the Bank of United States out of
Maryland. In the famous case of McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice
Marshall·stated, "The power to tax is the power to destroy 11 and ruled
Maryland's tax unconstitutional. The states did not have the power to
destroy a federal instrumentality by taxing it to death.
Today, because of the federal income tax, it is now the states
themselves that are being destroyed. Their power is being taken away
from them through the grant-in-aid system supported primarily by the
federal income tax. The claim is that the states are actually doing
more, that they have more power, but much of what they do is done increasingly for the National government. The argument sometimes used
in defense of grants-in-aid is that the states don't have to take it
if they don 1 t want to. That argument doesn't stand up. The intent
is there to influence.
Grants-in-aid do distort state ~pending. They tend to encourage
wasteful or low yield undertakings. 8
State correctional and rehabilitational institutions have been neglected for years because funds
have been drawn elsewhere by grants-in-aid, Overspending is justified
by saying that if we don 1 t get it, someone else will. Waste occurs in
interstate highway contruction because it costs the states less to
complete ill-conceived projects and receive 90 percent back from the
Federal government than it would to abandon the project when the mistakes were found while far less was spent. Waste occurs because money
is not put in places of greatest need. It occurs beg~use planners and
engineers are not realistic in their cost estimates.
The list is
endless.
The Federal aid projects are paying higher salaries and attracting former state employees to do the same work in the same place for
more money. Welfare funds are being wasted. Federal reports state
that grants are improper in 40 percent of the cases. If states were
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spending their own money, much of this incorrect payment would be eliminated. The Federal income tax has turned the financial situation
around. In the Marbury case it was the power to tax that was the power
to destroy. Now it is the power to spend based on the power to tax
that can be used to destroy. Today the dictum in the Marbury case is
true, but now it is the states which need the protection. Revenue sharing is a start in the right direction. The income tax, not added until
1913, should be used for national purposes, especially national defense;
and that portion not needed should be returned to the states to be spent
by them according to. their own priorities. Revenue sharing is a start
in the right direction, but the money sent directly to communities may
place much of it where it is not needed. Rich suburbs may get too much,
while poorer core cities or poor rural areas get too little. Funneling
these grants through the states with the use of need and tax effort as
criteria could make more equitable distribution possible.
Grantmanship90 and the development of Washington offices by the
bigger cities will develop Federal grants into a modern pork barrel that
will far overshadow the old rivers and harbors bills. To avoid the
problem of determining priorities for such a multitude of requests on
a national scale, revenue sharing should go directly to the states and
into the general fund.· By this method, the various relative community
needs could be determined Within the state itself. The old argument
of rural domination of the legislature is no longer valid following reapportionment. Granted, suburban areas and middle sized cities might
not see eye to eye with core city needs, but that should.only help in
the compromise part of politics.
Revenue sharing money is now being spent for capital goods and
things, not services. It is not being used for services or lowering
taxes because Congress can 1 t be trusted to continue the sharing. A
law or an amendment clarifying the distribution of the receipts of the
Federal income tax, reserving a fair share for national expenses, especially national defense, would eliminate much of the uncertainty involved in planning state budgets.
If increased war expenses were necessary, Congress would need to
find additional revenue. The cost of wars or threats of war would have
to be met somewhat more by action of Congress and the President facing
the situation and mood of the time. The inflation of war could be
checked by taxes, especially excess profits taxes and surtaxes. Servicemen alone would not be asked to sacrifice. Those not in the service
could make their contribution, also. The Nation could not be expected
to raise enough taxes to fight a war on a cash basis. Long term borrowing and an increase in the national debt would be expected, but a
current effort to raise funds would increase the morale of the servicemen.
Some funds in addition to that amount needed for war o~ defense
could be left with the National government to be used for pilot projects in the states. Some could be used for variable grants to states
based on differences in wealth and need. Federal experts, fewer in
number, could be used to encourage states to adopt certain programs.
But persuasion, not bribery, would be the method. Programs would rise

90

or fall on their relative merits. States would decide how much programs were worth at full price, paid for by their own funds. States
would have a greater part in determining priorities and balance within
their own budgets.
Nationally most of the emphasis would be on defense and on doing
for the states what they couldn't do for themselves. Because of the
energy crisis and wheat shortages, more emphasis would be placed on
the conservation of human and natural resources. Care would have to
be taken to accumulate stock piles of food and strategic materials.
In the haste to trade with the Soviet Union, private industry might
make deals that would ignore some long range security problems. Governor Rockefeller was critical of American private industry's vlan to
build a huge·refinery and an aluminum plant for the Russians. 91 His
warning should bring a reminder of the Russian wheat deal which ruined
dairy, beef cattle, and poultry farmers and gouged consumers generally.
Trading with the USSR, if it must come, should be done through a
U.S. Government corporation so that the full extent and ramifications
of the trade could be more completely controlled and understood. Let
the U.S. Government sell from its surplus of grain and not take grain
out of the market and away from American consumers who need wheat for
bread, and grain for the production of milk, poultry and beef. It
would be even better to refuse such a deal to avoid arming a potential
enemy. Reliance upon and conservation of our own resources are needed
for our own well-being and protection... The food we raise should not
be wasted or bargained lightly away; strategic stockpiles of food alld
other natural resources are needed to tide ua over natural or man-made
disasters. Both occur frequently enough to provide ample evidence of
the dangers from the traditional American approach of too little and
too late.
Other disasters to be avoided include the economic. The last
great economic domestic disaster was the depression of the thirties.
At that time the private sector of the economy could go to the public
for help. Now with government the biggest purchaser, where can it go
for help, if bankrupt? The best economy will result from people and
the government living within their means. The best insurance is being
able to take care of ourselves. John Kennedy said, "Ask not what your
country can do for you, but what you can do for your country." This
means being self-reliant and helping the less fortunate help themselves. This requires a stable economy with its units kept down to
manageable size by taxation, controls and competition. It requires a
fluid economy providing new·opportunities for each coming generation,
a new frontier for their time. It means a return to Locke's concept
of inalienable rights, the right to life, liberty, and property, meaningless without opportunity.
Adequate political action will be required of an alert citizenship
to ensure the development and continuation of such an economy, Movement for the control of bigness, whether in the economy or government,
should occur gradually. Self-control and control through competition
should come first. Government regulation, from as little to as much
as necessary, would come next, with government ownership coming only
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as a last resort, and then only because of refusal of business to recognize other less drastic control. Government, of necessity, has to
be bigger than whatever it seeks to control. Both should be kept within a manageable size.
Not only the form of government and its administration, but also
the policies formulated and carried out by that government, will be
the determinants of its continuity and the freedom, opportunity, and
protection of its people. Increased democracy in form and administration should provide greater individual freedom and opportunity, greater
support for government from within, and a stronger government to deal
with other countries. Policies formulated through a democratic process
including consultation and variety in input should protect the democratic form of government and the people. Acting through informed representatives, voters should be able to protect themselves.
Democracy cannot be saved if connnunist totalitarianism cannot be
as readily recognized as Nazi totalitarianism. World conquest by the
Russians and Communism would be no better than world conquest by the
Germans and Naziism. The wheat deal and the oil embargo are two examples of what can be done to us economically by those who, according to
some, are supposed to be our friends. The Soviet Union, supposedly
more friendly to the United States than the Peoples Republic of China
during the war in South Viet Nam, supplied four times as much war material to North Viet Nam as did the latter.
The enemies of past wars have sometimes become allies in
but it is after a change in ideology and intent. The USSR of
not much better than Germany was under Hitler, scarcely more
even though somewhat more subtle. Actual statements, careful
and avoidance of wishful thinking makes this quite evident.

the next,
today is
friendly
analysis

Detente, Mr. Brezhnev said in June, 1972, in no way implies the possibility of relaxing the idealogical struggle.
On the contrary, we must be prepared for this struggle to be
intensified and become an ever sharper form of the confrontation between the two systems1~2
One of the weaknesses in present day American thinking is the subconscious acceptance of a modification of the Marxian-Hegelian dialectic as an explanation of economic development, According to Hegel,
there would be the original concept, the thesis; a counter concept, the
antithesis; and the synthesis resulting from the conflict would become
a new thesis. Applied to economics by Marx, this conflict would continue with communism the inevitable result. Present day pseudo MarxianHegelians start with capitalism as the thesis, communism as the antithesis and they think of socialism as the synthesis. They get the impression that Russian communism and U.S. capitali~m will get closer together as the struggle continues and that eventually they will be so
much alike that peace will come. Even that is no guarantee of peace.
There is nothing more bitter than a family feud or a civil war.
But if Marx is right and the Russians are right, our capitalism
would become communism, and private property would be a thing of the
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past. Yet Locke believed that property was one of the inalienable
rights of man. The others were life and liberty. The real contest
is between democracy and totalitarianism, freedom and the loss of it.
Economics· is an important part of life, but not all of it. The economic system can be used to-preserve liberty; it can be used to deny
it. Political liberty cannot exist unless there is wide distribution
in the ownership of property. Taking property in the name of the state
under con:anunism is no better than having the complete control of property through naziism. Both are extreme measures as carried out under
extreme ideologies. Less extreme methods and less extreme use of such
methods are available first and should be used to maintain a strong
economic base for democracy.
A second weakness in thinking is the comparing of communism as an
ideology with democracy in practice. That is, comparing something at
its best with something at its worst. This is particularly dangerous
with questionable activities in government so much a part of news. Communism as an ideology should be compared with democracy as an ideology,
and communism in practice with democracy in practice. That is a fair
comparison.
A third weakness in thinking. is the use of ideas out of context.
President Wilson developed the right of self determination as a justification for breaking up the Austrian Hungarian Empire. The same concept used relative to Castro's taking over Cuba might justify communism
there. However, that in no way changes the reality of a small unfriendly country associated militarily with our most powerful potential enemy,
the USSR. Nor does it change the reality of the missile crisis and
present day military danger from the USSR through Cuba.
A fourth weakness is that of discounting the revolutionary political and economic ideas that some young people get, by saying that they
are just theories. These are often minimized by saying that they are
just a passing fancy or a 'phase in their development. This may or may
not be true. Castro, Patricia Hearst, and Lee Harvey Oswald put their
ideas into action. What young people think does make a difference. Action may follow ideology. The teaching of the overthrow of government
by force and violence is incompatible with democracy.
In seeking democratic control of government and democratic input
in domestic and foreign policy, ethnocentricism and its dangers must
be recognized. The greatest of these is wishful thinking, overestimating the strength of our own country and underestimating that of others.
This wishful thinking includes the hope and mistaken bel~3f that the
aims and ends of our enemies will coincide with our own.

Another weakness is that of assuming that foreign diplomats will
reason and negotiate like those from the United States even though they
have a different social,cultural and ideological background. Negotiations under those circumstances may lead to inadequate protection of
the national interest when conducted with countries of great ideological
difference.
In attempting to understand the differences in ideology, there is
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a danger in being oversympathetic to .the different belief and overcritical of one 1 s own. Both beliefs should be analyzed carefully, recognizing whatever strengths or weaknesses there might be. A significant
part of an analysis is the strength gained from reasonable self-confidence, for in defeatism, as in·overconfidence, we may well contribute
to our own downfall.
Above all, foreign negotiations should.be avoided during a period
of internal weakness such as that of a Nixon facing impeachment, or
during Presidenti'al elections, for unwise concessions might be made to
gain some measure of apparent success. That is the time when such negotiations are most apt to occur, and can, because foreign policy is
under the control of the President and his emissaries. The Senate as
presently operating can do little to prevent such negotiations. A
President, challenged in domestic affairs, ethnocentric in his own way,
may seek to prove himself where he can be least controlled, that is, in
foreign affairs. He may wish to regain his ego in world leadership.
Increased democratic input through elected representation might restrain him from using foreign negotiations for that purpose and instead
limit their use to periods of governmental stability. An incumbent
President may put our foreign policy in limbo while seeking ·reelection,
to avoid embarrassment.
A successful democracy requires not only democratic control and
input, but also competent .leaders and participants in the
governmental process. A systematic method of gradual renewal of leadership, based on knowledge, preparation and experience, rather than
experiments, passions, and power of neophytes would come closest to
providing the competence necessary to solve both international and domestic problems. Adequate opportunity for democratic or representative
input would help insure that policies selected would work for the benefit of the people who would be sovereign.

~democratic
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DEMOCRACY AND THE MIDDLE CLASS
The strength of a democracy is found in a big middle class willing
to accept the wisdom and leadership of the gifted, strong enough to
control the political and economic power of the elite, and compassionate enough to be considerate of and helpful to the less fortunate. A
self-renewing democracy requires a fluid social structure in which opportunity for advancement exists and each person is rewarded according
to his talents and labor, to rise or fall in the social, economic and
political system on the basis of proven contribution and merit.
The preservation of this middle class is dependent upon control of
the economic system sufficient to prevent overconcentrations of wea1th
or power in any corporation, individual or generation which would hinder or prevent economic opportunity for those of coming generations.
Democracy and a prosperous middle class cannot endure when there is.an
overconcentration of wealth in the hands of a few.
The Economic Unit of U.S. News and World Report estimates that • • • one tenth of 1 percent of the total (U.S.)
population • • • owns • • • 12 percent of all personal net
worth in the u.s., including nearly one fifth of all the
cormnon stock that has been issued by American corporations. 94
Nor can it exist if there is too great a burden of care for the poor who
have a greater need for opportunity than assistance.
Some have been in favor of redistribution of wealth. The graduated
income tax is based on that principle. The concept is thought of as
meaning taking from the rich and giving to the poor. Of greater importance than redistribution of wealth alone is the concept of redistribution of opportunity not just for the poor but for all but the extremely
wealthy who already have more than enough.
This would provide the new economic frontier for the slower to
achieve and for the coming generations, that more individuals might
come closer to their greatest potential growth. President Theodore
Roosevelt developed the concept of the President as a steward in his
office. Those having wealth need to adopt the concept of steward in
the use of their wealth. The Protestant Ethic includes the idea that
the acquisition of wealth is ethically permissible, but that is because
it may be used for good purposes.
The vast fortunes accumulated in the United States were not made
trading shirts on a desert isle. Granting a fair share for inventiveness, initiative, skill, entrepreneurial ability and for other efforts,
a great part of the amount came from underpaid workers or overcharged
consumers. The general public has paid the bill.
Government action can be taken to limit this acquisition of wealth
at the taxpayers 1 expense. Subsidies can be scaled down to be available
for the smaller economic unit, with the elimination of the subsidy after
the economic unit reaches a certain size. From that stage on, it would
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survive or fail on its own ability. Subsidies for larger corporations
should be available only when there is some special need for a product,
and it is in the national interest to grant that subsidy.
Stronger enforcement of antitrust laws are necessary to create a
new freedom of competition. Learned Hand, one of our greatest judges,
has said that the Sherman Act is based on three premises,
• that possession of unchallenged economic power
.deadens initiative, discourages thrift, and depresses energy;
that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is
a stimulant, to industrial progress • • • • 95
Antitrust suits alone are not enough to protect consumers and
maintain a fluid economy. They come too late, after the abuse has developed. They take too long. Existing competition, difficult to reestablish, is destroyed while suits are still pending. In agriculture,
corporate farms, resulting in large part from tax breaks and subsidies,
having greater capital assets, even though less efficient than the oneor two-man farm, will buy up fertilizer in short supply, corner the
markets and drive the small farmers out of existence. Remed~gl action
has been too little and too late to revitalize family farms.
Difficulties have been encountered in trying to break up ITT. The mistake
was made in permitting excessive growth in the first place.
Two centuries or more ago excessive growth in land holdings in
Europe and the American colonies of Britain resulted from the law of
entail and primogeniture. Under this law the eldest son inherited the
land intact. The injustice of this law on other relatives is obvious.
Its impact on the economy and politics of a colony could be seen in
Virginia where much of the land was held by a few wealthy slaveholders.
Thomas Jefferson did much to end this practice. Now redistribution of
property takes place each generation as it is passed on from one to the
next.
But corporations by law may never die. There is no specific periodic time when redistribution takes place. There is no recurring time
when decisions must be made about what to dispose of and what to keep
to meet the equivalent of an estate tax. There is no division of the
corporation that its parts can compete with each other as redivided
family farms would. Estate taxes and inheritance taxes help redistribute wealth owned by individuals, but do nothing to redistribute the
holdings of the corporation to avoid or meet tax obligations. Some
property is now retained to show a loss for tax purposes. Disposal of
such property would make the corporation more efficient. Placing such
property on the market could make it available for purchase and possibly more efficient use by another smaller corporation.
To many the size alone of a corporation does not constitute a danger. They speak of 11 economy of size. 11 But size alone is not a virtue.
Bullies are usually bigger. Only in Phantasia have we seen elephants
fly. More seriously, still a few, but more large banks are becoming
improperly managed and incompetent. A Lockheed Corporation is mismanaged and seeks government help, when what it really needed was tighter
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control. Imagine the impact of the failure of a General Motors. Some
would say, and we all hope correctly, that it would never happen. But
that is a chance we cannot take.
When a leaf falls in the forest, it can hardly be heard. When the
might oak topples, the sound reverberates. A falling redwood would
cause great havoc all around. There is danger in bigness per se, just
as there is danger in a benevolent despot.
The benevolent despot does many good things, but weakens those who
should do much for themselves. Worse than that, he paves the way for a
dictator, one who mainly has his own interest at heart. He makes possible big mistakes instead of a series of lesser ones or perhaps other
choices that in the long run would be much better. Lacking competition
the big corporation, like the dictator, can choose at will. There, too,
lies the possibility of big mistakes.
Exceptions to the limit on size because of the danger of bigness
per se could be made for natural monopolies such as public utilities.
The size of a public utility, subject to government regulations, should
not be limited so long as it is operated within the scope for which
it was established. Holding companies, conglomerates or subsidiaries
should be forbidden. Interlocking directorates, now forbidden, should
be broken up.
Standards of maximum size should be established by Congress to be
used as yardsticks for breaking up larger economic units and for stopping excessive growth. Exceptions to such maximum could be made by a
two-thirds vote of Congress and denied subsequently by a majority vote
not subject to Presidential veto. The mechanics of voting suggested
are for the purpose of making it harder to approve exceptions and easier
ta remove them to hold closer to the general rule.· Nor should the President have the power to veto in these cases and thereby subject himself
to excessive pressure from trusts or conglomerates.
The Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments, added to the original
Constitution, have limited the national and state governments in their
authority to break contracts, but this can be done if the contract has
been used for illegal purposes. Automobiles used in transporting illegal cargo can be confiscated. Contraband is subject to seizure. Reduction of patent rights could be used to break up monopolies. Forfeiture of patent rights could be a possible penalty for conviction in an
antitrust suit. The power to give should carry with it the power to
take away.
Laws passed to break up huge corporations a~d conglomerates could
substitute competition for artificial prices, artificial shortages,
price controls, rationing and other more difficult methods of control.
Reducing the size and increasing the number of firms
to , •• restore • • • price competition • • • may be the
only course • • • consistent with minimizing the role 9f
government in controlling private enterprise economy. 9
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This in turn would decrease the amount of bureaucracy necessary by substituting controls of the market place for controls of government, competition for bureaucracy.
Study could be given to the interlockings of credit,
investment and inaurance companies with industrial firms
to see whether it is desirable to broaden the prohibitions
of Section 8 of the Clayton Act • • • also the legalization
of export-trade agreements could be limited to firms of
small size. 98
Taxes could be used to discourage the growth of, or break up huge corporations by having new truces or taxes at higher rates on vertical integration, horizontal integration and conglomerates. Fritz Machlup lists
several in his article on 11Taxation and Monopoly Power."
They are
• steep progression in the corporate income tax,
heavier taxation of intercorporate dividends, • • • graduated taxes on very large undisrributed prefita • • • graduated sales tax, taxes on the number of establishments,
taxes according to the number of employees • • • and making
nondeductible for income tax purposes, exg§ss expenditures
on sales and certain kinds of litigation.
The graduated income tax with its rate of 70 percent -for the highest bracket gives the appearance of .an opportunity to redistribute
wealth. However, according to Gabriel Kolko,
Taxation has not mitigated the fundamentally unequal
distribution of income. If anything, it has perpetuated
inequality by heavily taxing the low and middle income
groups--those least able to bear its burden.loo
Stock options, buying tax exempt securities and paying lower rates on
capital gains are among the methods used to avoid paying the regular
income tax rates.
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Taxes need to be revised to do away with special
breaks for
the wealthy which amount to nearly $80 billion a year.
The National
Urban Coalition proposes to treat capital gains as ordinary income for
tax purposes except when used for new funding, • • • limiting to· $15 ,000
a year the amount of 11 phantom" farm tax loss any individual or corporation can apply against other income and setting maximum allowable deduction .ceilings on mortgage interest and property taxes, setting a lifetime exemption limit of $50,000 on recipients of estate and gift taxes
and others.10 2 Excess profits taxes would cut down on the tax burden of
others or the prices they paid. Either one would increase the buying
power of the general public.
The income tax as presently administered not only favors the rich
through tax breaks, it also gradually impoverishes those with moderate
or fixed incomes. For those with salaries raised to offset the loss
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of buying power, there is another loss. The increase in income ~ushes
the taxpayer into a higher tax bracket and takes more from him. Inflation and increases in Social Security taxes add to the amount taken by
FICA. In spite of ordinary raises, buying power decreases.
Tax rates for those of moderat·e and lower incomes should be tied
to the actual buying power of the dollar to be decreased during times
of inflation. This would leave a more constant purchasing power for
those two groups. Tax rates for those in the higher income brackets
.should be increased during inflation to discourage luxury spending.
The government having less tax income would be forced to face cuts in
spending or borrowing. Government spending should be held at a minimum
during inflation. The·exception to this would occur in wartime when
increased sacrifice and increased taxes would be expected that the burden of servicemen and their families might be shared.
Federal fiscal policy for stimulating the economy during a recession should be chosen for long run improvement of the economy as much
as possible. Tax breaks for conversion to the metric system would not
only provide for increased employment in the conversion, but also for
increased efficiency and competitive ability following conversion.
A decrease in roadbuilding due to a lessening of automotive use
could be offset in part by an increase in the use of cement for improving railroad beds in areas of increased urban and interurban travel.
Conversion from gasoline and diesel fuel for automotive and rail transportation, to electricity and coal for urban travel could do much to
relieve the gas and oil shortage. This conversion process could also
be encouraged through tax breaks.
Losses in tax funds could be offset by a federal graduated sales
tax .(previously proposed) and by a graduated property tax on the bigger
corporations and on corporate farms. The latter would not only provide
additional funds but would also aid in recycling corporate property and
assets. This would increase the opportunity for newer £inns to be established to increase business competition.
Waiting for such redistribution to occur through personal income
tax, and estate and inheritance taxes takes too long. Proper steps to
recycle property should be taken year by year, not generation by generation. In Jefferson 1 s time they did away with primogeniture to prevent
the growth of a landed gentry in the United States and provide land for
other than the first born sons. The need is for action to prevent the
growth of a corporate gentry; and prevent the continued holding of property by the corporation, a fictitious person with everlasting life.
The recession in Van Buren's time followed the destruction of the
Bank of the United States by Jackson and Jackson's specie circular to
stop speculation in government land. The recession in our time followed
the overstimulation of the American economy by a tax cut favoring the
rich in Kennedy 1 s administration. It came after Johnson 1 s policies of
guaranteeing both guns and butter, a period of a war stimulated economy,
an overspending administration and Congress, and an administration and
Congress unwilling to tax war profits and a growing wealthy class. It
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came after Nixon 1 s policies continuing to favor the rich and the poor
at the expense of the middle class.
Unemployment, started by decreased military spending, returning
G.I.s and increased by a strike at General Motors, became prevalent
with the oil embargo and continued losses to the auto industry. Inflation, already high, was fed by the oil embargo and what is commonly
referred to as the 11 Russian Wheat Deal. 11 The postwar recession was
made worse by continuing inflation.
In spite of the losses by many, the oil companies have increased
their profits. In the name of stopping inflation, banks have added to
inflation costs by increasing interest rates. Claiming that there was
a shortage of money to loan, increased rates made it possible for banks
to receive more interest money from less money loaned. The Federal Reserve Banking System, financed by its members and developing policies
to protect its members rather than customers, needs to have more competition.
A Bank of the United States, destroyed by Jackson to stop its competition with state banks, may need to be recreated to provide more
competition for the Federal Reserve System. The TVA, a government corporation, was created to compete with private utilities and provide
electricity at a lower cost. A Bank of the United States, recreated,
could compete with private banks and provide loans at lower interest
rates. Competition would be better than increased regulation and fixing loan rates. The threat alone might be sufficient.
Another method of improving the economic climate and of providing
opportunity for the coming generation of taxpayers would be to grant a
tax offset, dollar for dollar, to college students for money actually
spent for college tuition. This would encourage individuals to invest
in their own education and future and know that they would be repaid in
education, opportunity and money. This tax offset would be for the
student himself, not his parents. The present method favors the children of parents who can afford to send their offspring to college. It
does nothing for those whose parents cannot.
The student at tax time, whether in school or after he graduated
and had his first employment, could get refunds from his withheld income tax to be applied on tuition or loans for tuition. The maximum
tuition offset limit could be that of average instate tuition in the
state university system.
Since education tends to increase earning capacity, this offset
would be repaid many times over in later income tax. Additional funds
for educational opportunities could come from the apportionment of all
income from Federal estate and gift.taxes on a per capita basis to the
states to be used for education. These funds in turn could be apportioned by the states to the local governments in the same way and for
the same purpose. As additional funds were needed, rates could be increased.
Younger workers with less experience may have difficulty in finding
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employment because prospective employers may not feel that they can
earn the minimum wage. A scale of wages paralleling the gradual learning of an apprentice might come closer to matching comp-ensation with
production. A lower minimum wage might be paid to those eighteen years
old and the amount increased in yearly steps to the full minimum wage
at twenty one. This might increase the opportunity for younger individuals to gain initial employment.
A sheltered workshop similar to those found in Goodwill Industries
could be used to give employment to less efficient workers. The minimum wage established to raise the income and level of living of workers
and their families works to the disadvantage of these less efficient
workers.
Some potential employees are priced out of a job. They cannot
earn enough to be paid the minimum wage without financial loss to their
employer. Those last hired and the first fired tend to be the least
productive. They may need experience or training to be more productive.
They may need to learn good work habits.
Subcontracting of·production to a sheltered workshop paying lower
wages geared to the actual production of the worker could provide temporary employment for th~ unskilled or the less skilled. As these
workers gained in skill, dependability, and efficiency, they would be
preparing to compete in the labor market for at least the minimum wage.
Provision should also be made for more gradual retirement. Instead
of having full time work until a person reaches retirement age and then
have instant complete retirement, the potential retiree should gradually
decrease his hours of work until fully retired. He might drop from
forty to thirty to twenty hours a week and have two years of partial retirement. This would help not only with income but also with adjustment
to retirement itself. The broadening of the economic base of society as
a result of these actions would be conducive to an increase in political
democracy, the aim and purpose of exploring old and new approaches to
democracy.
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DEMOCRACY AND THE HOME
In the United States, democracy many times is taken for granted.
Almost forgotten is the fact that its principles must be taught and carried on from generation to generation. There is a tendency to think of
a democratic United States emerging suddenly full blown and forget the
time and effort responsible for its development. We need to be reminded
that our American heritage includes the democracy of the Greek city
states, concepts of proper forms of government and constitutions from
Aristotle, the power to tax controlled by the House of Commons, the traditional rights of Englishmen, experiences in colonial self-government,
New England town meetings, and nearly two hundred years under state and
national constitutions.
The social background is fully as important as the political for
the development of democracy because it shapes the participants, the
citizenry, the voters, and the officeholders, and also those who don't
vote or hold office. Children become politically socialized at a very
young age, much younger at times than we might expect. A woman was taking two boys to Church Primary. She was driving along the street and
the boys were riding in the back seat. They were a little late, and she
was driving forty miles an hour on a broad street with no traffic; but
they were going that fast in a twenty-five-mile-an-hour zone. Suddenly
they heard a siren. These boys, both three years old, began to sing
out, "Ya! Ya! Mrs.
is going to jail." At the age of
three, they had a concept of the results of lawbreaking; and they were
on the side of the law even at the expense of their friend.
Democracy and good government begin in the home and come from
principles that are taught and practiced. Joseph Smith.was asked years
ago how it happened that his particular group.of settlers got along so
well together. His answ~t' was, "I teach them the right principles and
they govern themselves."l03 The place to teach democracy is in the
home. Young people need to be listened to and realize that someone in
a position of authority hears their problems. This doesn't mean that
little ones will make the decisions of the home anymore than it means
that those under eighteen will be permitted to vote. However, there
are many times in the home when those under eighteen can make decisions
for themselves. There are other times when the parents and children can
make decisions together, Still other times it is more appropriate and
necessary for the parents to decide what is best for the family. A comparison in a political situation would be actions taken in a town meeting, other decisions made by Congress and still other decisions, particularly those in foreign affairs, made by the President alone.
However, in the family, just as in politics, there should not be an
abuse of power. In both places there are some, who once they get a little authority, will abuse it. Those who would, should be counseled and
checked; and if they abuse that authority enough, it should be removed,
for each individual having authority has certain obligations to use it
wisely. In the home at times, it means to correct sharply those in need
of correction, but only as much as is needed and not in anger. In government it means judgments and penalties for those breaking the law.
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Following correction comes rehabilitation, the showing of greater love
in the home, and the use of suspended sentences, probation or parole for
lawbreakers. Rehabilitation requires a joint effort, compassion on one
side, and recognition on the other side that along with rights there are
responsibilities. To be successful it requires an understanding on both
sides, that proper use of freedom earns the right to greater freedom and
responsibility. It means that no one, at home or in government, is answerable to himself alone, that he is not above the law in either case.
In fact, the higher the position the greater the freedom to do good or
ill and the greater the responsibility for those actions. Homes that do
not teach democracy and responsibility, those that teach special privilege, regardless of whether they are rich or poor, do not giv.e adequate
preparation for citizenship in a democracy. Instead they prepare a destructive element to such a society. They teach antisocial behavior and
are a detriment to society and government. There is no substitute for
teaching democracy in the home.
Certain minimum standards are essential in a home ·giving proper
preparation for democratic citizens. Food, clothing and shelter are
generally accepted as the bare minimum. Poverty level, defined in dol~
lars, does not go far enough. It says nothing ~bout the quality of life
or the concept of a suitable home. Too much emphasis has been placed on
direct money grants to the poor without sufficient recognition of the
inability of many of the recipients to use it even moderately well.
Poor nutrition is not the result solely of a lack of funds. It is due
in large part to the failure to use the money for a balanced diet. Alcohol and soft drinks are not an adequate substitute for milk. Poor
choices are made in other ways.
A suitable home requires more than just food, clothing and shelter.
Poverty is no excuse for filth. A lack of work is no excuse for filth.
A person on welfare not working outside the home should have time enough
to keep that home and the children reasonably clean and sufficiently
fed. They should have the time to teach the children to do some things
for themselves and learn some responsibility. If these things cannot be
done in some measure, that home is not suitable and the children would
most likely be better off elsewhere.
A home should not be broken up except as a last resort; but if the
health or well being of children are deteriorating because of the environment, malnutrition, abuse or neglect where they are living, that
place is no real home for them. Each child in every generation should
have the opportunity to develop to his or her· full potential. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals should have its counterpart--The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. Action in
cases of cruelty or neglect should not be taken without careful investigation, provision of social services, weighing alternatives and taking
sufficient time to avoid hasty or inadequate decisions. A man's home is
his castle, but which is more important, his privacy or adequate protection ·for children as well as animals. Whether it is the failure of the
parent or parents, social worker or the courts, something more needs to
be done to combat child neglect and abuse. Selection of social workers
who are compassionate without being too soft would speed up the action
to improve the child's situation.
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Some social workers have what might be called a defeatist poverty
syndrome which looks at the poor as unfortunate, second class citizens
who can 1 t be expected to live as high standards as others ,1 This tends
to support a lack of expectation of a type of living and morality compatible with a strong democracy made up of people who can take care of
themselves. Poverty and low morals don't have to go together, but when
they do, problems are compounded. This lack of expectations condones
living conditions which aid the continuance of the cycle of poverty.
The Work Incentive Program, enacted in 1967 and amended substantially in
1971, placed "about 65,000 welfare recipients into jobs where they
lasted at least 90 days. About half of those left welfare rolls com-·
pletely. 11104
More should be done to help individuals raise their own goals and
more should be expected from those receiving assistance. They too,
should work for what they get. More emphasis on the potential value of
the women in the home and the dignity of being a housewife might improve
care for the children and the conditions within the home. Changing the
terminology from welfare to workfare and from Aid to Families of Dependent Children to Child Care Income with a parallel change in thrust might
also lead to bette~ child care, healthier and happier children. This
program, originally called Mothers Aid when started by the states, was
changed by the Social Security Act to Aid to Dependent Children to emphasize that children were the primary concern. This was also done because the new terminology had greater public appeal. Why not carry this
concept another step and use Child Care Income to denote not just rights
but responsibilities.
There would be a double responsibility for this program to be operated effectively. The first would be the care of the child or children
by the adult or adults in the home, and the second would be the allocation of funds to that home for that purpose. The assistance received
should not be considered as a gift, but as a paycheck with the sense of
respect that goes with that. But, being a paycheck, something should be.
expected in return, just as there are certain minimum expectations from
a baby sitter. If those who are poor through no fault of their own have
a right to be taken care of, those paying the bills and the children
themselves have a right to expect the recipients to do as well as they
can to provide the necessary child care. Following this philosophy, a
mother would be rendering a greater service staying at home and taking
care of her preschool children, than she would be working out and having
them reared.by a baby sitter. This does not preclude her working while
her children are in school.
Positive incentives such as honest praise, special recognition and
a bonus could be used to encourage better child care and better homemaking. Teaching the parent and children responsibility and dependability
will improve the education the child receives both at home and in
school. With a better education, job opportunities will improve. Three
significant factors in breaking the cycle of poverty are: knowledge,
dependability and sociability in .the sense of getting along with others.
It is necessary to have knowledge to be prepared tor a job and get it.
It takes dependability and good work habits to keep it. The ability to
get along with others helps to get a promotion. A good home can do much
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to develop these plus a good self~image which will add to the potential
productivity of the individual. Breaking the cycle of poverty is essential in relieving the frustrations of the lower class, in building a
bigger and stronger middle class and in perpetuating stronger families,
the basis of self-government and the means of limiting government that
it may be democratically controlled.
Social workers .cannot solve social problems by themselves; parents
and the courts among others have their responsibilities. Child neglect
and child abuse are not confined to the homes of the poor. In many of
the poorer homes there is far more love and understanding than in homes
having more funds. Homes broken through death, desertion or divorce
have special problems. Support should come first from within the family. If not given voluntarily, legal means ·should be used to compel
this support for children. While support cannot be required of relatives for the elderly, it should be sought on a voluntary.basis. A lien
should be taken on the property of the elderly receiving assistance for
the amount of assistance-granted. No ~laim could be enforced on this
property during the lifetime of the recipient or the surviving spouse.
Repayment to the government ~or assistance granted should come first,
for there is no justification for guaranteeing an inheritance, however
small, to a child who won't support his or her parents in time of need.
The recent change to Supplementary security Income for 5ge elderly
nearly doubles the number eligible from 3.4 to 6.2 million. 1
With its
huge increase in number of recipients and in cost, because of lower eligibility requirement including the dropping of the property lien, SSI
shifts more welfare cost and administration to the National level and
increases the Federal bureaucracy. State employees are being hired by
the Federal Government to do their same type of work for higher salaries. Federal requirements that grants remain at least at the same
level have made it necessary to continue the state system for supplemental grants to supplement Supplementary Security Income. If the above
seems to be redundant, that is what is intended--to show the waste, inefficiency, duplication and extra expense of SSI. ''The central computer system that was supposed to control the nation's first venture
into a federalized welfare program collapsed during its first year of
operation. 11106 Two others were established in turn when each failed.
In the last two and one half years clients were overpaid by $622 million.
Laws should ·be passed to strengthen the home and provide better
homes for the neglected and abused. More should be done to strengthen
family ties between parents and children. Drawn in many directions, the
modern urban family is losing much of its influence on its children.
The generation gap arises in part because the family is not together
enough to communicate. Effort should be made to have the immediate family together socially at least once a week. Laws enacted against immorality, laws protecting children and enforcement of these laws to eliminate the bad do not do enough to eliminate the causes of immorality
and abuse. Positive efforts to strengthen the family gets at the core
of the problem, the original neglect of the child. Counseling, home
making advice and assistance can do much to make a house a home. Continuing present services and adding to them along these lines can do
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much toward developing the right kind of family. The right kind of family, caring for its own, teaching and practicing democracy, and living
a respectable standard of morality can do much to prepare prospective
citizens to be law abiding and self-sustaining. This, too, is the essence of democracy.
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CONCLUSION
This combination of old and new approaches to democracy and a return to colonial and early constitutional princip.les would establish the
framework within which the middle class and others could present their
problems in a systematic and democratic fashion. The channels would be
there not only for the gradual development and change of policy, but
also for the gradual development and change of leaders. The channels
would be there for sufficient feedback to make possible the ultimate
control of government by the people, the essence of democracy. Elitists
and so called practical politicians will say, 11 1 know, but politics just
does not operate that way. 11 Robert Michels saw the difficulty in maintaining democratic control as he developed his theory of the iron law of
oligarchy. He.said, "Nothing but a serene and frank examination of the
oligarchial dangers of.democracy will enable us to minfBtze these dangers, even though they can never be entirely avoided. 11
Madison, recognizing t;he nature of men knew that a "number of citizens, united and
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest adverse to
the rights of other ~igizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of a community11 O .would develop into a .faction. Re worried about
these factions being represented and judging their own causes which
could lead to bias and corruption. He went on to say, 11 It is vain to
say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests.11109 He developed checks and balances to control the effects of
factions. 110
Michels in pursuing dangers to democracy further said, "rlhen democracies have gained a certain stage of development, the! ~ndergo a
gradual transformation, adopting the aristocratic spirit!' 1 ''Bigness in
business, together with parallel developments in other sectors of society has moved us away from pluralism to a pluralism of elites. 11 112
These factions and elites are not being controlled.
Dye and Zeigler say in The Irony of Democracy
• • • that the responsibility for the survival of liberal democratic values, depends upon elites, not masses • • •
We have observed thet both the procedures of the democratic
process and the values of liberal society are not widely
shared by the masses of Americans and are occasionally abandoned by America's elite~.ll3
If the term masses· refers to many from the middle class, it is inaccurate. If it refers to the lower class, it is more appropriate. The
lower class, not having shared much in the benefits of liberal democracy, has not yet had the feeling of its value. As individuals from
that class move up and gain more social and economic rewards, they gain
a sense of loyalty to the democratic system. In like manner, as those
from the middle class move up and are absorbed by the upper, more privileged class, they forget its benefits and gradually lose their appreciation for it. In contrast, the newest members of the middle class,
like the newest citizens appreciative of their newly won gains, are apt
to be the most loyal. The new black middle class may well be such an
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example.
The more privileged class, the elitists, are aped by their newest
members. The nouveau riche, sure that they have earned their way regardless of the means, have little feeling for others still in the middle class. Elitists in general, and self-made elitists in particular,
tend to be nondemocratic. They are most liberal in looking out for
their own special interest, not the interest of the majority. Political
donations in the 1972 election campaigns, Presidential and Congressional, but particularly Presidential, are prime examples.
In a discussion of elites and counter elites, the needs and
strength of the middle class are commonly overlooked. Its apparent political weakness and other weaknesses are magnified and multiplied.
Seldom does the middle class receive due credit for its contributions
and accomplishment. The mass media is looking for the unusual and the
spectacular. Society is geared to lavish high praise on those coming
in first. Insufficient credit is given to others who have done their
very best and have given their utmost. Too much emphasis is placed on
competition and not enough on cooperation. For some, competition gets
the better of Christianity. The contributions of the middle class, individually not always spectacular, but collectively considerable, merit
recognition and appreciation. Not motivated as much by greed as the
upper class, or by frustration as the lower class, able to muddle
through and adjust to most difficult situations, resilient and generally
passive, occasionally aroused and momentarily politically powerful, the
middle class can vote to throw the rascals out. It knows what it does
not want and will set limits if the elite and special interests do not.
This nation, still potentially great if self controlled and self directed, will lose much of its greatness if controlled by elitists and special interests to be kept, sold or betrayed to the highest. bidder. The
place to start talking about democracy is with faith in the people to
rise to challenges, choose leaders, develop leadership and govern themselves. Otherwise the concept of democracy has no meaning. Likewise
the extension of suffrage and the election process would have no value.
Who are the people? The majority of the people in the United States are
in the middle class. This middle class and its needs have been overlooked. It may need its own party. This party might be called the Constitutional Party. Disillusioned by what can happen to and through our
present government and parties, voters may gradually feel that the time
has come for a center or middle party to provide new direction and give
this country a new lease on life. Evidence of discontent with both the
Democrat and Republican Parties has been seen in the growth of a new
Populism. Newsweek in its issue of October, 1969, reported, "This is
the year of the New Populism, a far-ranging, fast spreading revyl~ of
the little man against the Establishment at the nations polls. 11
Conditions since that time have deteriorated even more. Discontent is increasing not only with those in the lower income bracket, but also those
in the middle income group. As inflation decreases their earning power,
dissatisfaction will become even more widespread. As the dissatisfaction spreads, the base of opposition to the present major parties will
be broadened, unless one or the other meets these growing needs and absorbs this growing number of discontented voters. A source of· leadership and core of members could come from young people looking for job
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opportunities to grow and develop over the years. Struck by inflation
and diminishing buying power, the consumer and home oriented voters will
seek more protection and a party that would meet their needs. Continuing inflation will drive more older middle class-persons in the same political direction. Following the traditions of the agrarian movement
and the Populist Party, a middle party would attempt to reestablish democratic control of big business and big government. It would also seek
methods to protect the general interest from special interests. Without
the political protection and renewal of the middle class, the middle
class-may decline. The decline of the middle class would leave the extremes to fight it .out. Should this happen, the final result might be
a dictatorship of the right or the left with place for little or no democracy. Is this to be .the fate of our country or will the United
States -government be redemocratized, rejuvenated and redirected toward
the economic and political liberty of the great majority of the people,
the middle class; including, through a recycling of wealth, ample opportunity for the youth of coming generations and the lower class. This
recycling should also be designed to retain a sufficient amount for giving reasonable recognition and reward to the older and renewing elite.
But won't these changes require too much control and won't they be too
drastic or too sudden? An analogy may be helpful in putting the answer
into perspective •
.Pets in a home or pets in society have to learn self-control or be
taught. It is important in both places to let them know who is.master.
Once this is accomplished, home and society are much more livable. Even
the pets become-more lovable and less subject to harsh treatment, providing the master has sufficient self-control. Neither the people in a
. democracy nor the master of pets should be abusive. Control in both
places should be adequate but at a minl.lllum. Jefferson said, "That government is best which governs least." Fully as important but unsaid
was, ''and still governs."
Methods of achieving democracy old or new may not be readopted or
even used for the first time. This does not mean that they should not
be considered, to be accepted or discarded on merit as they relate to
the political setting. Rate of change is significant. Timely, gradual
change is preferred to delayed upheaval. If it is going to take a thousand years to accomplish something of value, then at least a thousand
years ago or now at the latest is the time to start. SetFing the tone
for increased democracy and strengthening the middle class can help
those tempted to take advantage of either, recognize the need for selfcontrol to avoid the appearance of abuse. For the appearance of abuse
would bring retribution and greater control from other elements of society and government.
Gradual readjustment would be necessary to avoid undue hardship.
True greatness would have to be found outside the political and economic
spheres which in and of themselves are only a means to a higher end, the
growth and development of each and every individual within the society,
the real goal of a true democracy.

111

For forms of government let fools contest
That which is best administered is best.
Alexander Pope
Administration is important. It does depend upon who is in the
driver's seat and the way a vehicle is driven. But the best driver in
the world can't make a cheaper car ride like a Cadillac. The form is
important and needs to be revised by revising the Constitution. By revising the Constitution the passengers can have more to say about who is
in the driver's seat. Back seat driving properly done can have an important and significant role, for the passengers have a right to say
where they are going, because they are paying the bills. The driver has
the title and the responsibility and has the most to say about the details of driving. But the passengers who are paying the bills should
set the general direction and prescribe the limits. They know when they
are going too fast and when they are going in the wrong direction. At
times they may not know the details of what they do want, but they can
and will surely tell what they don't. The final control is theirs and
the American voter is highly competent to fulfill that task.
The driver, himself, is important. He does not own the car, but is
selected by the passengers from candidates with known qualities. But
can you ever know enough about him? Can he ever have enough experience
and ability to traverse the· challenging terrain of tomorrow with its
congestion, its upheavals, its dens of iniquity as well as its promised
land over the horizon. The line of travel must be chosen well for there
are no short cuts. There will be storms, floods and detours, but we
will never arrive at the proper destination by going very long in the
wrong direction. We won't find freedom by heading where there is little
or none. Nor will we make progress if the vehicle is so cumbersome that
it can 1 t be maneuvered with some measure of precision. The vehicle>
too, will require proper care. We don't want to end up with nothing but
junk or spend so much on the vehicle that there is little left for a
home or the people who wish to inhabit it.
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THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS REVISED
(New material underlined.)
We the People of the United States, in recognition of the·innate
to~ Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do reestablish this Constitution as revised for the
United States of Ame~ica and do dedicate ourselves to support it-and the
government established thereby.
worth of each and.every individual and in Order

Article I
Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a House of
Representatives.
Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen for six years by the People of the several States, and the
Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requiSite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the
first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three
Classes. The seats of the Representatives of the first Class_ shall. be
vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at· the
Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration
of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year.
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to
the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the ·
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of the
district within that State in which he shall be chosen. No Person shall.
be elected to this office more than three times or serve more than
twenty years.
Representatives shall be apportioned-among the severer States which
may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers. The actual Enumeration shall be made within· every Term of ten
Years, in.such Manner as they shall be Law direct. The Numbec of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each
State shall have at Least three Representatives.
lolhen vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof may·make temporary appointments until such po7·
sition can be filled at the next annual election. The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other Officers; shall elect
the Attorney General of the United States fo~ a six .year term; and shall
have the sole Power to try all impeachments. Such trial shall be conducted by a committee made up of one member from each state chosen bv
that state 1 s delegation. The Attorney General of the United States 1
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together with a committee chosen by the Presidential Council. shall con.duct the prosecution. At the end of the hearing the findings shall be
presented with recommendations to Congress for final consideration and
vote. A two thirds concurrent majority shall be necessary for conviction. The two thirds concurrent majority shall include two thirds of
the members voting, assuming a quorum, plus a majority of members from
each of two thirds of the states.
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office
of honor, trust or profit under the United States: but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial,
judgment and punishment, according to law.
Section 3. District Councilors shall be apportioned and elected in
the following manner, There shall be five Councilor districts within
each Congressional district, the boundaries of which are to be determined by the state legislature. District Councilors shall be elected
for two years starting in 1980 and in every second year thereafter.
No person shall be a District Councilor who shall not have attained
to the age of twenty one years, and have been five years a citizen of
t;he United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of
that district in which he shall be chosen. No person shall be elected
to this office more than ten times or serve more than twenty years.
District Councilors shall .be elected to observe Congress and its
members, represent their constituencies to Congress. its committees and
to the executive branch; as Congressional District Council advise their
respective Congressman and· as State Congressional District Council cooperate with their state legislature to represent such state legislature
to Congress. These District Councilors shall also function as the electoral college for President and Vice President when no candidate receives a majority of the electoral vote.
Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators, Representatives and District Councilors, shall be prescribed
in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any
time by Law make or alter such Regulations.
'nle Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such
Meeting shall be on the third day of January, unless they shall by law
appoint a different Day. Members shall take office the third day of
January following their election.
Section 5. 'nle House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns
and QualificationS""Of its own Members, and a Majority shall constitute
a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to
day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members,
in such Manner, and under the Penalties as each House may provide.
To facilitate the dispatch of business, there shall be established
three Rules Committees with concurrent jurisdiction and three Committees of the Whole with concurrent jurisdiction. Business shall be
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scheduled from Monday through Friday. Adjournment from day to day may
be authorized by a two·thirds vote. Such adjournment or recess shall
not be counted in the ten days allotted to the President for consideration of billS.
To insure that special interests are not over represented, a majority of the members of each standing committee. apportioned between parties in the ratio of party members in Congress, shall be chosen by lot.
The remaining committee members, apportioned between parties in the same
way, shall be selected by their respective Congressional party organizations. The chairman of each committee shall be elected by the majority
party members of the committee through secret ballot.
The House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members-"for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member.
The House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, -excepting such Parts as may"in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members on-any question
shall, at the Desire of one fifth of the present, be entered on the
Journal.
Section 6. The representatives shall receive a Compensation for
their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury
of the United States. They shall in all Cases, excep-t Treason, Felony
and Breach of ~he Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of the House, and in going to and returning from
the same; and for any Speech or Debate in the House, they shall not be
questioned in any other Place.
~District Councilors shall receive a Compensation for their services. to be ascertained by Law. and paid out of the treasury of their
respective States to be reimbursed fully from the treasury of the United
States.
No Representative or District Councilor, shall, during the time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been crested, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of the
House or a District Councilor during his Continuance in Office.
Section 7. Every Bill, except as specified below in this section.
which shall have passed the Rouse of Representatives by a concurrent majority made up of a maiority of members voting, assuming a quorum. plus
a majority of the members voting from each of a majority of the states
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the
United States; if he approves he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to the House, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal,""""Bri'd proceed to reconsider it. If after
such Reconsideration, a two thirds concurrent majority of~ House
shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall become a Law. But in all such
Cases the Vote of the House shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and
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the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of the House. If any Bill shall not be returned by
the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have
been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he
had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
Every Bill. Order or Resolution to which the concurrent vote of the
House of Representatives may be necessary es specified above, Which
shall receive either the votes of majority of the members voting, assuming a quorum, or the votes of a majority of the members voting from each.
of a majority of the states, but not a concurrent majority. shall be recommitted to committee for further consideration, revision, or recommendation.
Every Bill, Order, Resolution or Vote to which the concurrent vote
of the House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a questionof Adjournment, repeal of emergency power or removing exception to the
limit on size of corporations) shall be presented to the President of
the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by a two
thirds concurrent maiority of the Hbuse of Representatives, according
to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Section 8.

The Congress shall have Power

To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general welfare of the ·
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States;
To borrow Money on the Credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes;
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and
fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and
current Coin of the United· States;
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries~
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,
To define and Punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high

122

Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, .but no Appropriation of Money to that
Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a ·Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval forces;
To provide for calling for the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress .Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for ·organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment
of the Officers, and thaAuthority of training the Militia according to
the discipline prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over
such District (not- exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the ·Seat of
the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over
all Places purChased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in
which tbe Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
.into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
To elect the Attorney General for a term of six years and to frll
any unexpired term by special election;
To elect justices of the Supreme Court and choose the Chief Justice. subject to confirmation and decennial reconfirmation by the Senate;
To overrule decisions of the Supreme Court by a three-fourths concurrent majority. which shall include three-fourths of the members voting. assuming a quorum? plus a majority of members from each of threefourths of the states.
Section 9. The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it. ·
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Laws shall be passed,
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Pro-
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portion to the

Cen~us

or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the ports· of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels
bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties
in another.
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from
time to time.
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States:· And no
Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without
the Consent of the Congress,, accept of any present, Emolument, ·Office,
or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit
Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and·silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any. Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all
Duties and Im.posts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports·, shall be
for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws
shall be subject to the Reviai·on and Control of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in
Agreement or Compact with another State,
gage in war, unless actually invaded, or
not admit of Delay.

of Congress, lSy any Duty of
time of Peace, enter into any
or with a foreign Power, or enin such imminent Danger as will

Article II
Section 1. The Executive power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America subject to the advice of a Presidential
Council and the Senate.
The first election for President-Elect shall take place in 1982.
He shall take office as President-Elect January 20, 1983, and as President on January 20. 1985. Election and assumption of office shall occur
every sixth vear thereafter. Having served two years as PresidentElect, he shall thereafter hold office dUring one term of six years unless removed by death, disability, resignation, popular vote, or impeachment and conviction. The President-Elect and Vice President-Elect
shall be elected as follows:
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The District Councilors. functioning as.electors, shall meet in
their respective States, and vote by ballot as directed by the majority
of popular votes cast in each district for President-Elect and Vice
President-Elect; they shall name in their ballots the-per;on voted for
as President-Elect, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as
Vice-President-Elect, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons
voted for as President-Elect and of all persons voted for as Vi~e President-Elect, and of the~r of votes for each, which lists they shall
sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the- government of
the United States, directed to the Speaker of.the House;--The Speaker of
the House shall, in the presence of the House of Representatives, open
all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted.--The person
having the greatest number of votes for President-Elect, shall be the
President-Elect, if such number be a majority of the whole number of
District Councilors elected; and if no personhave·such majority, the
District Councilors shall be called in convention to choose the President-Elect by majority vote. The person having the greatest·number of
votes as Vice President-Elect shall be the Vice President-Elect, if such
number be a majority of the whole number of District CounC'ilorS elected,
and· if no person have a majority, the District Councilors shall be called
in convention to ~hoose the Vice President-Elect by majority vote. But
no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall
be eligible to that of Cabinet Secretary or Vice President of the United
States nor shall be elected President--Elect or Vice President-Elect.
The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and
the day on which they shall give their votes; whicb. day shall be the
same.throughout the United States.
No person except a natural born citizen shall be eligible to the
office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that office
who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been
fourteen years a resident within the United States.
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his
death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of
the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the
Congress may by law provide for the case of-removal, death, resignation,
or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a
compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the
period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive
within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of
them, nor from private sources except as interest from investments
placed in a blind trust prior to his accession to office.
Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the
following oath or affirmation:-- 11 I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States,
and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States."
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Section 2. The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
forces of the United States and of the militia of the several states
when called into the actual service of the United States. He shall be
given counsel and reports ·by the Presidential Council and the Senate and
reguest and receive reports and opinions from.the principal officer in
each of the executive departments, boards, or commissions and he shall
have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against.the
United States except in cases of impeachment.
He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. to make treaties and executive asreements, provided two thirds Of"""
the Senators concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with ·the advice
and consent of the Senate shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and all other officers of the United States, whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of
such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in
the courts of law, or in the heads of d~partments.
The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies by granting
commissions which expire upon disallowance by the senate, at the end of
one year. or upon appointment and confirmation of ·the office holder or
of a successor, whichever occurs first.
Section 3. He shall receive counsel· on a regular and freguent basis from the Presidential Council and Senate and from time to time give
to-the Congress information on the state of the·Union and together with
the Presidential Council recommend such measures as they shall judge
necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary. occasions, convene
Congress; he.shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States.
The President shall meet with the Presidential -COuncil in each and
every calendar month at the call of either the President or the Presidential Council acting by a majority vote. A refusal of the President
to meet with the P~esidential Council when so requested by a two thirds
vote of the Presidential Council shall constitute an impeachable offense. The agenda for such meetings shall be determined jointly by the
President and the Presidential Council. Priority of business shall be
accorded the President and the Presidential Council in alternate monthly
meetings. The President shall have priority in determining the agenda
for the first meeting in January. These constitutional reguirements
shall not preclude additional meetings or further determination of
agenda items by mutual agreement of the President and the Presidential
Council.

On one day each week the President shall meet only with those given
appointments by the Senate Appointments Secretary. Refusal of the Pres. ident to grant one day of appointments each week unless upon approval of
a two thirds vote of the Senate shall constitute an impeachable offense.
Section 4. The Senate shall be composed of three Senators from
separate districts within each state. elected by the people from that
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district. for nine years; and each Senator shall have one vote.
first election shall take place in 1981.

The

Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the
first election. they shall be divided into three classes with one member
from each state in each of the three classes. The seats-of the Senators
of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the third year.
of the second class at the expiration of the sixth year. and of the
third class at the expiration of the ninth year. so that one third may
be chosen every· third year.
No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age
of thirty years. and have been nine years a citizen of the United States
and who shall not, when elected. be an inhabitant of that district within that state in which he shall be chosen. No person shall be elected
to this office more than two times or serve more than twenty years.
When vacancies occur in the Senate from any state. the executive
authority thereof may make temporary appointments until such position
can be filled at the next annual election.
The Senate shall elect its own presiding officer and be judge of
the elections. returns and qualifications of its own members. It shall
have the sole power of impeachment.
Senators shall be ex officio members of any and all departments,
boards or commissions with full access to information as though direct-·
ing or being employed by that agency.
Section 5. A Presidential Council of the United States shall be
composed of fifteen members chosen from and by the Senate for nine years
in the following way. As soon as possible after being assembled, five
members apportioned by party on the basis of party membership in the
first class shall be elected by the members of their own party in the
first class for a term of three years; five members selected on a similar basis and in the same manner shall be chosen by class two members
for six years; and five members selected on a similar basis and in the
same manner shall be chosen by class three members for nine years. Subsequently on every third year successors shall be chosen in like manner
for nine year terms by members of their respective class. Vacancies
shall be filled for unexpired terms in the same way as above.
Section 7. The President, Vice President and all civil officers of
the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
Article III
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behav-
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ior, subject to reconfirmation on the tenth anniversary of the date of
assuming office and every tenth year thereafter, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office. This shall not be construed as limit1ng the obligation to pay taxes or to contribute to their
own retirement, They shall not receive within that period any other
emolument from the United States. or any of them, nor from private
sources except as interest from investments placed in a blind trust
prior to their respective accession to office.
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and T~eaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to Controversies. between two or more States;·--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the' Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction. In al~ the.other Cases before mentioned,
the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact,. with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as Congress shall
make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be
by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been cormnitted; but when not committed within any State, the
·rrial shall be at such Place of Places as the Congress may by Law have
directad.
Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only
in levying War against them or in adhering to their Enemies; giving them
Aid and. Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason,
but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

ARTICLE IV
Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Section 2.

The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
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Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
A Ferson charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime,
who shall flee from· Justice, and ·be found in another State, shall on
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be
delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the
Crime.
Section 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union; but no new State shall be formed without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have Fower to dispose of and make· all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States, and nothing in this Constitution shall be so
construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any
particular State.
Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of
them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
Violence.
Article V
The Congress, whenever by two thirds concurrent majority, shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on
the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case,
shall be valid to all Intents and Furposes, as Fart of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the
other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.
Article VI
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Fursuance thereof; and all Treaties·made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Representatives before mentioned, Senators, District Counciland the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several
States, shall be. bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to
any Office or public Trust under the United States.

~'
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Article VII
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the·press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Glvernment for a redress· of g~ievances.
This article is Rot to be construed to favor atheism over religion.
It shall not be construed to carry with it the right to toin organizations advocating the overthrow of government by force and violence without sacrifice of other rights available to other citizens. Rights of
citizens in a democracy carry with them corresponding·responsibilities
to support the democratic form of government and operate within its
framework.
Article VIII
A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free
State,·the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
Article IX
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any.house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law.
Article X
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article XI
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subjected for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. The term 11 person 11 in this amendment
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shall not be construed to include fictitious persons or corporations.
Patents or copyrights .granted, may also be taken sway as a penalty for
violation of the law.
Article XII
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compu~sory process for obtaining witnesses in his
faVor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Article XIII
In Suits at common law, ~ere the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, sha11 be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Article XIV
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Article XV
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
Article XVI
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
Article XVII
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
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Subjects of any Foreign.State.
Article XVIII
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shell have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
Article XIX
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United states,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges of il!Dllunities of citizens of the United Statesj nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The
term 11 person 11 in this amendment shall not be construed to include fictitious persons or corporations.
Section 2. No person shall be a Representative in Congress, Presidential Councilor. District Councilor, or elector of President-elect and
Vice President-elect, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States,~der any State, who, having previously taken an oath,
as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer
of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall
have given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a
vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 3. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Article XX
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State except for treason, impeachment and conviction of felony.
Article XXI
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
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from whatever source derived, .without apportionment among the several
States; and without regard to any census or enumeration. All personal
income taxes from income of less than $20,000--derived wholly from within that state with the exception of nontaxable retirement funds shall be
collected by the state within which that person"resides. All other Federal personal or corporate income shall be collected by the Internal
Revenue Service.
Article XXII
Section 1. The District constituting the seat of Government of the
United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct; a
number of District Councilors equal to five times the number of Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were
a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall
be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered for the purposes of the election of President-Elect and Vice
President-Elect, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall
meet in the District and perform such duties.
Section 2. The Congress shall-have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.
Article XXIII
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in
any primary or other election ~or President-Elect or Vice PresidentElect, for District Councilors, or for Presidential Councilors or ~epre
sentative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other
tax.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.
Article XXIV
Section 1. In case of tbe removal of the President from office or
of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice
President, the President shall nominate a person Constitutionally eligible to be President as Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a concurrent majority vote of Congress, or by a majority vote
of the District Councilors meeting in the capitol of their respective
states and voting by secret ballot.
Section 3.

Whenever the President transm1.ts to the Speaker of the
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House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to
him a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall
iie"""discharged by the Vice President as Acting. President.
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either
the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other
body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the· Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall inunediately assume the powers and duties of the office as
Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the
Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the
executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within;four days to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall
decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose
if not in session. If the Congress within twenty-one days after receipt
of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session,
within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds concurrent majority vote that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
Article XXV
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article ·
by appropriate legislation.
Article XX.VI
The Ratification of the Conventions of thirty-eight States, shall
be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the
states so ratifying the Same.
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